EU Referendum

Showing posts with label nuclear bomb. Show all posts

AIR+-+F-16+IAF+006[i-AIR+-+F-16+IAF+006]Yesterday, according to the great Sunday Times, Israel has drawn up secret plans to destroy Iran's uranium enrichment facilities with tactical nuclear weapons. Under the by-line of Uzi Mahnaimi in New York and Sarah Baxter in Washington, the newspaper further asserts that two Israeli air force squadrons are training to blow up an Iranian facility using low-yield nuclear "bunker-busters".

Nothing of this is new however. We have been reading reports of IAF practising a strike for some considerable time and, ten days short of a year ago, posted a picture of the IAF Squadron that would lead the raid. The IAF has also published a picture of one of what might be a back-up squadron (above left). And the idea of a nuclear strike on Iran goes back to at least October 2003 when the LA Times "revealed" planning for such an attack.

However, the Sunday Times, in that infuriatingly self-important way that so typifies the MSM, seems to think such plans are new. It is thus able to announce, "Revealed: Israel plans nuclear strike on Iran", telling us that they were prompted "in part" by the Israeli intelligence service Mossad's assessment that Iran is on the verge of producing enough enriched uranium to make nuclear weapons within two years.

Actually, this is also not new. Iran has been "on the verge" for some considerable time. But, as we pointed out in February last, it is producing a uranium bomb, which means it will be too heavy for its current or any known means of delivery in the foreseeable future.

This minor piece of information seems to have escaped the Sunday Times and nor have I seen it in any other MSM outlet. But it has an enormous significance in assessing the threat from Iran. Even if it could get a bomb together in two years, it would take several more before it could get anywhere close to developing a means of delivery that could carry the weight.

Another highly significant issue is the delivery to Iran by the Russians, which started last November, of the Tor-M1 air-defence missile systems. Time and time we have argued, not least here, that the presence of these highly capable missiles would tilt the balance of advantage against an Israeli airstrike, to the extent that, once deliveries are complete, it would no longer be an option.

This is something which the Sunday Times itself, when it was forecasting a raid by March 2006, thought important in December 2005 - but now seems to have forgotten about. It also seems to have forgotten about its earlier report in March 2005 that an Israeli strike had been given "initial authorisation", that too being announced in the same, breathless, self-important tones, the headline proclaiming: "Revealed: Israel plans strike on Iranian nuclear plant".

Once again, we have the same pair of journalists in the by-line, Uzi Mahnaimi - in Tel Aviv, not having yet moved to New York - and Sarah Baxter, in Washington. And, as for Mahnaimi, he is a very odd cove indeed.

Nevertheless, if an Israeli strike was likely then, as Mahnaimi then asserted, it is now - over a year later - highly unlikely, whether nuclear or otherwise. In the first instance, this is because it is evident that there is no immediate threat and, secondly, because the window of opportunity for a quick, pre-emptive strike is now closing, if not actually closed.

A grown-up newspaper might actually mention these issues, in the absence of which, you just know the story is a crock – one of these excitable, lightweight fillers that the Sunday Times uses when it wants to look important but actually does not have any hard news. The funny thing is that if this blog "revealed" such garbage stories in such a consistently breathless manner, we'd be laughed off the blogsophere.

COMMENT THREAD

Gauntlet%20008[i-Gauntlet%20008]"The West is losing patience with Putin" says The Daily Telegraph leader, railing against the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, even though the paper admits that there is, as yet, no evidence linking the poisoning of to the Kremlin. Nevertheless, that does not stop it declaring:

Until now, the West has tended to overlook Mr Putin's authoritarianism, largely for the sake of a quiet life. But there must come a point when our patience runs out. It is one thing to tyrannise your people; quite another to presume to do so on British territory.

Conspicuously absent from the newspaper, however, is the news for which The Times and many others find room – that Russia has begun delivery of Tor-M1 air-defence missile systems to Iran, confirming that it is proceeding with arms deals despite Western criticism.

This is an issue we covered in depth in January here and here, the implications of which are admirably summed up today by the Debka file:

The first of 29 Tor-M1 systems in the $700m deal have been delivered to Iran by Moscow despite US opposition to their sale of a weapon widely regarded as the most advanced of its kind in the world. Some Iranian and Russian air defense experts say its full deployment at Iran's nuclear installations will make them virtually invulnerable to American or Israeli attack in the foreseeable future. Therefore, no more than six months remain, until the Russian Tor-M1 systems are in place, for any attempt to knock out Iran's nuclear weapons industry.

link[i-link]Now, as Russia starts deliveries of the missile systems, a window of opportunity is closing. And it was to prevent this that the US, last spring sought UN support for an arms embargo on Iran, a proposition that received no support from the Europeans, who have taken the lead role in dealing with Iran and its nuclear ambitions.

Fittingly – and perhaps not entirely coincidentally - the news of the missile delivery (known as the SA-15 Gauntlet in Nato terminology) came on the same day as the ending of the abortive 18th EU-Russia summit in Helsinki.

Plans to launch negotiations for a new agreement on partnership and co-operation between the two sides have been aborted after Poland vetoed any deal, over a dispute about the hygiene standards of meat.

In a way, this just about sums up the European Union. Having egregiously failed to deal with Iran in any effective fashion and suffered a major diplomatic defeat, its famous "soft power" having become a laughing stock, it now retreats into squabbles about Polish veterinary standards and "cross border meat smuggling".

Nintendo[i-Nintendo]But it also sums up our media. The issue, in its own way, has echoes of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. If you think about it, Iran is poised to build a nuclear bomb which it threatens to use to destroy Israel. And, while the West ponders whether to take military action to prevent a holocaust, Russia steps in to supply missiles which close that option down.

Never mind though. If the Telegraph could not manage to report on real missiles, at least it found room – like a full half-page - to write about the Nintendo Wii (above), designed for the latest in "shoot 'em up" computer games. This confirms the paper's retreat into fantasy, as it finds a "toy" that it can actually deal with.

COMMENT THREAD

A Snatch Land Rover on fire after an IED attack[i-A Snatch Land Rover on fire after an IED attack]"While the world remains understandably transfixed on Lebanon and Israel, one fact bears keeping in mind: more people were killed in Iraq in the past two weeks than in Israel and Lebanon combined," writes Andrew Sullivan in The Sunday Times.

The numbers tell the story: 2,669 Iraqis lost their lives to violence in May. In June the number jumped to 3,149. Almost all the deaths were deliberate targeting of civilians. The attempt after the death of insurgent Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to assert the Maliki government's control of Baghdad — a police and military offensive in the capital — has been revealed as a failure within a few weeks.

In many ways, says Sulivan, the biggest story of the past fortnight may, in other words, have been missed. It was not the moment that Israel used "disproportionate” force; it was the moment when the West's inadequate force in Iraq was revealed as finally, irredeemably, insufficient to the task."

It is rather apposite, therefore, that in the Booker column today is a picture (above) which illustrates precisely one aspect of that "inadequate force… insufficient to the task". This is a burning Snatch Land Rover, which has been hit by a roadside bomb.

Booker recalls that I have been pointing out on this blog why these hopelessly inadequate patrol vehicles, which provide no protection against mines or roadside bombs, have been responsible for the deaths of more than a quarter of the 84 British soldiers who have been killed in action in Iraq. He also reminds us that in June, when this was first raised in the Lords, the defence procurement minister, Lord Drayson, insisted that these unarmoured Land Rovers provided "the level of protection we need".

Now that the MoD is to buy 100 Cougars (rather longer and wider than the RG 31s which it had earlier claimed were too large), Fraser Nelson, in his column in The Business tells us that "it quickly became apparent that the Snatch Land Rover was easily torn apart by roadside bombs." So, he writes:

Mr Browne negotiated an extra £40m from the Treasury for 100 US-made Cougar vehicles, which can survive such attacks, for delivery in November. As defence procurement goes, it represents lightening speed and an encouraging ability to change the mission depending on what is learned.

This, however, is not exactly how it looks to us. Although the vulnerability of the Snatch Land Rover indeed did quickly become apparent, it became so as early as 2004 and it has taken the MoD over two years to respond – in the face of counting evidence and unnecessary casualties. This hardly represents an "encouraging ability" to change the mission.

