EU Referendum

Showing posts with label mastiff. Show all posts

Mastiff+034[i-Mastiff+034]What an extraordinary contrast we have in the treatment of British and US troops in Iraq. On the one hand, we have the US government taking force protection seriously, and then we have the British secretary of state for defence, Des Browne.

He announced an order of "around" 100 the vehicles illustrated left, then known as Cougars, but since renamed as Mastiff “protected patrol vehicles”. That was on 25 July 2006, when he also promised that there would be “an effective capability in place” in Iraq by the end of that year.

In fact, the order did not go out until 11 August and then for only 86 vehicles, with an option for four more, the contact worth (including the option) nearly $65 million, including “non standard vehicle parts” priced at $3,532,868.00, users’ manuals at $153,540.00, training at $573,100.00 and field support at $2,710,344.00. This works out at about £360,000 for each vehicle. However, carrying six people, plus two crew – with far superior protection – it is still (with all the extras) nearly £70,000 cheaper than the four-seater Panther.

One example of the Mastiff was being paraded on Salisbury Plain last September but, by January it seemed as if only four were in place – although more were quickly to follow and we saw them in action ten days ago when the Duke of York met members of the 1st Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment in Basra

Now, procurement minister Lord Drayson has turned up in Iraq to give the delivery of the Mastiffs the official seal of approval and to claim credit for their purchase, which is a bit rich considering that he fought tooth and nail to avoid buying them.

Mastiff+035[i-Mastiff+035]Nevertheless, the vehicles have recently started to be used on patrol and Mastiff Company Commander, Major Dan Bradbury, 1st Yorkshire Regiment, readily declares that "The soldiers love it. It's a real investment in their protection." Driver, Private Ciaran Castles, adds: "All round it's a good bit of kit. It's enjoyable to go out there because you feel more safe and you know if it comes down to it, you've got that extra armour to protect you."

Only now, however, does it appear that the MoD is ordering the full number, with Force Protection (the makers of the Mastiff) announcing yesterday a “contract modification” from the MoD for 22 additional vehicles. The order, it says, will bring the total number of vehicles produced for the British government to 108 at an approximate value of $70.1 million.

By contrast, the US government is to order 6,738 of this type of vehicle, preparatory to replacing every Humvee carrying out a tactical role. This, as we reported earlier (and here), represented a real commitment to winning the war in Iraq.

Now, also, we can see the price the government is prepared to pay. It is proposing cuts to several aviation projects, including reducing the number of F/A-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft it will buy, all to fund $1.2 billion for the Army's MRAP vehicles and the $250 million for Marine Corps

And there is the real contrast between the US and the UK. There is limited scope for cross-service transfers in the UK so that any re-equipment on a scale equivalent to that proposed for US ground forces will have to come out of the Army's equipment budget. There lies the Holy Grail, by the name of FRES, and despite signs to the contrary in February, it like the Army brass might have won the day.

Responding to a question from MP Mike Hancock on the future of Fres, Adam Ingram responded yesterday thus:

The Department reviewed the future rapid effect system (FRES) programme in 2006 to take account of our experience on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the light of recent developments in vehicle technology and protection systems. This review aimed to ensure we deliver the best possible vehicles able to meet the operational needs of the British Army through life.

… This review was completed last year. The procurement strategy has now been announced and we are now making rapid progress on the FRES programme with candidate vehicle designs undergoing proving trials this summer and the winning vehicle(s) selected by November 2007 to proceed to the next stage. It is essential to carry out this detailed assessment of the candidate vehicle designs and to drive out programme risk before the major investment decision is taken.

So we have £14 billion to buy toys for the Generals, while the troops in the field get $70.1 million for the kit needed to save their lives.

Meanwhile, the man who did so much to ensure that FRES survived, General Sir Mike Jackson is reported to have been paid close to £900,000 for his memoirs, due to be published in September. It looks like betrayal is a little better rewarded these days.

COMMENT THREAD

Mastiff+Basra+001[i-Mastiff+Basra+001]The Duke of York met members of the 1st Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment in Basra on Saturday. The regiment's Colonel-in-Chief, Andrew also saw the Shaibah logistics base. A few hours later mortars and rockets hit the Basra Palace base, used by multi-national forces, in a separate part of the city.

That, amazingly, is what the BBC thinks important – missing, quite literally, the "bigger picture". That is behind his nibs - the first appearance in public of the famed Mastiff mine protected vehicles.

Mastiff+Basra+002[i-Mastiff+Basra+002]And, going from the sublime to the ridiculous, as well as a ride in a nice safe area in an under-armoured "Snatch" Land Rover, he gets to see the Mastiff, which has not only been fitted with extra side armour, it seems to have acquired an all-round cage of slatted armour. No wonder they have taken so long to get into service.

And, considering the RG-31 was thought to be "too big for Basra", not only has the MoD bought a bigger vehicle, it has added to its width and length with the extra armour. I guess size wasn't such a critical factor after all.

Now, if only those blokes in the berets would get out of the way, we could get a better view…

COMMENT THREAD

clemencau[i-clemencau]Famously said by the French politician and former prime minister Georges Clemenceau, this is becoming an issue in the prosecution of the war in Iraq – and war it is – as evidence begins to emerge that much of the current British strategy is increasingly being dictated by the military, with insufficient political input.

One of the many clues to this lies in an article in last week's Sunday Telegraph, which pointed out that the current Labour government front bench are "total strangers to front line".

The piece was by Geoffrey Wheatcroft, who pointed out that every prime minister from 1940 to 1963 had served as an infantry officer in the Great War. Even Winston Churchill, after he had resigned from the government in 1915, commanded a battalion in the trenches for several months. Attlee and Macmillan were badly wounded, one at Gallipoli, the other on the Western Front. Eden won an MC for rescuing his sergeant under fire.

DesBrowne2[i-DesBrowne2]By contrast, in the present cabinet, there is not a single member of the Government who has ever worn uniform, let alone heard the proverbial shot fired in anger. Tony Blair did not even serve in the cadet force at Fettes and, with the exception of "the preposterous Major Eric Joyce", there is no Labour MP with any military experience.

Wheatcroft, however, sees this in terms of "military virgins" who wage war now that they are too old to serve. "Never has there been such a gulf between the forces and politicians," he writes, "few of whom know any soldiers or sailors even socially. Never has there been such a breakdown of true responsibility."

What this conveys is an impression that the political novices are imposing on the military, dedicated professionals who are suffering the ministrations of the amateurs, and suffering as a result.

However, there are different ways of looking at this. In his book, "Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime", published in 2002, just before the second Gulf War, Eliot A. Cohen – described as the (American) nation's leading scholar of military-civilian relations – argued for more not less civilian interference. In the history of warfare, all the great civilian war statesmen interfered in things military.