Apart from this, as Booker points out, welcome though this news is, even here the tale has a nasty twist. To meet the MoD's needs, it seems, the small US firm making the Cougars must delay meeting an order for similar vehicles for the Iraqi army. So the safety of British troops is to be bought at the expense of their Iraqi comrades.

This assertion is largely speculative for MPs are now on holiday for 76 days, and the MoD – which made the announcement the day before parliament broke-up for the holidays – cannot be grilled on this. But, while Defense Industry Daily points out that BAE Systems is using its United Defense plant for some of the production, we have no doubt that there must be some delay in producing the vehicles ordered for the Iraqi Army. If we are wrong, no doubt the MoD will now be quick to tell us.

The Buffalo IED hunter - the absence of which in the British armoury indicates the lack of aggressive intent[i-The Buffalo IED hunter - the absence of which in the British armoury indicates the lack of aggressive intent]More to the point, the purchase of what amounts to an improvement in passive protection does not indicate any change in tactics or strategic direction in southern Iraq. That would require equipment such as the Buffalo (pictured right) and a re-structuring of the Army, enabling it actively to hunt for IEDs, an increase of which would surely be the result of any attempt by the British to wrest control of Basra from the militias and bring the city under the control of Nouri al-Maliki's government.

While Andrew Sullivan does not deal with this situation, his piece does paint the bigger picture. He argues that the war in Iraq is being waged by Islamist Shi'ite militia and is, in some ways, the same war that is being fought out in Lebanon

The trouble is that, with British forces tied up in not fighting the war in Iraq, none are available for the projected "stabilisation force" on the borders of Israel, making Blair an impotent observer when it comes to really influencing events.

But, in many ways, although Lebanon is currently capturing the headlines, Sullivan argues that Iraq is much more important. The Hezbollah provocation, sponsored and armed by Iran, is dangerous in itself, he writes:

Combined with the developments in Iraq, it presages a real and new shift in power. If Tehran gains a Shi'ite mini-state with vast oil reserves in Iraq, if its nuclear programme continues unchecked, if its proxy fighters in Lebanon continue to show the tenacity and barbaric targeting of civilians that they have demonstrated so far, we have the makings of a war in the Middle East with Iran as the central player, vowing to rival Al-Qaeda as the spearhead of the new caliphate.

Sullivan adds:

The Israelis are aware of this because their survival depends on it. Their elimination as a people and a nation is a central tenet of Hezbollah’s and Tehran’s ideology. That is why their response in Lebanon, however awful the collateral civilian deaths and injuries, and however unsettling to the region, is rational from their point of view. It is disproportionate only if you ignore the existential threat that they increasingly face.

But it is to Bush that Sullivan directs his ire:

Bush's bungled, unserious Iraq occupation has given the Shi'ite Islamists an opportunity. In southern Lebanon they have opened a polarising second front. In southern Iraq they are gaining a new and potentially deadly base of operations. From that base, their true intentions will shortly become clearer. And the future darker.

However, southern Iraq is occupied and administered by the British. It is as much Blair's "unserious Iraq occupation" that is giving the Shi'ite Islamists an opportunity. And buying a 100 Cougars will not make any difference. Thus, while, rightly, we are all focused on Lebanon, it is still important that we should be looking the other way.

COMMENT THREAD

Israeil airstrikes on Lebanon - The BBC goes into overdrive[i-Israeil airstrikes on Lebanon - The BBC goes into overdrive]It is hard to decide which part of the British media that is more nauseating: the likes of the BBC, which puts out what is effectively Hezbollah propaganda (the website is, in fact, better) or the ignorant snootiness of the likes of Simon Heffer, known affectionately as the Hefferlump.

Let us set aside the BBC (as well as the Independent, fond though I am of Robert Fisk’s lunacies). In fact, given the choice examples of British coverage that Stephen Pollard supplies on his blog, it might be a good idea to ignore much of it. It is not a question of them taking an anti-Israeli line and supporting terrorism – they are entitled to that. They are not, however, entitled to equate the two. And they are not really entitled to write and pronounce with quite so much ignorance. On the other hand, several of their European brethren are equally bad and ignorant.

Let us concentrate on the Hefferlump who does not, as it happens, take the side of the terrorists. He is simply not interested enough in what goes on in the big bad world. The piece, entitled “A third world war looms - but Britain has no foreign policy” can best be described as a sort of curate’s egg. It is good in parts. Very few parts. Then again, judging by the largely inane comments posted by his readers, the bad parts have their fan club.

Margaret Beckett - an embarrassment[i-Margaret Beckett - an embarrassment]Let’s get the good bits out of the way first. It is undoubtedly true that Margaret Beckett is an embarrassment as a Foreign Secretary but so was Robin Cook with Jack Straw coming up close behind. And don’t get me on the subject of Douglas Hurd or Malcolm Rifkind.

In fact, the only half-way decent post-war Foreign Secretary we have had (actually the ones before the war were not that much better but it was a different world and you could get away with a lot more) was Ernie Bevin, who, as Mr Heffer reminds us, “spent his life as a trade union leader before, at a late age, entering government”.

In a way Beckett does not matter as Blair has been his own Foreign Secretary since soon after 1997 (probably since Cook’s ethical foreign policy collapsed around the government’s ears). Nothing particularly unusual in that. This country has had a number of prime ministers who, either formally or informally, conducted their own foreign policy. Margaret Thatcher did so periodically, others all the time.

The Boy King at PMQs[i-The Boy King at PMQs]Heffer is also correct in delivering a glancing blow to the Conservative Party, who appear to have no collective views on what is going on in the Middle East. As Tim Montgomerie pointed out on the Toryboy blog, Cameron did not raise the subject during the last PMQ before the summer recess. Judging by some of the comments, large parts of the Conservative Party think there is nothing wrong with that, one little lad (well, I have no idea of his size) even pointing out that this is all happening a long way away and has nothing to do with us.

The Conservative Party has, I believe, has a Shadow Foreign Secretary. He is believed to be the brightest of the bunch around the Boy-King. Have we heard any pronouncements from him on matters international, apart from the benighted EPP?

Blair acting the courtier to Bush[i-Blair acting the courtier to Bush]Anyway, back to the Hefferlump. I very much fear that he is one of those blessed baa-lambs that I have referred to in a previous posting. He seems not to have read or listened to that exchange between Bush and Blair, unexpectedly caught on the mike, in any detail. Yet it is very short and even Mr Heffer could have found time for that, though he seems to have been put off by that jocular “Yo!” used by the President.

Instead we get the usual stuff about the “master-servant relationship”, Bush’s poodle, yadda-yadda-yadda. Instead of which Blair must take “a more critical line with America” as the latter’s policies have been a disaster and we have been branded by it all, yadda-yadda-yadda.

It seems Mr Heffer has not noticed that, as we pointed out and as Fraser Nelson has written in this week’s Spectator (in case Mr Heffer is too grand to read blogs) Mr Blair does have ideas for a policy and he is always trying to foist it on President Bush. These ideas are all to do with multilateral activity and transnational organizations. They have failed in the Middle East and President Bush has, rightly, rejected them.

UN Peacekeepers in Lebanon[i-UN Peacekeepers in Lebanon]There are already UN peacekeepers in southern Lebanon. They have been there ever since Israeli troops moved out. They have not prevented Hezbollah from arming itself, stockpiling more arms from Iran or from lobbing thousands of rockets into north Israel (described as the northern part of occupied Palestine by the Speaker in the Iranian Parliament).

Another thing about Mr Heffer is that he has really important friends:

“As a former Foreign Office minister put it to me this week, American diplomacy is now a contradiction in terms.”

Well, of course, the Foreign Office and its political masters have done so superlatively well in the diplomacy stakes in the last few decades that they are entitled to sneer at the Americans. The history of our negotiations with the rest of the EU would be instructive reading on that score.

Mr Heffer and the former Foreign Office minister might be too grand to listen to my recommendations but I do really think they should read an article in yesterday’s Wall Street Journal Europe, entitled “Lebanon poses risky calculus”. It’s long but not too long and it analyzes President Bush’s and Secretary of State Rice’s reaction to the Lebanese crisis.

Unlike the last time events took this turn and Warren Christopher rushed off to win a cease-fire deal (and much good that did in the region), the present administration takes the view that long-term changes are necessary.