This, Cohen says, was unavoidable:

The goals of the military - the definitions of victory - are ultimately political questions; as Churchill wrote in 1923, "The distinction between politics and strategy diminishes as the point of view is raised. At the summit true politics and strategy are one." Not even military professionals have real practice employing military tactics: They spend most of their careers not fighting. "It is quite true that conventional war can hardly be made by complete amateurs," Cohen concludes, "yet neither can it be handed over to the professionals."

churchill[i-churchill]Cohen then cites examples of great civilian statesmanship: Abraham Lincoln in the Civil War; Georges Clemenceau in World War I; Winston Churchill in World War II; and David Ben Gurion in Israel's war for independence, demonstrating the need for a hands-on approach to military affairs.

He thus challenges the long-held view that military strategy should be a sphere wholly apart from civilian leadership, disagreeing that military strategy is a matter of technical expertise, which must inevitably be degraded by civilian, and does not accept that the political role is merely to set the goal and leave the military to decide how to get there.

Another clue emerges from a remarkable interview for Australian television of Dr Rosemary Hollis from Chatham House. She claims that the current British strategy is "one driven to a large extent by the advice of concerned military leaders in Iraq who have warned that British troops may be doing more harm than good in the country."

Other sources, of a diverse nature seem to confirm this, pointing out that, far from taking a hand-on approach to the day-to-day management of the war, the Tony Blair and his ministers, handicapped by their lack of military experience, are leaving too much to the generals. They are too willing to defer to their judgement, even when the outcome has profound political implications.

For sure, as even today another group of experts pointed out, the armed forces are undergoing a cash crisis, but this is largely long-term and related to the strategic objectives of the forces.

As far as the prosecution of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are concerned, the money is not actually drawn down from the defence budget, but found from contingency reserves, funded directly from the central budget.

One thing which has puzzled us is the continual refrain that that the armed forces are short of key items of equipment – ranging from armoured vehicles to more helicopters – all of any of which can be obtained through what are known as the "Urgent Operational Requirement" (UOR) process. Yet, we are constantly assured by ministers – who could so easily be contradicted on this, if they were not telling the truth – that all UORs, which have been approved by the chain of command, have been sanction by ministers.

Ministers themselves do not have the knowledge to generate orders for equipment, and neither does the system work that way. The armed forces have to trigger the process by asking for what the need. And, from this we must conclude, some of the reason why specific equipment is missing from the field is simply because it has not been requested.

LAND+-+Mastiff+089[i-LAND+-+Mastiff+089]That actually seems to have been the case with issue of armoured vehicles to supplement the "Snatch" Land Rovers, with the reasons why they were adequate coming, in the first instance, not from ministers but from the higher echelons of the military, who have been opposed to the idea of taking on new equipment.

We have explored what might be some of the reasons for this in an earlier post and sufficient emerges from that, and other posts (such as here and here), to confirm that the military has a far greater role in the running of its own affairs – and the current war strategy - than is popularly imagined.

Thus, while we see a growing legend, as expressed in one blog, that the, "Soldiers have done a sterling job under impossible political conditions…" the top brass, as well as the politicians, seem to have some of the responsibility for the current situations.

That is not in any way to exculpate the present government – ministers bear the ultimate responsibility for any failures (in theory at least). But, unfashionable though such a view might be, this post simply serves to offer a corrective suggestion. Simply, if we are going to be locked into that oft quoted paradigm of "lions led by donkeys", it is as well to remember that, when that phrasing emerged, many of the "donkeys" were in uniform. And that might apply with some force in this current situation.

COMMENT THREAD

Sun+002[i-Sun+002]At the heart of the dishonest and inadequate Defence Committee report on "The Army's Requirement for Armoured Vehicles: the FRES programme" lies a failure of the Committee to explain what FRES actually is.

That, most likely, stems from the fact that the MPs themselves do not understand what it is.

Although I have done this before (not least, here, here and
here), let me attempt to summarise it in this post for, without that basic understanding, you cannot even begin to appreciate the issues involved.

Essentially, this is a child of the post Cold War period, when the US and European government started to confront the idea that dealing with the world's hotspots required highly mobile, air-portable forces which could be shipped out at very short notice to deal with trouble as it arose, rather than letting the situation deteriorate to the point where larger ground forces would be required.

The concept crystallised in 1998 when the MoD decided that the UK Army required a fleet of armoured vehicles to fulfil what was termed the "expeditionary role", which was envisaged in the Strategic Defence Review, and then formalised as the "rapid reaction force", aimed at serving both the EU and Nato requirements.

Now, the trouble was and is that the basics of armoured warfare were incompatible with the requirements of air-portable rapid reaction forces. In the former, this had evolved to spawn two main vehicles, the Main Battle Tank (MBT) and the Mechanised Infantry Combat Vehicle (MICV), the first providing the direct firepower, the second providing the infantry support.

link[i-link]In the MBT had evolved the optimum balance of three requirements: speed and manoeuvrability, armoured protection and firepower, emerging in its current form as the Challenger II (pictured) in the British armoury (and the Abrams in the US armoury), weighing in at around 65 tons.

To enable the maximum number of vehicles to be delivered, however, it was necessary to restrict weight to that which could be carried by the most common military airlifter, the C-130 Hercules, dictating a maximum weight of between 18-22 tons. This meant that military planners had to develop an armoured vehicle which could afford the same overall protection and performance of the MBT but came in at less than a third of the overall weight. (Pictured below is the "SEP" prototype platform, being considered for FRES: various versions will be produced, including an APC and a "direct fire" MBT equivalent.)

link[i-link]Ostensibly, this would have been impossible, except for the emergence of new technologies, enabling vehicles to shed weight, in the form of less armour, in exchange for three attributes: "situational awareness", "network capability" and high-precision stand-off weapons.

Using an elaborate system of high-tech sensors and reconnaissance systems, the new forces could detect the enemy earlier and at greater distances than before. With advanced electronic networks, that information could then be shared in real time, so that all mobile assets would be immediately informed of the presence of threats that could harm them, long before they came into range. Then, with those threats located, a whole range of weapons could be employed to destroy them, without their ever posing any danger to the lightweight vehicles.

LAND+-+IED+023[i-LAND+-+IED+023]That was the theory which drove what became known as the Future Rapid Effect System. But, by late 2003, the shooting phase of the Iraqi invasion had passed and the war had moved into an insurgency. There, the enemy's weapons of choice became the roadside bomb (IED) and the RPG fired by insurgents in civilian clothes who would not declare their identities until the moments they fired.

For dealing with this situation, any idea of relying on "situational awareness" and stand-off weapons, which underpinned the whole concept of FRES, became totally unrealistic.