“Instead, when Ms. Rice ventures to the region as early as this week-end, administration officials say that her mission will be to build support for the effective crippling of Hezbollah, which has popular backing across southern Lebanon and has two ministers in the country’s government. The U.S. officials also hope the crisis could end up limiting the influence of Hezbollah’s chief sponsors, Syria and Iran.”

The article discusses the various problems that this policy might throw up, not least the possibility of a long-drawn-out battle on the Israeli-Lebanese border that could, quite conceivably, unite that famous Arab street against Israel and the United States, intensifying, if that is possible, anti-Western feelings.

Nevertheless, pace the Hefferlump and his friend the former minister, this is a sensible and imaginative policy, that is already bearing some fruit in the fact that outside Europe and the UN there have been relatively few voices that described Israel’s reaction as “disproportionate”.

Both the Australian and Canadian prime ministers have made it quite clear that they supported Israel’s right to self-defence and the word has gone round that Hamas and Hezbollah are acting as agents of Iran and, to a lesser degree, Syria.

As Michael Rubin wrote, while the original Gaza attack called forth condemnation all over the Middle East, the opening of the second front in Lebanon, had a very different effect:

“No longer subject to Syrian occupation, Lebanese officials spoke freely. The Middle East Media Research Institute translated many reactions. "Lebanon ... is not willing to be the spearhead of the Arab-Israeli conflict," former President Amin Gemayel said. "Hezbollah will have to explain itself to the Lebanese," Druze leader Walid Jumblatt told Le Figaro.

The independent Beirut daily Al-Mustaqbal quoted Lebanese Communications Minister Marwan Hamada saying, "Syrian Vice President Faruq al-Shara gives the commands, Hezbollah carries them out, and Lebanon is the hostage."

Nor did the wider Arab world rally in unanimity toward Hezbollah. "A distinction must be made between legitimate resistance and uncalculated adventures undertaken by elements [without] ... consulting and coordinating with Arab nations," the official Saudi Press Agency opined. Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul Gheit included Hezbollah rocket attacks in his condemnation of terrorism.

Even the Arab League, which seldom misses an opportunity to denounce Israel, offered only muted criticism. True, League Secretary General Amr Moussa condemned Israel's "disproportionate attack," after the July 15 meeting, but rather than just slam the Jewish state, Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, chided Hezbollah's "unexpected, inappropriate and irresponsible acts."

Delegates from Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait and the UAE backed Mr. al-Faisal. Ahmed al-Jarallah, editor of Kuwait's Arab Times, condemned both Hezbollah and Hamas in an editorial that same day, writing, "Unfortunately we must admit that in such a war the only way to get rid of 'these irregular phenomena' is what Israel is doing."”

In Lebanon itself the reaction has been mixed, as Al-Jazeera reports. Some of the politicians are wringing their hands, trying to explain that it is not fair that their country should be attacked, as they cannot possibly control Hezbollah.

Others, justifiably, bemoan the fact that once again they are getting caught between warring factions with Hezbollah being blamed for its provocative actions.

“There is anger at Hezbollah among many Lebanese who believe that its operation to capture soldiers on Wednesday invited Israel's military response, and some believe that Hezbollah is not acting in the interests of Lebanon.

Said Goksel: "If this carries on like this Hezbollah will turn up as the villain in this. This is not going to be healthy for this country. Forget national dialogue. Hezbollah has made it clear that it is not interested in internal politics."

But besides being a militia, Hezbollah is a political party popular with Lebanon's Shia community, and while much of Hezbollah's infrastructure can be destroyed, support for Hezbollah is likely to remain among the Lebanese Shia - the country's largest group.”

Even when other governments, such as the Iraqi called for Israel to stop “destroying Lebanon’s infrastructure”, there has been a distinct coolness about Hezbollah.

Some of this might be due to the despicable and deplorable American diplomacy. Who knows?

There are other issues here. Hezbollah, as Michael Rubin says, makes Arabs nervous because it is seen rightly as Iran’s tool.

“Even as Arab states routinely condemn U.S. foreign policy, they embrace the American umbrella. John Mearsheimer and Steven Walt, respectively of the University of Chicago and Harvard, may argue that "the Israel Lobby" perverts U.S. interests; but Arab leaders understand that the only countries the U.S. military has fought to protect in the Middle East were Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

The tiny Gulf emirates are defenseless without U.S. protection. There is hardly a state on the Arabian Peninsula that does not train with the U.S. military or welcome a small U.S. presence. But with U.S. congressmen proclaiming the defeat and vulnerability of U.S. troops in Iraq, and the Islamic Republic drawing closer to its nuclear goals, Tehran's stock is rising at U.S. expense.

The signs of Arab unease have been growing over the last 18 months. Jordan's King Abdullah II first raised alarm. In a Dec. 12, 2004 interview with Chris Matthews, he warned that the rise of Iranian-backed Shiite parties in Iraq could give rise to a Shiite "crescent" stretching from Iran to Lebanon. Abdulaziz Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, called Abdullah's comments "ridiculous," but the remarks resonated in Arab countries.

True, the Shiites might account for only 10% of the world's Muslims, but in the volatile region stretching from the eastern Mediterranean to Iran, the Sunnis and Shiites are near parity. That Shiites predominate in the oil-producing regions not only of Iran and Iraq but also in Saudi Arabia accelerates the fears.

Satellite stations throw fuel on the fire. A July 12 political cartoon in the Iraqi daily al-Mutamar depicted a man pouring gasoline labeled sectarianism into a satellite dish.”

In other words, he says, the Arab leaders are acknowledging that they can live with Israel and need the United States but Iran frightens them. Their apparently sane attitude proceeds from that rather than any real change of heart about Israel.

I am not sure this is such a great problem. After all, most alliances in history, as Mr Heffer’s friend the former minister would know, are formed by nations and countries that fear someone else more than each other.

Nor is that the complete story. As the article in this Sunday’s Business, which we have already quoted, points out, the Palestinians are being abandoned.

Fighting to the last Palastinian?[i-Fighting to the last Palastinian?]This is nothing new and is, in many ways, unfair on the Palestinians, who have been used as proxies by the various Arab states and leaders against Israel. I have never quite understood why the Palestinians accepted their role of everybody’s eternal victim. All those who preached the great crusade were willing to fight to the last Palestinian. When there was trouble, the latter tended to find themselves alone.

When the Hamas led PA found itself without donations from the West, the Arab response was very patchy and reluctant.

After all, the highest level of casualties inflicted on the PLO (later transmogrified into the PA) was not by Israel but by King Hussein’s Jordanian army in 1970 –71. Looking at what happened in Lebanon once the PLO decamped there, one might say that the King had been justified to exert all means to protect his country. And it is not over yet, as far as Lebanon is concerned.

It would seem that the Arab states and leaders have decided that it is not just Iran they are going to find hard to live with but also the permanent instability caused by the Palestinians and their various political organizations.

At each crisis, newspapers publish short interviews with assorted Arab shopkeepers, lawyers, students, anyone they can find, who shout their support for whoever is fighting Israel and the United States (usually the Palestinians) and their disgust with Arab leaders who will not support the fight. Each time there are doom-laden predictions about those leaders losing their credibility and, possibly, their lives.

Not only have these predictions not come true, but this time the opposition to Hezbollah and its behaviour is out in the open. Of course, I am careful not to make any predictions and if the fight is prolonged there might be some political realignments.

About the worst thing that can happen, I am sorry to say, would be a premature cease-fire administered by an incompetent UN peacekeeping force that leaves everything in the same position. We can then assume absolutely that the whole cycle will start again with Hezbollah a little better armed each time and with Iran a little nearer to that nuclear bomb.

Meanwhile, what of the EU? Well, some countries have been condemning Israel and calling for multilateral peacekeeping forces. In France, one politician, as the Dissident Frogman relates, has called for France to intervene against Israel. At the risk of possibly annoying Mr Heffer with my language (not that he would condescend to read a blog) I have to admit to thinking: “Yo! Bring it on!” I am afraid it will not happen. The French will not be facing the Israelis any time soon.

The EU, as Dan Bilefsky, something of a cheer-leader for that organization, sadly wrote in yesterday’s Trib, has not acquitted itself well. As ever, faced with a crisis, it had nowhere to go, though Javier Solana was flown by the RAF to Beirut, where he, presumably, went through his usual hand-wringing procedures. He did then go on to Israel and Egypt but nothing much has come out of it all.

Mark Leonard - out of his depth[i-Mark Leonard - out of his depth]As ever, Mr Bilefsky asked Mark Leonard, the wonder boy of the NuLab Europhile establishment. Mr Leonard was very upset:

“The EU is based on consensus and has a hard time responding during crises. And it is now floundering because all the previous givens and consensus on the Middle East have become obsolete.”

Dear me. Did Mr Leonard not tell us at length that the EU was a spectacularly unusual and successful institution, who was quietly influencing many countries “from Russia to Rwanda” and who was uniquely capable of dealing with the modern world, unlike those outdated nation states.

Now he tells us that it cannot deal with something so predictable as fighting between Israel and Hezbollah on the Lebanese border. What does it tell us about Mr Leonard and the Centre for European Reform that they actually believed the unstable situation of the last few years was a given and a consensus?

It seems likely, though one must not put it any higher, that Hezbollah and its patrons Iran and Syria miscalculated. They were clearly hoping to provoke Israel into a war. They are not very particular about the way they use civilians (especially Maronite Chrisitans) as shields. They were clearly hoping that the mounting casualties, most Hezbollah but some Lebanese, would bring the world in against Israel.

This has not happened. The UN may be huffing and puffing but otherwise, Hamas and Hezbollah are getting support from France, some European and a considerable proportion of British media, the BBC, Robert Fisk, Tariq Ali, George Galloway, the usual crowd of demonstrators in American cities and the moonbat blog The Daily Kos (kind of). There is also half-hearted support from Russia that is unlikely to lead to anything. As for the EU, one can only surmise that Hamas and Hezbollah leaders took it at its own estimation.

COMMENT THREAD

For an update on this post, see here.

The Viscount Brookeborough[i-The Viscount Brookeborough]And so it came to pass that their Noble Lords had their debate on defence yesterday and, in the nature of things, widely ignored it was by the media and the great unwashed.

It was in many senses a messy affair, covering too wide a range of subjects – from the nuclear deterrent to housing for the armed forces and all points in between.

One contribution which did stand out though was from the Viscount Brookeborough which, especially in the context of my earlier post, seems to make enormous sense. In the interests of fuelling our own debate, therefore, I am publishing the full text here:

While in Basra recently, I was struck by the similarity of certain operations to those that we carried out in Northern Ireland. But what really made an impression was the obviously low numbers of helicopters—less than half the maximum of 72 that we had in Northern Ireland. I have been involved in anti-terrorist operations in Northern Ireland for the past 30 years or so, and I saw some interesting parallels.

In Basra, in the multinational force area, insurgents are not normally suicidal. However, they have taken IRA technology—which is what it was—directly off the shelf. Suffice it to say, it is a device that noble Lords may have seen in the newspapers last week. It is called a PIR RC IED—a passive infrared radio-controlled improvised explosive device. It is almost certainly manufactured in Iran. It is not improvised—the device has been made by machines in a factory. The system of initiation enables extreme accuracy. That is why soldiers are being killed in Snatch vehicles. It is also capable of disabling tracked vehicles.

I am aware that we are developing counter measures. However, like Northern Ireland terrorists, the insurgents are most certainly developing the next generation of weapons to get round our counter measures. By the nature of things, we will always be slightly behind, so the problem cannot just be shuffled away, with the hope that there is a counter measure.

We were told by the Minister in May in answer to a Written Question that our service helicopter fleet was only 59 percent operational. That is seriously bad news; it is a disgrace within a modern Army. We were also told that there were 28 helicopters in Iraq, of which an average of 22 percent were not serviceable. Therefore, there are, on average, 20 serviceable aircraft in Iraq. This does not differentiate between the various capabilities. We were told that we had two Chinooks, eight Sea Kings, seven Merlins, five Pumas and six Lynx. I read a report about more Sea Kings going to Iraq, but I am not sure whether they are the right aircraft and whether we are not plugging a hole with the wrong nail.

If these helicopters are defined, rather vaguely, into "support/heavier lift" and "tactical/patrol deployment" categories, that would result in the Chinooks, Sea Kings and Merlins being in the support and heavy lift category, the Pumas being dual purpose and the six Lynx being the patrolling aircraft. This does not take into account the fact that seven may be unserviceable, spread over all types, or in extremes, all from one category. That is a possibility, but we hope it does not occur.

My observations are as follows. The 17 aircraft in the larger category and the Pumas in the second category are almost entirely used moving personnel and equipment between bases in the multinational force area in southern Iraq. That also includes providing aircraft to go to Baghdad occasionally. These tasks include administrative resupply, changeover of units, servicemen travelling to and from R&R and hospital visits. These tasks are important—in fact, they are essential. They have become a vital priority in maintaining our deployment, so they are not for giving up, day by day, in preference to something else.

That leaves the Lynx and sometimes some of the Pumas for all the other tasks, including operational patrolling, surveillance and general taxi work. Surveillance is important because our modern surveillance system—the successor to P3—fills up the back of a Puma. You cannot land it on the ground and pick up eight soldiers. That helicopter is operational for surveillance only.

At the very best, it would be difficult to ring-fence the use of more than eight choppers for eagle patrolling and tactical operations by troops on the ground throughout the whole of our area. Where the use of single aircraft is at high risk, it will have to be done in pairs, thereby reducing separate operations that may be supported by choppers at any one time.

In practical terms, regardless of the theory, if anyone suffers a reduction in heli hours due to serviceability, it is the soldiers deploying on routine operations—they may be routine, but they are highly dangerous in Iraq—and not the vital admin resupply and support. It is therefore true that an overall increase in helis, and therefore heli hours, by, for example, 25 per cent, would be seven aircraft. That could result in a 100 per cent increase in availability of choppers for supporting patrolling on the ground. That is not great and I do not understand why we are not doing it.

We have lost personnel increasingly while on mobile patrol. We had a very similar problem in Northern Ireland, and we had to put large areas completely out of bounds to mobile patrols. Where I live, across the main road, it did not matter what happened—you were not allowed to take a mobile patrol. We used covert patrol vehicles, but I accept that that is not an option for Iraq. We also used helis, but we had 72 before taking serviceability into account. They often had to operate in pairs. We must ask ourselves questions about the patrols, especially mobile patrols. Is a given patrol really necessary? What is the threat and why is the IED beside the road? Could the patrol be done on foot? If we have the heli hours, could we use helis to patrol at virtually no risk? Are the helis at risk?

There was a range of conclusions, which included the following. Obviously many mobile patrols are vital to achieve the mission, but occasionally, if you ask the questions carefully, it is found that the answer is that they are "not really vital". So why are we doing it? If the threat to a mobile patrol is an IED, then why did the opposition set it up? To protect something, or purely because the patrol would pass it? If the latter is correct, then there is no need to be there, and that is why the IED is there. That is a very simple but important argument.

If the patrol is on foot, it is easier, through tactics developed in Northern Ireland and now in Iraq, to protect themselves and control the environment around them. I shall not go into detail, but that is what occurs. If there are heli hours, eagle patrolling reduces the risk immediately. If helis are at risk, the use of helis in pairs enhances safety yet again. One helicopter operates while the other one watches. Two helis in the air can virtually freeze terrorist movement in a 2 kilometre-square area. The second one can react to any unusual activity. There are more ARFs—air reaction forces—in the air, day by day, which can react to other things occurring in the area.

In Northern Ireland, the threat to helis virtually disappeared when there was more than one of them in the air. There were occasions in County Fermanagh, where I live, when a patrol or OP was hit and there was not vital necessity for it to be there. There would have been no attack if it had not been on the ground at the time. If it was not in an ambush position, what was it doing providing a target? That is what some mobiles are doing.

While in Iraq, I asked a very senior person how the Iraqis will patrol when we leave and remove our technology, which is going to happen. I was told that the Iraqi mobile patrols did not seem to be targeted in the same way. We seem to be providing ourselves as a target, especially if an Iraqi patrol can do it. That is fact—it is what I was told.