Meanwhile, to deal with the insurgency, as we recorded, our then CGS Mike Jackson was trying to make do with "Snatch" Land Rovers. But, as the wider lesson of the insurgency were learned, planners were left to look at ways of improving the protection of FRES vehicles.

The task was effectively trying to square the circle, which they attempted by using additional sensors and self-defence equipment, plus increasingly esoteric forms of armour. Each added to the weight, eventually making the proposed vehicles too heavy for the C-130 and, possibly, too heavy for the A400M, should these ever be acquired.

Thus, at the heart of the conundrum is a conflict – which the Defence Committee acknowledges - where "the MoD", it says, "wants a vehicle which has sufficient armour to protect soldiers from IEDs and RPGs but which it also light enough to be transportable by air."

FRES+001[i-FRES+001]Now we come to the nub. The Committee says that seeking a perfect solution is "unrealistic" and that it is high time the MoD decided where its priorities lay. And that is where the dishonesty lies. The underlying decision is not one for the MoD but one for the politicians.

Essentially, what we are talking about are two different things – FRES-type vehicles for conventional warfighting, and completely different vehicles for counter-insurgency operations. It was never the case that "dithering" over the final shape of FRES cost any lives. The demands of the two types of warfare are so different that it is impossible to combine the requirements for both in a single platform. We need two completely different ranges of vehicles and the lives were lost because of the failure to provide suitable, non-FRES vehicles.

Currently, we still need the decision as to whether we are going to undertake "warfighting" or counter-insurgency operations – or both. And that, as we say, is a decision which must be made by the politicians.

Where the MoD has gone wrong, if it has, is in not making that abundantly clear to the Defence Committee - not that the MoD was actually asked. Now, it is left to Lord Drayson to explain the facts of life to the MPs. The FRES programme, he says:

…should not be confused with the recent urgent operational requirements to procure additional protected patrol vehicles to complement Snatch Land Rovers in Iraq and Afghanistan. The recent and very rapid procurement of vehicles such as Mastiff, Vector and Bulldog, is not related to the FRES requirement. These patrol vehicles are important additions to the capabilities at the disposal of commanders, but are separate from the FRES programme.

But, in fact, it is not the MoD informing the Committee. It is the Army brass. They, collectively, want FRES. They want an army equipped for high-tech "warfighting" and do not want to buy counter-insurgency equipment that will affect their plans for acquiring their shiny new toys. Nor indeed do they want an Army which is primarily equipped for counter-insurgency.

ARMY+-+Dannatt+006[i-ARMY+-+Dannatt+006]That much was the real message CGS Richard Dannatt was giving last October, effectively a plea to pull out of Iraq, thereby saving FRES and keeping the Army in the shape the generals wanted.

For the political glitterati (aka clever-dicks), of course, all this will pass them by without disturbing so much as a hair on their carefully coiffured little heads. Yet, at those different levels, political and technical, the Defence Committee report marks an important turning point in the decline of this nation.

Future historians will see in it evidence of the total failure of the parliamentary system, a victory of the Army over the politicians and a retreat from any attempt by this nation to recognise what is needed to deal with the growing threat of militant Islam. For, what the report does is fail to recognise that the Army needs to equip to deal with the Islamic counter-insurgency, wherever it occurs, and that FRES is not the answer. More importantly, it fails to understand that role of the Army brass in sabotaging attempts to ensure that our armed forces are properly equipped to deal with the job at hand.

Thus, the MPs have let the Army brass get away with it. Meanwhile, as ill-equipped troops are pulled out of Iraq in an ignominious retreat, the national interest – to say nothing of the interests of our troops in the field and those of the Iraqi people - has been put on the back-burner.

COMMENT THREAD

Otokar[i-Otokar]
Believe it or not, I found this rather amusing – not the picture, as such, but the whole package, including the caption.

The latter, presumably written by USAF Staff Sgt. Stacy L. Pearsall, who took this official DoD picture, records "US Army Soldiers from the personal security detachment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team" and they are providing "security for team commander Col. David Sutherland at an Iraqi army compound in Baqubah, Iraq, Jan. 31, 2007."

She does not name the "toy" in the centre of the frame, yet this is more than usually interesting, if only for its novelty value. Our readers will know it to be a Turkish-built Otokar Armored Personnel Carrier, a conversion based on the Land Rover Defender 110 chassis.*

LR067[i-LR067]Overall, it is probably no better protected that the "Snatch" Land Rover (I do not have the technical specs) although the "top guard" undoubtedly is, with an armoured turret rather than a hole in the roof provided for our troops.

There is another feature of this vehicle which, in comparison with the "Snatch" tells you a great deal about the British Army – this vehicle has side windows and gun ports for the passengers, so that you can observe and fight from the vehicle.

LAND+-+Cougar+012[i-LAND+-+Cougar+012]The superior British do it a different way. A feature of all their tactical personnel transports is that they do not have side windows and, as demonstrated by their conversion of the Cougar to the Mastiff, we go to great lengths to cover them up, even when provided in the original vehicle (the pictures show the "before and after").

LAND+-+Mastiff+089[i-LAND+-+Mastiff+089]This actually is not a trivial point – it reveals something of the character of the British and the British military. It seems that the brass do not like ordinary soldiers knowing where they are or what is happening around them – so called "situational awareness". Instead, they like them to be kept in the dark (quite literally), relying on them to respond to their training when they are ejected from their vehicles, blinking into the light to face the enemy.

To that effect, British soldiers are taught a limited number of drills, which are repeated again and again until, with all the fidelity of trained seals, they can perform them flawlessly. But the one thing soldiers are not taught to do – and in fact are actively discouraged from doing – is thinking for themselves.

German+Army[i-German+Army]This was characteristically a feature of the Armies of the Second World War, where, typically, even junior NCOs in the German Army were included in the tactical briefings, while British NCOs were not. In the event of the loss of their officers, German NCOs were expected to take command, whereas the standing instructions to German troops, fighting against the British, was to target the officers, whence their attacks would often stall.

For the future, this is going to become more and more of a problem for the British Army, as equipment of greater sophistication and complexity is introduced into theatre. Not only is the educational attainment of the average solider such that they are going to have difficulties exploiting it fully, but the culture of the British Army is such that, as it stands, it does not want and cannot cope with educated soldiers, who can think for themselves.

Perhaps though, when we see British Army vehicles with windows in the sides, we will know that times are changing.

*edited 18 July 2007 to remove offensive references.

COMMENT THREAD

snatch[i-snatch]The Times is reporting that several British troops "are believed to have been injured" in two near-simultaneous attacks which today struck in Basra today.