If you ask a senior officer, "Are you coping with accomplishing your mission?", the answer will be yes. If he gave the wrong answer, you would probably remove him. However, if you were to ask, "If you were provided with substantially more helis, would it change your tactics and make it safer?", the answer would be a resounding yes and you would have a very happy officer. Incidentally, an increase in helicopters to Northern Ireland levels would increase those provided to soldiers by 600 per cent.

In a discussion on research for new vehicles in the other place on 26 June, the Secretary of State said:

"There are medium and long-term plans relating to vehicles, and I shall be considering what we can do to respond to the situation in the short term".

The review should already be under way. We are in an operational situation. How come we have just decided to do it today? The terrorists, or the insurgents, are already reviewing what we are trying to counter, and we are about to set up the review. I suppose that it is something. What are the Government doing when they say that they,
"shall be considering what we can do to respond ... in the short term"?

The "short term" is tomorrow. Something should already have been done. That debate was on 26 June. It is amazing.

Later, the Secretary of State said:

"Decisions on which vehicles to use on operations are for the commanders on the ground". [Official Report, Commons, 26/6/06; cols. 4-5.]

The commander can use only what he's got. It is a lovely turn of phrase, but if he had the helis, he wouldn't be in the wagon.

A number of those in another place and some commentators have asked about bigger or stronger vehicles, but I do not think that that is the right line to go down. We do, however, need a patrolling vehicle, because the type of IEDs being used will disable tracked armoured vehicles. What are you left with after such an incident? You are left with a marooned armoured vehicle. How do you get it out? If you cannot, you may have a riot situation. Or perhaps we do not need to worry about it because, after they have stopped killing people in the tracked vehicle, the crowd will ensure that the situation is sufficiently in hand to petrol-bomb the living daylights out of it. These vehicles are difficult to recover. All I will say is that these reviews are a bit late in the day, and we ought to get some of the 41 percent of choppers which are non-operational into the air pretty quickly.

I shall have more to add on this and other contributions to the debate, when I have been able to study it in more detail. I will post the forum link with the general debate on "Snatch" Land Rovers.

COMMENT THREAD

The Vanguard missile submarine - due for replacement[i-The Vanguard missile submarine - due for replacement]You have to give it to little Gordie. Not even prime minister yet (if ever) and he is already making the "big decisions". And they don't get much bigger than deciding to renew Britain's "independent" nuclear deterrent.

That certainly has got the BBC nicely worked up, and the Guardian too, not least because the estimates of the cost vary from £10bn to £25bn, depending on what type of new missiles or submarines are chosen.

In fact, generally, Mr Brown was very robust about his future defence policy in his Mansion House speech last night, declaring that he would be, “Strong in defence in fighting terrorism, upholding Nato, supporting our armed forces at home and abroad, and retaining our independent nuclear deterrent." For all the world he sounded just like Liam Fox, complete with exactly the same commitment to Nato – thus, ostensibly kicking European defence integration into touch.

British warheads for the missiles - but French explosives[i-British warheads for the missiles - but French explosives]But, Brown's declaration will also renew the argument about whether the deterrent is truly independent, not least because the missiles will be made by the US – probably Lockheed Missiles and Systems - and we will be beholden to the US for the supply and then the ongoing maintenance.

As before though, we will be making the warheads – which gives us the notional indpendence, except for one very important difference. As we recorded in November last year, the last remaining military explosives factory in the UK is being closed down, and the production transferred to France.

Included in that transfer is the vital and very special technology for making the conventional explosives which are required to trigger a nuclear bomb, without which we will have no deterrent at all.

If Mr Brown wants his "independent" nuclear deterrent, therefore, he had better not be too robust about his support for Nato. Au contraire, he will need to be very, very nice to the French - or he won't get his bombs. I wonder if anyone has bothered to tell him this?

COMMENT THREAD

UN-acceptable[i-UN-acceptable]The response to the MEPs who are junketing in the Middle East and who were convinced that they can create some kind of diplomacy that would sort out the Palestinian question has been swift, as has the reaction to funds being offered to the Palestinian Authority by Iran and Russia. A suicide/homicide bomber killed himself and eight other people and injured 49 in Tel Aviv.

Responsibility is variously being claimed by the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ brigade (the “militant wing” of Fatah, which is rather unhappy at the turn of political events in the Palestinian Authority) and by Islamic Jihad. Hamas, of course, keeps telling us and this is repeated by somewhat naïve Western commentators, that they have agreed to a cease-fire and are keeping to it.

That does not mean, in their opinion, that they should in any way constrict the activity of Islamic Jihad who has not agreed to anything like a cease-fire, has consistently fired rockets into Israel and has now, possibly, sent a suicide/homicide bomber into Tel Aviv.

Nor has Fatah ever bothered to control or disarm Al-Aqsa. Speaking of the bombing, Hamas representatives all repeated the same line: this was legitimate activity in the face of Israeli aggression, by which they seem to mean the withholding of tax money until Hamas agrees to recognize Israel’s right to existence and definitely eschews terrorist activity. Also, it was self-defence.

It is important to emphasise that the bomb went off in Tel Aviv, not in the supposedly disputed territory. But, as one has to keep repeating, all Israeli territory is disputed by Hamas and their latest, though somewhat inadequate, paymaster, Iranian President Ahmadinejad.

In the meantime, the American Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) has published a report, which says that

“Iran has expanded its uranium-conversion facilities in Isfahan and reinforced its Natanz underground uranium-enrichment plant”.

There is, as we know, growing speculation about possible American military action and, even, some discussion of Israeli action. Ahmadinejad, having at various times told the IAEA to stop bothering him, the Israelis that he intended to wipe them off the map and the Americans that they were courting disaster if they attacked him, has also said that an attack on the Iranian nuclear plants would be answered by scores of terrorist attacks by suicide bombers.

Naturally, we have to take threats like that seriously. But it is worth pointing out that there have been no Iranian suicide bomber attacks anywhere. Ahmadinejad’s calls for a jihad against the infidel and, in particular, Zionism have always made it clear that this was to be conducted by the Palestinians.

Unsurprisingly

“U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan also warned that U.S. military intervention in Iran was not the best solution to resolve the nuclear standoff”.

It is not clear what his alternative proposal is. After all, Iran is a highly valued member of the United Nations. Last Tuesday, on the day, Ahmadinejad boasted about Iran powering ahead (if one may use such an expression) with its nuclear reactors (nobody seems to be mentioning any more that they are there for peaceful purposes only), the United Nations Commission on Disarmament elected Iran as the deputy for Asian nations. This is in the supposedly reformed United Nations. Personally, I cannot wait to see who is chosen to be on the new Human Rights Council.

And while we are on the subject of the United Nations, one cannot help wondering why Claudia Rossett was not awarded a Pulitzer Prize for her patient unravelling of the far-reaching and deep-seated corruption in the UN. Instead, the awards, apart from the probably well-deserved ones to various regional and local newspapers, went to journalists on the New York Times, the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times. Again.

COMMENT THREAD

Actors holding vials of enriched uranium (supposedly) in a theatrical celebration of Ahmadinejad's announcement[i-Actors holding vials of enriched uranium (supposedly) in a theatrical celebration of Ahmadinejad's announcement]It is all very well for Ahmadinejad to announce that his scientists have been able to produce enriched uranium but, as the Americans point out, we have no means of knowing whether this is true, or merely bluff and bluster, calculated either to improve Iran’s international negotiating position, or for domestic consumption – or a bit of both.

As US state department spokesman Sean McCormack said, "At this point, I can't confirm any of the technical details. There is a lot that goes into a technical assessment of where the Iranians might be in their capability in operating a centrifuge cascade, whether it be a small one or a large one ... I couldn't offer an assessment for you as to where they stand in that process."

If indeed Iran has succeeded with the enrichment process, at 3.5 percent, this is a long way from producing weapons-grade material in sufficient quantities to make a nuclear bomb and, as we have pointed out before, there is a massive leap in technology required to turn this into a bomb. There is then yet another leap before a reliable delivery mechanism can be produced.

Madman or what? - Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad[i-Madman or what? - Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad]Either way, in his prancing and preening, Ahmadinejad is playing a dangerous game and, despite the BBC's attempt to turn this into an US versus Iran conflict, with the peace-loving EU member states mediating, the fact is that the US – short of Israel for the time being – is the only nation with the means to mount effective military action against Iran, should Ahmadinejad go completely off the rails. Therefore, we can be thankful that the US is clearly developing contingency plans – it would be irresponsible of it not to do so.

Needless to say, left-wing columnists – like the increasingly mad Simon Jenkins - blame "western provocation" for Iran's actions, while others point to the sinister role of Russia and Saudi.

Remarkably, no-one seems to be mentioning the role of Russia in arming Iran and the possibility of an independent Israeli response is not being discussed either, although it must still be on the cards.

Altogether though, it is fair to say that no-one really knows what is going on in this troubled region, and we take little comfort that our ignorance is matched by that of the state department. The one thing of which we can be sure, however, is that cannot serve the interests of stability and world peace for Ahmadinejad to be playing to the gallery.

COMMENT THREAD

straw%20iran%202[i-straw%20iran%202]The Business has managed a singular achievement today in recruiting an American writer, James Forsyth who, in writing about Jack Straw and his wholly malevolent role in the Iran crisis, seems to display some understanding of British politics.

The piece, entitled The Straw that won’t break Tehran’s back, argues that, to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons, the West must convince the authorities in Tehran that it is prepared to use force.

But, writes Forsyth, one politician keeps getting in the way of this strategy and making it seem that force would never be even an option: Jack Straw, the UK Foreign Secretary, whose words keep reassuring the Iranians that they can do whatever they want.

The thesis, which suggests that Straw is playing to the anti-war elements in his own party, and his shrinking support in his own constituency, is well argued and convincing, and well worth a read.

In addition, it is also worth remembering that Straw is a man who, at best, can be described as having very poor judgement, viz his recent visit to Tehran. It was while there that he shook warmly by the hand Esfandiar Rahim Masha'ie (pictured), otherwise known as “the Butcher”, for the cruelty he exhibited in Tonekabon in the 1980s.

Forsyth suggests that Blair should reshuffle Straw at the earliest opportunity. Until he is removed from the foreign office, it will be impossible to persuade Iran president Ahmadinejad that the West is serious about him acquiring the bomb, thereby making armed intervention more likely.

That is too kind a fate for Straw, but at least it would be a start. He is truly a man we could do without.

COMMENT THREAD

shahab3_001[i-shahab3_001]A disturbing report was published in the Jerusalem Post yesterday, suggesting that Iran has already enriched enough uranium fissionable material to manufacture at least one or two atom bombs

Their source is Rafi Eitan, a former Israeli intelligence chief who believes that Ahmadinejad "would not have dared come out with his declaration that Israel should be wiped off the map," unless he already had the means to do so. Eitan was involved in the secret planning and implementation of the attack on the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor in June 1981.

Although he is now eighty, Eitan is still active and still in touch with the intelligence community, so it would be unwise to ignore completely his views. Furthermore, other sources report rumours of an Iranian "experiment" in March. But one does wonder.

Putting various strands together, for Iran to pose a credible threat to Israel, it must not only have a functioning bomb, but also a reliable means of delivery. And here, not all the pieces are falling into place.

shahab3-iran1[i-shahab3-iran1]The most likely delivery vehicle is the Shahab 3 missile, a much modified version of a North Korean missile, developed with Russian and Chines technical assistance. There are later versions, running to the Shahab 6 series, but only this model seems to have the reliability to pose a credible threat.

Then, although the distance between Tehran and Tel Aviv is just under 1,000 miles, at the limit of the missile's range, firing from either the western provinces of Ilam or Khuzesatan, close to the Iraqi border, would shave 200 miles off that distance and bring the missile well within range.

However, what is interesting is that the Iranians have opted for a uranium rather than a plutonium bomb, which means that they can refine the material without recourse to a nuclear reactor (the latter being the only source of Plutonium). The down-side of this is that a uranium bomb is heavier (and also produced a lower explosive yield).

Using uranium would also simply the design, enabling the relatively crude "gun" arrangement of the type employed in the first atomic bomb dropped by the Americans on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. Bit what must be remembered about that bomb is that it weighted in at 9,700 lbs, with a length of 10 ft and a diameter of 28 in. It also contained 140 lb of uranium.

Clearly, such a crude weapon could not be delivered by an intermediate-range missile like the Shahab 3, which has a maximum payload of a ton and serious dimensional limitations.

To enable missile delivery, the Iranians would have to produce a much more compact implosion device, which could be engineered to fit the limited warhead space of their missile.

However, the first design of this type was the American "Fat Boy", used on Nagasaki, and that weighed in at 10,800 lbs, with a length of 10 ft 8 in and a diameter of 60 in.

nuclear%20bomb.0[i-nuclear%20bomb.0]With all their skills and experience, the resources of the nation and no outside restriction placed upon them, it than took the Americans until 1966 to produce a lightweight implosion bomb, the B61 (pictured left). At 700 lbs, a length of 10 ft and a diameter of 10.75 in - with the actual nuclear device considerably smaller, this is the sort of development needed before the Iranians could fit out their missile. And, bearing in mind that this is a plutonium weapon, a uranium weapon would be heavier.

The technology required to produce this bomb is fearsome, not least the highly complex array of conventional explosives needed to trigger it, and to produce it would stretch Iranian capabilities and resources to the limit. Furthermore, such is the complexity that the Iranians would at least on live test to prove the design.

Even then, there have been doubts expressed as to whether the warhead dimensions of the Shahab 3 are sufficient even to accommodate a lightweight bomb, which raises further questions about Iranian preparedness.

Despite Rafi Eitan's concerns, therefore, an Iranian nuclear strike – or the acquisition of deliverable bombs - may be less than imminent, which raises questions as to why Eitan has gone public with his fears.

This could, of course, be part of the war of words, aimed at speeding up the reference to the UN Security Council, but it could also be part of the process of preparing Israeli and world opinion for a strike shortly after the Israeli general election, which is to be held on 28 March.

Whatever the truth, it looks like the possibility of an early Israeli strike cannot be ruled out, making the world of much more dangerous place than it was even a few months ago.

COMMENT THREAD

heffer[i-heffer]What is it with right-wing commentators? Yesterday, we observed that neo-con supporter Douglas Murray was suggesting the right action on Iran, for entirely the wrong reason.

Now, in the Telegraph today, we have Simon Heffer arguing that "Doing nothing in Iran is not an option", a sentiment with which we could not but agree.

As for his prescription, though, Heffer rightly observes that any military action against Iran, "whatever it is and whoever takes it," is likely to be provocative to the wider Islamic community. He also quite correctly notes that "none is likely to be quite so internationally combustible as a unilateral decision by Israel to bomb - by conventional or possibly other means - Iran."

The, says the redoubtable Heffer, seems to leave only one feasible option – "a United Nations-endorsed series of air strikes on suspected nuclear installations in Iran, made after due and reasonable warning and only as a last resort." All that must be made clear - but it must also be made clear, by the united powers of the United Nations, that any insistence by Mr Ahmadinejad on pursuing his present policy will be met with such a response.

At least Heffer does go on to say it is unlikely that "this happy diplomatic state can be achieved", which has to qualify for the understatement of the year. Russia is on the UN Security Council and thus holds a blocking veto, a country that is flogging billions-worth of arms to Iran, selling it nuclear technology and demurring even at the prospect of trade sanctions, does Heffer really think that there is any possibility at all of the UN authorising air strikes?

biplane.pdf[i-biplane.pdf]And if, say, the UN – under the management of Kofi, father of Kojo - did managed to get permission to mount an airstrike, who would possibly offer its own aircraft for a strike when, authorisation procedures and the "due and reasonable warnings" will have thoroughly alerted the (Russian-supplied) Iranian air defences which will be ready and waiting? Perhaps the only willing supplier would be Mothercare (right), the aircraft from which would be about as much use as Mr Heffer's ideas.

However, at least Heffer's heart is in the right place. Not so Simon Jenkins who has temporarily departed from The Times to his true spiritual home, The Guardian. There, he proclaims: "The west has picked a fight with Iran that it cannot win".

He would sleep happier if there were no Iranian bomb "but a swamp of hypocrisy separates me from overly protesting it." Iran is a proud country, he writes, "How can we say such a country has 'no right' to nuclear defence?" ... from Israel? And how dare Washington's kneejerk belligerence put the "strong diplomatic coalition of Europe, America, Russia and China" under strain? And America wants to do what?