One incident is said to have involved a roadside bomb striking a British convoy south of Basra, causing a number of casualties. The BBC website is saying that one soldier has been killed and three others are injured. One is in a critical condition. All three have been airlifted by helicopter to the hospital at Basra air station.

The Associated Press calls the vehicle an "armoured personnel carrier" - as does The Daily Telegraph (nice one, really helpful, that) but a photograph (above left) of the scene shows a damaged "Snatch" Land Rover, the caption reporting four soldiers "injured". The BBC report on the fatality thus looks to be accurate, and it is confirmed by the MoD.

Snatch+002[i-Snatch+002]Other reports indicate that the attack took place around 1pm local time at an intersection about three miles south-east of Basra. An updated BBC report confirms that the men were all travelling in a "Snatch" Land Rover, which it describes as "lightly armoured vehicles".

The Times quotes "military sources" saying the target of the roadside bomb was an armoured Land Rover – "a vehicle considered vulnerable to attack, and subsequently being used less and less than the heavily armoured personnel carriers which provide more protection." However, as the picture (above right) - and the many others we have published recently on this blog - shows, these vehicles are still in widespread use.

Lynx[i-Lynx]As to the other attack, this was a mortar or rocket attack on the Basra Palace complex. A Times reporter in Basra witnessed a medical helicopter flying from the city centre to Basra airport, where the main military hospital is based. Usually, the paper says, military helicopters do not fly in Basra in daylight as it is too dangerous – a rule which is only broken in emergency situations.

In two areas, therefore, where British troops are known to be vulnerable, insurgents have again struck to cause death and injury. However, since this is clearly not "friendly fire" by the Americans, one expects it will get minimal media coverage. Nor do we expect the media to ask what happened to the Mastiff mine and blast protected vehicles, which were supposed to be in place by now.

Snatch+003[i-Snatch+003]Meanwhile, after this, Sue Smith, whose son Phillip Hewett was killed near Basra in July 2005, is according to The Independent, planning to take legal action against the Ministry of Defence over its failure to protect combat troops with the right equipment.

She says military commanders are exposing soldiers to unnecessary danger by continuing to use ageing "Snatch" Land Rovers instead of armoured vehicles. "I want them to accept that Snatch Land Rovers should not be used on patrol. These vehicles are death traps," she says.

The Army has refused to launch a board of inquiry into the circumstances of Hewett's death – in an incident where two of his colleagues also died – describing it as an unavoidable "accident".

Yet the inquest in Oxford heard that the three men were dispatched to al Amarah in a "Snatch" Land Rover, even though just weeks earlier a roadside bomb had killed two soldiers near the town.

LR081[i-LR081]Mrs Smith said the Army told her that the men were hit by a previously unseen kind of explosive which would have penetrated even a heavily armoured Warrior vehicle. But photographs submitted to the inquest showed that the bomb entered the Land Rover through a window protected by nothing more than a steel mesh.
Said Mrs Smith, "There has been no proper investigation and the truth still hasn't come out. It took 19 months to get the inquest, and all I have to show for it is a three-page report and a patronising letter from the Army saying it was an accident."

According to Mrs Smith at least 20 servicemen have been killed in "Snatch" Land Rovers by roadside bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan since her son's death. She said: "I just want the Army to stop using these bloody vehicles. How many more people will have to die for them to change their minds?"

Quite.

COMMENT THREAD

link[i-link]A tome of nearly 45,000 words would qualify as a small novel but it is also the typical size of modest debate in the House of Commons. And such was the length of the defence debate in the Commons on Thursday, under the title "Defence in the World".

This was an adjournment debate, which means there was no vote. With such a broad title, this conspired to make it a dull, shapeless affair which came to no conclusions and produced very little of consequence – and certainly little that we had not heard before.

However, while the media failed to take any notice of the debate, there was at least one sub-agenda, which emerged when secretary of state Des Browne offered a spontaneous comment "on the increasing threat to our bases from indirect fire, principally rockets and mortars." He told us:

I discussed that with commanders in Basra on Tuesday. The increase in indirect fire is a worrying trend. The threat is becoming more sophisticated and dangerous, and the links to Iran and Hezbollah are more evident. Our forces are not standing idly by as the threat develops—they are taking steps to deal with it by targeting the terrorists through intelligence-led operations, and with some success. We are also always looking to strengthen our defensive measures, but Members will understand that for reasons of operational security I am not in a position to say much more than that on the subject, other than to assure the House that we take it very seriously and that we acknowledge the risk our brave men and women face.

This was picked up by Gerald Howarth who noted that there was a system called the Mamba "which is able to track incoming mortars and provide an accurate fix on their source." Could he, asked Howarth, "reassure us that sufficient such devices are available to our armed forces in Basra to ensure that we have the maximum protection?"

As he did with his response to Ann Winterton, Browne took this seriously but refused to put information into the public domain that would jeopardise operational security.

You would have had to have had a journalist in the gallery who understood the issues to pick up on this and, inevitably, no such creature existed. Somebody, some time later, might take one of the poor little dears aside and spoon-feed them with the details but, until then, nothing will emerge.

Anyhow, it would be wrong of me to say that there was much more of interest. The trouble with debates of this nature is that they are so wide-ranging that they tend to be highly superficial, no more so than the response by the shadow secretary, Liam Fox.

One would actually like to be complimentary, if only because it is not always a good idea to be negative. A little bit of encouragement goes a long way. Unfortunately, we cannot do this – even if the problem was not what was said, but what was not.

However, rather than inject our own words to illustrate the nature of the deficiency, we shall use some from a US Department of Defense press release yesterday, citing the new defense secretary Robert W. Gates. "Debate about operations in Iraq is completely appropriate,” he says, adding that he believed the debates centred "not on whether there's any option except to win, but on the best way to reach that objective."

That was what was missing in this debate. We are a nation at war and, by any candid assessment, things are not going well. Nor could anyone sensibly say that the government is entirely on top the situation, or is completely in control. The debate, therefore, was wide open for some constructive suggestions as to how best to win the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

In terms of any specific detail, there was nothing on offer. For sure, we had ritual complaints about a wide range of issues and a few generalities - but nothing bankable, nothing that you could mark down and say was a good, workable idea.

What we did get though, from another member of the Conservative defence team, Dr. Julian Lewis, was an illustration of the dangerous complacency and arrogance that pervades some parts of the establishment. Said Lewis:

I mean no insult to the record of the American armed forces when I say that Britain's achievements in counter-insurgency campaigns in the past feature lessons that can usefully be learned by our allies, and that, along with some of my colleagues, I am not entirely sure that they are always prepared to listen and take those lessons on board.

This is from the representative of a nation that is struggling to put 20 Mastiff mine protected vehicles into Iraq, when the US is looking at better than 4,000 RG-31s.