Jenkins does not see "how all this confrontation will stop Iran doing whatever it likes with its nuclear enrichment". The bombing of carefully dispersed and buried sites might delay deployment, he adds, "but given the inaccuracy of American bombers, the death and destruction caused to Iran's cities would be a gift to anti-western extremists and have every world terrorist reporting for duty."

EarthAS17[i-EarthAS17]Therefore, for his recipe, Jenkins enjoins us to recognise that Iran "is the regional superstate." If ever there were a realpolitik demanding to be "hugged close" it is this one, he tells us. And, "if you cannot stop a man buying a gun, the next best bet is to make him your friend, not your enemy."

I can't even be bothered to deconstruct this garbage – has he tried talking to the Israelis on this? Has he not seen the video films of strikes in the Gulf, where they can decide through which window they put a bomb? Silly though his ideas may be, I think I prefer Heffer. For Jenkins, I have put a special picture up for him to remind him which planet he is on. He has obviously forgotten.

COMMENT THREAD

IAF%20F-15sbase[i-IAF%20F-15sbase]The Social Affairs Unit has put up a post on its blog from “bestselling author and freelance journalist” Douglas Murray, author of Neoconservatism: Why We Need It.

Headed: "Why Israel must bomb Iran in the next two months", Murray argues that Israel must bomb Iran - in order to destroy its nuclear facilities - within the next two months. After that, he writes, it will be too late to take action to prevent Iran acquiring a nuclear bomb.

Israel, he continues, is the only country with the capacity and political will to carry out this vital operation: the "international community" will not act decisively; the situation in Iraq makes it all but impossible for the USA, or the UK, to take military action against Iran. If Israel bombs Iran's nuclear facilities, this will have appalling repercussions - but the alternatives are much, much worse.

We do not disagree with this thesis but, unfortunately, the reason why Murray believes a strike is so urgent is horribly flawed. As early as March, he retails:

…Iran will have the capability and expertise to enrich uranium in the quantities required to make a device. This is the point after which our options are appallingly limited. Once it has its uranium, Iran can develop its bomb, and do so safe in the knowledge that no foreign power will risk attacking a reactor once it has gone "hot".

Deconstructing this passage, which forms the core of his thesis, what Murray seems to have done is assume that the "reactor" is a part of Iran's uranium enrichment capability.

iran%20busher[i-iran%20busher]There are, in fact, two reactors, at Bushehr, in southwestern Iran, located on the Persian Gulf. One is has not been worked on for some time and is not currently scheduled to be completed, but the other in an advanced stage of completion and may be on-line in a couple of months.

But, as one of the commentators on the blog points out, Iran is just developing a U-235 weapon it does not need a reactor, only uranium super-enrichment facilities. Weapons-grade U-235 neither needs nor is useful for a reactor. A reactor only comes into the equation if Iran decides to pursue the Pu-239 weapon type as well – which is not the case.

link[i-link]And it is those enrichment facilities which will have to be the Israeli target. They are based at Natanz, which is located in the northwestern Iran, about 130 miles south of Tehran, although work is dispersed throughout as many as 25 or more other sites. The status of the Bushehr plant is irrelevant.

Furthermore, the best estimates are that Iran will take at least two, more likely three years to enrich enough Uranium 235 to make a weapon, and more yet to a weapons system with arsenal plus delivery.

It is a pity, therefore, that Douglas Murray makes this his central point, as the case for an early Israeli strike needs to be made. A more persuasive argument is the expected delivery by the Russians of SA-15 Gauntlet anti-aircraft missile systems, and issue which has been rehearsed on this blog here and here.

Murray, however, does not stop there. He suggest that the Israeli Air Force might make multiple raids over an extended period. This is hardly credible. No strike could take place without, at least, tacit US approval but, at least, the US could deny complicity - albeit not very convincingly - if the IAF carried out just one strike on the grounds that it had been caught by surprise.

Multiple strikes, over a period, would prove (or be taken as proving) direct US involvement and put the United States in the front-line as a co-belligerent. This would not be politically sustainable.

However, in a single strike raid, however, the IAF is at a serious disadvantage. Unlike Osirak, it would have to split its forces to hit near simultaneously multiple targets. This means it would not be able to achieve local defence saturation - leaving aircraft highly vulnerable to anti-aircraft defences.

Therefore, the best - and possibly only - chance of the IAF carrying out a raid successfully is to do it sooner rather than later. The timetable will depend, more than anything else, on the delivery schedule for the Gauntlets and the time taken for the Iranian forces to get them fully operational. That may in a few months, but it may be longer.

Incredibly, though, the media is still completely failing to address the Russian arms supplies to Iran, which have increased five-fold since 1994 and account for over 90 percent of Iran’s arms imports. I caught on a BBC bulletin today, a comment that Russia was anxious that economic sanctions should not be imposed on Iran, because "it might damage her trade", but – of course – the Beeb failed to state that a massive amount of that trade was in arms.

That sentiment is also conveyed in The Times today, with the headline: "Kremlin says Iran sanctions not the solution". Russia has broken ranks, it reports, saying that sanctions were not the best way ahead.

I am completely at a loss as to why the MSM (MainStream Media) has so totally lost the plot on this issue and rather regret that Murray has said the right thing for the wrong reason. It has not helped.

COMMENT THREAD

putin%202[i-putin%202]Reviewing this morning's press on Iran, the single thing that is most striking is not what is said, but what is not. The more I think about it, the more I am inclined to the view that the politicos and the media are misreading the situation, and are emphasising the wrong things.

As it is, the focus is on Iran and its recent decision to re-commence work on uranium enrichment, with various erudite – and less informed – comments on the application of sanctions through the UN.

But, as has been thoroughly rehearsed on this blog and on the forum, the immediacy of the crisis has not been brought about by the Iranian decision. At best, it would probably be late next year before Iran has enough material to construct even one bomb. Given the probabilities of launch or delivery failure of its relatively primitives missiles, the likelihood is that, to make a credible strike against Israel, the Iranians would want several bombs in their armoury before deploying them.

Thus, it is probably fair to say that there is no immediate threat from Iran, and any such threat may be several years away.

The other driver of the crisis is, of course, the political situation in Israel, with the prospect of a hard liner being elected in the wake of Sharon's departure from the political scene, with a mandate to take pre-emptive action against Iran. That put the date of a strike at the end of March, or shortly thereafter.

On reflection, though, that does not stack up. A strike at this time, when the Iranians have produced relatively little, if any, weapons-grade material, would cause relatively little delay, while a later strike, aimed at destroying or rendering inaccessible such material as had been produced, would have a more serious effect. Arguably, this suggests that the best option would be a watching brief rather than an early strike.

Gauntlet%205[i-Gauntlet%205]What has to be asked, therefore, is what makes the difference – what makes the likelihood of an Israeli strike imminent? The answer, of course, is makes the difference the forthcoming delivery by Russia of the SA-15 Gauntlet anti-aircraft missiles, the sales of which it has been negotiating since 2001, and right through the EU3 diplomatic initiative.

Fully to understand the significance of this, one must go back in history to 1970 and the "War of Attrition" between Israel and Egypt. With recently delivered US F-4 Phantoms, the IAF was able to command air superiority over Egyptian skies until June, when – with Soviet assistance – the Egyptians deployed SAM-3 missiles, the very latest in anti-aircraft weaponry.

IAF%20phantom[i-IAF%20phantom]On 30 June, the IAF launched a furious attack on Egyptian defences after it had been discovered that dozens of SAM-3 batteries and hundreds of AAA guns had been advanced the previous night. But, unlike previous occasions, two Phantoms were downed, both falling prey to Egyptian SAMs. Another Phantom was downed on 5 June, once again by a SAM. By August five Phantoms had been shot down and the IAF was forced to suspend operations over Egypt.

I was in Israel during this period and remember the profound sense of shock amongst ordinary people. Travelling on the busses, the radio was piped continuously to passengers and, when the news bulletins came on, there was absolute silence. Everyone listened and, following the news of the first downing, instead of the animated chatter that you so often get, there was tangible gloom. Unlike our ignorant, pampered population, the ordinary Israeli-in-the street was fully aware of the implications.