There lies the disappointment. It was all very well for minister of state Adam Ingram to declare of our armed forces that, "we really do recognise that they are the best in the world", except that they are not. We may – and in fact do – have some good elements, some good people and some very dedicated and brave service personnel, but that does not make for the best armed forces in the world.

But we also have poor equipment, poor structures, poor administration and some singularly bad leadership. We are far from convinced that the top Army brass have got a grip on the situation or are acting in the national – as opposed to their own sectional – interest.

How things could be made better though is not clear. This is why we really do need a debate – a serious, intelligent debate, not just ritual offerings and point-scoring. Not for the first time, therefore, do we suggest that the opposition needs to raise its game.

COMMENT THREAD

MISC+-+Cat+001[i-MISC+-+Cat+001]According to the MoD website, day to day control of Operation Sinbad has now been handed over to the Iraqi authorities, with British forces now relegated to a supporting role.

This marks the penultimate step in the process of "managed retreat" from Iraq which has been evident since August last. There are now only a few more months to go before large numbers of British troops leave the theatre with no replacements planned.

The news coincides with the announcement by secretary of state Browne that a further 800 British troops will be sent to fight the Taleban in southern Afghanistan, although this only increases the commitment by 300 as 500 British personnel are to be pulled out of Kabul.

Dannatt%252003[i-Dannatt%252003]So well has the ground been prepared for this strategic realignment – not least by the apparently spontaneous statement by the CGS Richard Dannatt in October last - that the media (and opposition politicians) have not raised even a murmur.

As regards Dannatt, he said then that his comments were not "substantially new or substantially newsworthy" and we said that he was simply preparing the ground for the eventual withdrawal from Iraq, acting entirely in accordance with government policy and intentions.

So easily have the gullible media fallen for it though that, currently, their main obsession is with the "friendly fire" incident in 2003 when two US A-10s fired on British forces, causing the death of one soldier.

This gives a convenient cover for a bit of Yank bashing, which is much more enjoyable than getting to grips with the equipment issue, over which the media has completely lost the plot.

Browne4[i-Browne4]Funnily enough, even though this means Browne has got away with posing on top of a Bulldog APC and not a single journalist has given him a hard time over the delay in introducing the Mastiffs, the government is getting sickened by the superficiality of the approach to defence issues. One of our family cats (pictured top left) offers more perceptive comment than the entire press corps combined.

One response to the more general lack of debate is the lament by defence minister Adam Ingrams at the end of the British Army debate, where he agreed that we should have more defence debates, but – to an empty chamber – said that he just wished "that more hon. Members would participate in them."

We have there a vicious circle. MPs do not attend because there is no media attention, and there is no media attention because so few members attend.

But perhaps the media - having recast itself as part of the entertainment industry - have it right. Apart from the "Boys Own" garbage trotted out by the media, there is very little appetite for serious defence reporting so anyone interested in maintaining readership levels – whether old or new media – will avoid the issue like the plague.

It is extremely unlikely, therefore, that you will read in either media the news that the US Marine Corps Systems Command has awarded General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada an Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract and an initial delivery order for the testing, production and support of four Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles.

The MRAP vehicles will provide improved protection for troops from mines, improvised explosive devices and other threats. A possible follow-on production contract could call for the delivery of up to 4100 vehicles.

LAND+-+RG-31+099[i-LAND+-+RG-31+099]And guess what. The MRAP vehicle is based on the highly successful RG-31 Mk5 - which has saved so many lives. US forces have already ordered or received 424 RG-31s and the decision of the USMC to go for another 4,000 demonstrates their commitment to winning the war in Iraq.

By the same token, that it will be later this month before we have just 20 Mastiff "Mine Resistant Ambush Protected" vehicles in Iraq, demonstrates the level of British commitment. And the failure of British journalists even to notice demonstrates more than words can ever say, their level of commitment to good journalism.

COMMENT THREAD

LAND+-+Mamba+Estonia[i-LAND+-+Mamba+Estonia]In today's Sunday Telegraph, Sean Rayment reports an officer in Afghanistan complaining that troops from Estonia … who were working alongside the Royal Marines were better equipped and had more reliable armoured vehicles than did British troops.

Er… would that be because the Estonians are operating ex-British Mambas, as reported by this blog on 8 January and The Booker column last week?

It would be too much to ask Rayment to read this blog but one might have thought that, at the every least, he could read his own newspaper – from which he might have learnt something.

In this week's edition, however, the Telegraph's defence correspondent also tells a sorry tale that all four of the Army's mine protected vehicles (MPVs), "used to extract injured troops from minefields in Afghanistan", have broken down.

LAND+-+Tempest+003[i-LAND+-+Tempest+003]Commanders, we are told, regard the MPV (illustrated) as one of the most vital pieces of equipment in Afghanistan, where more than 10 million mines lie primed after 20 years of war. Since last June two servicemen have been killed in mine explosions and three have been seriously injured yet "one source" reveals that the farthest the MPVs have travelled outside Camp Bastion in Helmand has been just one mile. The same officer who complains about the Estonians is then cited as saying that "we need four more MPVs and we haven't got them".

Although Rayment doesn't say so (possibly because he does not know), he is actually referring to the vehicle known as the Tempest MPV (illustrated above), which we described last June. Ironically, as we described then, the Tempests were the replacements for the Mambas which have been sold off to the Estonians.

However, not all is lost. Despite the Telegraph conveying the view that there are only four MPV, readers of this blog will know that there are in fact eight vehicles (see also here), so somewhere (possibly in Saffron Waldron, where they were last seen) there are another four. It would not take very long to fly them out in a C-17 Globemaster, so perhaps the newspaper could not ask why this isn’t being done.

LAND+-+Mastiff_PPV2[i-LAND+-+Mastiff_PPV2]Even then, there is another option. Once again this is not "revealed" by the Telegraph, but as we know, the Tempest was effectively the prototype for what is now known as the Force Protection Cougar, a fact we revealed last June.

As we also know, the British have bought 100 Cougars under the name of Mastiff, some of which, we have been told, are destined for Afghanistan. These are described by the manufacturer as a "mine protected vehicle" so, far from there being only four MPVs, there are a considerable number on their way – perhaps as many at 30.

These, however – according to Rayment - are vital tools that have been refused by the Ministry of Defence. To that list, Rayment adds "night-vision equipment and thermal-imaging devices used to distinguish friend from foe" - the latter, as we know, being particularly useful for detecting suicide bombers.

LAND+-+Vipir+sight[i-LAND+-+Vipir+sight]Something else we know is that these is no shortage of night vision equipment – the shortage was in thermal imagers, which was "revealed" by the Daily Mail in November. But, as we reported on this blog on 9 January, plans are in place to increase this number, by the procurement of over 300 additional sights.

All that leaves little Sean with is the original litany of a shortage of helicopters and troops, which makes for rather a thin story, especially as he does not bring in the issues raised by the use of Apache helicopters to carry troops in last Monday's attempted rescue.

Fortunately, the Sunday Telegraph's alternative defence correspondent, Christopher Booker is on the ball.

COMMENT THREAD

Gerald+Howarth+Pinz[i-Gerald+Howarth+Pinz]My latest piece on defence was forwarded by a reader to shadow defence minister Gerald Howarth, to which he responded with some alacrity. We publish this, in its entirety (barring one tiny edit), below:

Richard North (whose pamphlet on Galileo I launched at the House of Commons) has some good ideas but gives no credit to anything anyone else does and has little understanding of the - often extremely frustrating - political process, or of the power of the Opposition to get the media to focus on the issues we are tackling. Let me make a few observations which you are entirely free to circulate:

The Opposition has been doing precisely that - opposing. Not mindlessly, but intelligently where we believe the Government is wrong. You are probably not aware, but Liam Fox held a press conference on Tuesday which was extremely well-attended, including by George Jones of the Telegraph. However, very little coverage followed, the Telegraph running not a single column inch. At the press conference not only did Liam spell out forcefully in a series of PowerPoint displays the extent to which the Armed Forces have been betrayed by this Government, but when asked if he would increase defence resources if he were Secretary of State today, he replied emphatically 'yes', thus pre-empting the Prime Minister's remarks yesterday. He also said he saw no reason at all to close either of the South Coast dockyards, currently under threat from Labour. And he was honest enough to acknowledge that the last Conservative government's cuts in defence went too far, although of course not as far as Labour, let alone the Liberals, wanted at the time.

We are constantly pointing out that Brown has betrayed the Armed Forces by failing to fund the endless military operations undertaken at Blair's behest and it was nauseating yesterday to see the Prime Minister promising increased defence spending when we know that every aspect of military activity is currently under threat and having to make cuts in advance of the Comprehensive Spending Review now underway across government.

I could go on and on giving examples of what we have been doing, but let me give you just three specifics: I think I was the first to raise the issue of armoured vehicles which I did on my return from Iraq in September 2005. I told John Reid privately that he had to do something to get better protection for the troops facing roadside bombs (privately because I represent a garrison town and know how careless politicians can cause increased anxiety). He told me that they were aware of the problem and actively seeking solutions, but would not be specific. Since then, we have raised the matter repeatedly (see my website, www.geraldhowarth.com which carries my views on the issue), as have many fellow MPs. As North suggests, the RG-31 (on which I was briefed at the Farnborough Air Show in July) is one of the most robust, but the Government has rejected this solution and gone for the US Cougar, known in the UK as the Mastiff, which I understand (I am not an expert in this field, nor I suspect is North) is similar in performance. In July the Government announced it would acquire 108 Mastiffs which would be 'fully operational' by the end of the year. It is we, the Opposition, who have established that this has not happened, only 4 being delivered into theatre. We told the press about this latest failure this week, and I gather The Sun carried the story prominently on page 2 yesterday, but it was downgraded in the final edition.

As far as the Pinzgauer is concerned, this (now) US-owned British company makes - in Guildford - an all-terrain troop carrier widely in service with the Army. I have indeed driven it at Long Valley in my constituency and it seems to me an excellent vehicle. However, it has no armour and therefore suffers from the same limitations as the Land Rover. In his July announcement the Defence Secretary also said they were ordering 'uparmoured' Pinzgauers, to be called Vector. This is a brand new vehicle but it does not pretend to have the armour of the Mastiff. It is my view that a range of armoured vehicles is required and that where the Government is guilty of betrayal is in failing to order off-the-shelf available heavily armoured equipment, such as the RG-31.

Secondly, there is the problem of troop air transport. The RAF is operating clapped-out 40 year old VC-10s and 35 year old Tristars half of which we have just established (through Parliamentary Questions, our principal means of trying to get information) are not fit for purpose. We have repeatedly raised the issue in Parliament and tried to get the press interested. In fact, The Telegraph did eventually run a story last week, so after 9 months of bashing away we obtained some coverage.

Thirdly, on procurement failures, it was we who were responsible for exposing the abject failure on the Landing Ships Docks project, praised by Blair yesterday, where the cost of the 4 ships has doubled thanks to appalling management by the MoD who awarded the principal contract to Swan Hunter. We ran a high profile campaign together with the Daily Telegraph. Last year, I asked the National Audit Office to investigate which they agreed to do and they will be reporting later in the spring.

The brutal truth is that we are not in power and not responsible for today's calamitous defence policy. Nor can we spell out today how much we will spend on coming to power in 2009 - 10, not least because we do not know what Labour will have bequeathed us in terms of commitments or the state of the public finances. All I can say is that the entire Tory Defence Team, led vigorously and determinedly by Liam Fox, are resolute that we shall not ask our magnificent soldiers, sailors and airmen to undertake tasks for which we are not prepared to give them the kit, the manpower and the training.

I know UKIP are trying to appeal to disaffected Tories, but they are not going to form the next Government. I hope that we are because I do believe that we understand the challenges which face our Armed forces and are incomparably best placed to meet them. On our benches we have MPs who have served recently (Andrew Robathan, formerly of the SAS, Hugh Robertson, Mike Penning, Tobias Elwood, Patrick Mercer (former CO of the Sherwood Foresters) and Adam Holloway, not to mention IDS. Others, like Desmond Swayne (PPS to David Cameron) and Mark Lancaster, who are TA officers, and Dr Andrew Murrison, former RN surgeon, have all served in Iraq and Afghanistan whilst being MPs. Lord Astor (who leads for us in the Lords) served for 4 years in the Life Guards, Julian Lewis MP (who leads on the Royal Navy and is the foremost exponent of the need for the nuclear deterrent) served for 3 years in the RNR, I was commissioned in the RAFVR and lead on the RAF, and of course Liam Fox spent 10 years as a civilian Medical Officer to the Army. Compare that record to the other parties!

We will not always get it right and must be subject to criticism if we get it wrong. However, I do ask that all those of goodwill will seek to encourage and support us. The most disastrous outcome would be for the UK to have inflicted on it a Labour Government led by a dour Scottish redistributive socialist who has consistently starved the Armed Forces of the resources they need to do the job and who until recently has distinguished himself by his complete lack of interest in our servicemen and women. That outcome will be assured unless people get behind the Tory party and rally to our flag.

Yours, Gerald
Gerald Howarth MP
Member of Parliament for Aldershot & Shadow Defence Minister

We have, as always, opened up a forum thread and tomorrow we will post our own response, building in the best of the comments posted.