That has left the IAF with a profound respect for Russian-built SAMs (a respect that USAF pilots acquired when they met SAM-3s in Viet Nam) and they will be under no illusions that, with the deployment of SA-15s, the chances of a successful air strike against Iran will have been reduced to as close to zero as makes no difference.

B-2[i-B-2]The new Israeli prime minister, therefore, is faced with a wholly new and uncomfortable decision. He will know that he has a very narrow window, when an strike could be effective. Following that, the only air force in the world which could deploy effectively in Iranian airspace would be the USAF, any strike spearheaded by its B-2 "stealth" bombers which would engage and suppress air defences.

For an Israeli prime minister – any prime minister - that is an uncomfortable position in which to be. He must either decide to act or give up any chance of future retaliation and trust that the United States, at some time in the unspecified future, will take the necessary action in the defence of Israel, should the need arise.

With what I know of Israeli psychology, my guess is that, at the moment, the "hawks" will be making the running. Whether they get their way depends very much on who is elected prime minister. In the case of Netanyahu, he has already said he would follow the example of former prime minister Menachem Begin who ordered the IAF bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear plant in 1981.

But the central point is that this current crisis has effectively been triggered not so much by the Iranian action, but by the Russian decision, in December last year, to sell the Iranians advanced anti-aircraft missiles. Thus, while the Western powers line up to condemn Iran, and look to Russian as an ally, perhaps they should be focusing their attentions on Russia, demanding that it delay deliveries of weapons to Iran.

Of course, with the EU cosying up to Putin, and reliant on Russian gas, it is unlikely to take this course, which leaves the Israelis exposed and the situation ever-more dangerous.

COMMENT THREAD

This is not meant to be a defence blog and neither is it. Discerning readers will have noted, however, that there has been a certain emphasis on this issue, but the emphasis is for good reasons.

Firstly, despite the EU constitution ratification process being temporarily stalled, defence integration is continuing apace, and has become the vanguard issue in the continuing process of European political integration. Secondly, at the current rate of integration, we are at risk of losing entirely any independent defence capability, with all that means for our status as a sovereign nation.

Thirdly, for reasons which remain mysterious, the mainstream media seem to have given up even a pretence of serious reporting on defence issues, which leaves to the blogs to pick up the slack.

Photo6000587[i-Photo6000587]That said, in today's Guardian, we have interview with John Reid, secretary of state for defence (left), in which he is said to be seeking a "debate on ageing Trident" – i.e., the replacement of our nuclear deterrent. Within the piece, though, there is a statement which, evidently, is not open to debate. Regardless of any decision (on the nuclear deterrent) says Reid, "spending would have to be tightened, with greater European co-ordination on procurement."

It is that latter statement that chills the blood, an acknowledgement – albeit elliptical – that the government is indeed adopting a "Europe first" policy on defence procurement.

Despite this, when Reid's minister for defence procurement, Lord Drayson, addressed the Royal United Services Institute yesterday, on "Military Capabilities in the 21st Century", he was guarded in his speech.

He was sure, he said that his audience would be "trying to parse my remarks for whether I am advocating wholescale protection for UK industry, 'Fortress Europe', or 'Buy America'", saying that he did not meant to convey any of those things. "There will be areas where appropriate sovereignty requires on-shore supply," he said. "There will be some we can procure from the global market. And there will be a third category which can be procured in co-operation with partners – continental European, or American."

casom[i-casom]"European and transatlantic purchases each have their own characteristics, and it is no secret that either situation can be frustrating at worst," he pointed out, adding, "We tend to forget they can also be extremely successful. For example, the Storm Shadow cruise missile within Europe…" (pictured left).

Unfortunately, no reaction is recorded to this claim, but one really wonders what was going through the mind of the minister as he made it. The Storm Shadow is, of course, the "million pound bomb" that we featured in an earlier posting. It is a French designed weapon, built by Matra Défense for the French Air Force under the name SCALP EG and has been built for the RAF by Matra BAe Dynamics.

JASSM[i-JASSM]In the sense, that it actually works, I suppose it can be considered a success, but it is heavier, with a shorter range than the equivalent US missile, the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) - see right, which has a significantly lower price tag of $300,000 (£167,000). We have bought 900 Storm Shadow missiles at a cost of £981 million, whereas the same number of JASSM could have been purchased for £150 million, saving the taxpayer over £830 million.

That, it seems, is Drayson's definition of "extremely successful", and John Reid wants more of it. One is reminded of another the catchphrase of another John – John McEnroe: "You can't be serious!"

COMMENT THREAD

The Wall Street Journal has today had a look at the Iran situation in an opinion piece entitled Carrots for the Mullahs, expressing the view that giving them incentives is a surefire path to a nuclear Iran.

It concludes that the US, with its stake in Iraq and the Persian Gulf, its opposition to terrorist groups that Iran sponsors, and its commitment to spreading democracy in the Mideast, cannot be indifferent to a nuclear Iran.

The problem, the paper says, is not that we have yet to hit on the right mix of carrots and sticks to cajole Iran into responsibility - it is that Iran's theocratic regime is by its nature inimical to American interests; any move that extends its life also prolongs the hazard it poses to the US.

But that does not mean the US should drop diplomacy and take up arms against Iran tomorrow, the paper says. It does mean that if any headway is to be made, the Administration needs to be absolutely clear about Iran's intentions and Europe's motives. Signing on to Europe's strategy offers one certain outcome: a nuclear Iran.

Coincidentally, Reuel Marc Gerecht, fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, also writes on the same subject for The Financial Times, under the heading: "Watch what you wish for in Iran".

He is betting that Iran's nuclear programme is likely to derail any serious rapprochement between the US and western Europe, possibly to the same extent that the Iraq war did.

This is because the EU's approach to a nuclear Islamic republic could become more morally repellent to Bush than was the Franco-German campaign against the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq.

Gerecht suggests that a "convergence" of American and European views is unlikely. Instead Bush will recoil from most of the compromises envisioned by the Europeans yet, as both tough economic sanctions and preventive military strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities are distasteful if not unthinkable to leaders of the EU, "carrots" are, for the Europeans, the only diplomatic tools left.

Gerecht then cites Robert Kagan, the foreign policy historian, who has noted that, when soft power becomes the only option in foreign affairs, appeasement - the preferred European word is "engagement" - becomes a morally and strategically compelling choice.

What the EU really wants from Washington, says Gerecht is "Libya Plus": in exchange for good nuclear comportment, the Bush administration should forgive the Islamic republic its terrorism - the clerics ruling Iran are the same ones who orchestrated the bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996 - without the clerics admitting guilt.

The US should be prepared to promise non-interference in Iran's internal affairs and stop condemning clerical tyranny and publicly ssupporting the country's democratic movement. In other words, the Bush administration should refrain from any action that might resemble Ronald Reagan's strategy toward the Soviet bloc.

If the EU could convince the Bush administration to "engage" Iran in this manner it would, of course, achieve perhaps the most highly-desired Franco-German foreign policy goal: effectively gutting the Bush administration's post-9/11 energy and mission. The Middle Eastern government with the longest terrorist track record could be rewarded with Boeing contracts.

This may be attractive to some in the Bush administration, who want to pass the Iran problem to the Europeans, hoping that EU-Iran negotiations would allow Washington to continue ignoring the conundrum.

Some still hope the Europeans can be converted to a big-stick approach; others, uncomfortable with the grand rhetoric about transforming the Middle East, hope the president will adopt the EU3's Libyan scenario.

But the European proclivity towards rapid concessions - and the near-total absence of will to even allude to big sticks - has disappointed the administration and Iran's ruling mullahs have now brought the EU talks to an impasse.

As a result, the odds are that Bush is not going to do Libya again and the two-decade old strategy of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the influential former president and the driving force behind Iran's nuclear weapons programme, is soon likely to come to fruition.

Says Gerecht, the Islamic republic will have successfully played divide and conquer against the west. But if this leads to a clerical A-bomb, or to a pre-emptive US strike amid a chorus of European outrage, the odds are good that the bonds holding the US and Europe together will further fray. One day, perhaps after the EU lifts its arms embargo on China and France supplies sophisticated radar and torpedo technology to Beijing, they will snap.

Altogether, from two different sources, the prognosis is poor. And the Europeans, it seems, are to be the losers. But that, appeasement did not work in the 30s. Why should it work now?