COMMENT THREAD

LAND+-+Mastiff+045[i-LAND+-+Mastiff+045]In general, claims Tony Blair, "the British Armed Forces are superbly equipped."

But, in order to equip them even better (/end irony), the MoD agreed last year, grudgingly, to buy 100 "Mastiff" mine and blast protected vehicles, to supplement the dangerously vulnerable "Snatch" Land Rovers.

And, as we reminded our own readers, when he announced their procurement on 25 July, defence secretary Des Browne promised that there would be an "effective capability" in place in Iraq by the end of the year.

Now, at last, Liam Fox is on the case, fronting a press release on the Conservatives' web site. It claims that British troops in Basra have so far received only FOUR Mastiffs of the "effective capability" promised.

FOUR Mastiffs… from July of last year to January of this, all the great might of the MoD can manage is four armoured trucks. It's as well we're not fighting a serious war out there, isn't it... or maybe, its just that we're not serious about fighting it.

COMMENT THREAD

LAND+-+Mastiff_PPV2[i-LAND+-+Mastiff_PPV2]Ironically, it seems, the girlie agenda espoused by the Tory front bench has been exposed by Tobias Ellwood, the Tory MP for Bournemouth East.

While Gerald Howarth was pursuing his fatuous agenda on transport aircraft charters, Ellwood – an ex Royal Green Jackets officer - was asking the secretary of state for defence how many Cougar and Vector Pinzgauer armoured vehicles were being sent to Iraq Afghanistan and when they were expected to arrive.

Alongside the 5 December answer about which Thomas Harding got so excited, defence minister Adam Ingram responded thus:

On current plans half of the Mastiff (the UK variants of the Cougar) vehicles will deploy to Iraq, the remaining half will be split between Afghanistan and a training pool of vehicles retained in the United Kingdom. The first batch of Mastiff vehicles is on schedule to arrive in Iraq by the end of the year.

A majority of the Vector vehicles will be deployed to Afghanistan with a small number retained in the United Kingdom for training. The first batch of Vector vehicles is on schedule to arrive in Afghanistan in January 2007.

LR276[i-LR276]This, as we indicated, was on 5 December and still there is no sign of the Mastiffs arriving in Iraq. More to the point though, the minister is re-writing history. When the procurement of Mastiffs was first announced by Des Browne on 25 July, he stated that they were, "...expected to be delivered to Iraq and Afghanistan in batches over the next six month rotation, with an effective capability in place in Iraq by the end of the year."

Yet, with no sign of a "effective capability" in place, their deployment is more than an academic issue. Troops may well die for lack of them in place. And today, AFP issued another photograph of burning Land Rovers, reminding us of what is at stake. (Are they trying to tell us something?). One might say, in this context, that Liam Fox - in concentrating on leaky toilets rather than Army equipment - is piddling while Rovers burn.

COMMENT THREAD

link[i-link]Another soldier has been killed, this one by a roadside bomb in Iraq. And, from reading the official report, the hand of the censor becomes apparent, not in this but in yesterday's bulletin on the soldier killed in Afghanistan.

Today's report openly states that the soldier, from 2nd Battalion, The Duke of Lancaster's Regiment, was taking part in a routine patrol in Basra City "when the Warrior Armoured Fighting Vehicle he was travelling in was targeted by a roadside bomb."

Yesterday, however, the MoD told us that the dead soldier, this one from 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery, was killed during a reconnaissance mission in the desert to the south of Garmsir, "in which a vehicle was involved in an explosion resulting in one fatality, one serious injury and two minor injuries."

For our suspicious minds, it really is too much of a coincidence that, when a soldier is killed in an armoured vehicle, the MoD is quick to identify this fact but when yet another is killed in (probably) an unarmoured or lightly armoured vehicle, the MoD is silent on the type, simply referring to an anonymous "vehicle".

If it hopes that, by avoiding any mention of the fact that our troops are being asked to patrol in dangerously inadequate vehicles, the media will gloss over the details – thus letting the Ministry of the hook – it is probably right. Reviewing all the media coverage of the Afghan incident up to midday today (GMT), only The Times, to its credit, questioned the type of vehicle involved.

LAND+-+Viking+023[i-LAND+-+Viking+023]The Sun, on the other hand, went to the other extreme – not only getting the details wrong (the soldier appears not to have been killed by the explosion but by the ensuing crash) but it also printed a photograph of a Viking, under the completely unwarranted caption "patrol … armoured vehicle".

As to The Times report, Jerome Starkey in Kabul and Daniel McGrory, under the headline, "Escalating conflict in Afghanistan claims 22nd British victim", note that:

The vast majority of fatalities have occurred after attacks on patrols where British forces are still without the armoured vehicles they need. …

and then tell us that, "Local police reported that the patrol was not using an armoured vehicle."

The general issue of equipment was raised on the BBC Radio 4 Today programme this morning, with the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, observing that the moral and the practical flaws of the government's policy had emerged as time has gone on, remarking that, "they have put our own troops increasingly at risk in ways that I find deeply disturbing."

This is not the first time that a cleric has commented on the moral dimension of equipping our troops and it is indeed "deeply disturbing" that the government has committed troops to two theatres without suitable equipment. But it is doubly disturbing that neither the opposition parties in Parliament nor the media have properly followed up these issues.

This shows in the government response to the attack in Iraq, as advocacy for the greater use of Warriors has been reported uncritically by the likes of Sean Rayment in the Sunday Telegraph.

link[i-link]But, as we have reported on this blog , two Canadian soldiers were killed in a Bison APC while others, in less heavily armoured vehicles, escaped with only light injuries. We wrote of the Bison that:

…its fatal weakness - in common with most vehicles of the type - is that it is not designed to be operated in a fully closed down condition for long periods of time. Visibility is restricted and crew comfort (especially when it is hot) suffers. By any measure, this equipment is far from ideal for use as convoy escorts or as patrols in counter-insurgency operations.

What applies to the Bison applies equally to the Warrior and, while even troops in better-protected vehicles have suffered losses (a Canadian soldier was recently killed while riding an RG-31 and, to our knowledge, at least three US RG-31s have been destroyed by enemy action), it has to be said that the Force Protection record, with its Cougars and Buffalos, still stands intact. No deaths have been reported amongst their occupants, despite over 1000 IED hits.

LAND+-+Mastiff_PPV1[i-LAND+-+Mastiff_PPV1]The Cougars, heavily modified and renamed the Mastiff by the British, should now have been in theatre. Lord Drayson made that promise in late July of this year, saying that there would be an "effective capability in place in Iraq by the end of the year."

Yet, it is not since early July that we have had an effective intervention from the Conservatives and, even now, they are ignoring the issue even as troops die for want of the correct equipment and a Minister's promise is broken.

Thus, when it comes to reckoning up the balance, it should not only be the government which is held responsible, in part, for the unnecessary deaths of our troops. We are dealing with a failure of the media to do its job and the failure of the opposition to do its.

And yes, we have said it all before. But, in this game, you have to say the same things again and again before they finally lodge in the collective consciousness. So guess what - each time an opportunity presents, we will be saying it again… and again.

COMMENT THREAD

link[i-link]UPDATED: A Royal Marine from 45 Commando has been killed and another seriously injured after yet another suicide attack on a "Snatch" Land Rover in Afghanistan.

They were driving in a military convoy leaving the Afghan national police station at Lashkar Gar, capital of Helmand province, this morning. The marines were airlifted to a military hospital at Camp Bastion, where one later died from his injuries. An MoD spokesman said the dead soldier's next of kin had been contacted.

Ghulam Muhiddin, the spokesman for Helmand's governor, reported that the attacker targeted British soldiers. He said the bomber, who was on foot, also killed a boy and a girl, both under eight. Other reports speak of bodies of civilians, some with arms and legs blown off, scattered around the scene near the town's bazaar.

link[i-link]This is becoming an all too familiar scene and, while better-armoured vehicles do not provide complete protection – witness an incident earlier this month when a Canadian soldier lost his life after an attack on an RG-31 (pictured) – the overall experience is that troops are much more likely to survive, usually uninjured.

Apart from anything else, a "Snatch" Land Rover costs in the order of £60,000 and this – like others before it – is clearly a write-off, while RG-31s suffering similar attacks need only relatively minor repairs.

What is particularly disturbing though is that, while the replacement Pinzgauer "Vector" is no better protected than the Land Rover, already the MoD propaganda machine is moving in to tell the troops what a good piece of kit it is.

kit1[i-kit1]Thus we see in this month's Soldier Magazine a "Boys' Own" puff on the two new additions to the British order of battle, the tame hack gushing that the "meaty Mastiff" and Vector (pictured left) are "destined to make life safer for troops in Iraq and Afghanistan".

The Vector – so soldiers are told – "will address the protection and payload problems of the Snatch Land Rover, making it ideal for Afghanistan." Surpassing the carrying capability of the Snatch, the Vector can carry an additional specialist, such as an interpreter, plus enough water for a ten-hour patrol. The piece adds:

"With Vector we have an improved payload capability, better mobility and improved protection,” said the vehicle’s project manager, Ben Onslow. “It will also have air conditioning, which is important for comfort.” The first of approximately 170 vehicles ordered should be delivered by February – just ten months after Pinzgauer started work on the variant.

Minister for Defence Procurement Lord Drayson told reporters on Salisbury Plain: "The Snatch Land Rover will continue to be an important part of our equipment. But we have identified that we need to give commanders more options. It is vital that we give our soldiers the kit they need. But it is down to the commanders in the field to choose the right tool for the job."

You would expect a tame house magazine to deliver that sort of guff, but it would be nice if the supposedly independent media took time out to tell our soldiers the truth. Unfortunately, it would seem that hacks are more concerned with the threat of external censorship, without realising that self-censorship, ignorance and indifference are probably the greater dangers.

COMMENT THREAD

The Swedish 'SEP' platform - one contender for FRES[i-The Swedish 'SEP' platform - one contender for FRES]Should we give half a cheer that at least one newspaper has picked up on Dannatt's plea for more resources to be devoted to the armed forces, or will this have no more effect than any of the tons of fish and chip wrappers produced each day?

Well… a micro-cheer – if there is such a thing. But, while the world's favourite newspaper (not) has come up with a stunningly obvious headline declaring that, "Winning the war will need more" – the problem is that the nature of "more" is not specified. What we do get though is this:

For the foreseeable future, the Army's basic task will be to defeat hit-and-run insurgent groups in hostile terrain. Yet the priorities for the defence budget are still geared towards frustrating an attack by the Soviet Union on Western Europe. A very substantial slice goes on our nuclear deterrent; more still will go on updating it. Some £18 billion has been expended on our share of the Eurofighter: a plane that still does not work properly, and for which no military function has been found.

...

The "peace dividend", the pot of gold politicians so love, has long since disappeared. We face a prolonged war against an implacable enemy. Mr Blair has recognised the threat. He, and his successor, now need to provide the resources our Armed Forces need to defeat it.

Clearly, the egregious hacks on The Sunday Telegraph did not fully read the Sarah Sands piece in the Mail (which is hardly surprising as most of them have been fired) but, had Patience given it to the dog, he might have reminded her of this:

What will make a difference is the arrival of more heavily armoured vehicles. Sir Richard is open about the vulnerability of some of the vehicles his soldiers have been using, particularly in Iraq.

"The threats we have been facing in Iraq from last summer grew considerably. The sophistication of the mines and rockets used to attack our vehicles went up significantly."

Thus, 160 six-wheeled, four-ton armoured patrol vehicles are on their way to Afghanistan. There is also a 20-ton vehicle called the Mastiff ready for use in Iraq or Afghanistan. The controversial "snatch" Land Rovers, which give little protection, should be replaced. "Over time I want to modernise all patrol vehicles," says Sir Richard. "The snatch vehicles were getting old. They were originally developed for Northern Ireland. I want people to have adequate vehicles for the tasks they carry out." There is also a family of armoured vehicles called FRES (Future Rapid Effect System). The cost of this future equipment is £14 billion.

And there it is. Dannatt, like his predecessor Jackson, is committed to FRES – with a price tag of £14 billion – the biggest single procurement programme for the Army ever devised.

Is anybody out there? FRES, i.e., Future Rapid Effects System, is the biggest single procurement programme for the Army ever devised.

This is not "geared towards frustrating an attack by the Soviet Union on Western Europe" but neither is it suitable for defeating "hit-and-run insurgent groups in hostile terrain." In fact, its primary purpose is to equip the European Rapid Reaction Force, the function of which is unknown – other than to pursue the "colleagues'" ambitions for further defence integration.

It is all very well taking a cheap shot at the Eurofighter (the only thing cheap about it) but the money is spent – or committed. It would cost us more at this stage to cancel the contract than buy the aeroplanes, unless we can dump more on the Saudis.

But when it comes to FRES, we are talking about the future – decisions yet to be made. And not for nothing have we called it a blunder of Eurofighter proportions with serious political implications.

There is still time to reverse course and equip the Army to deal with "hit-and-run insurgent groups", but that is not going to happen unless the media (to say nothing of the politicians) start waking up and discussing forward plans instead of ancient history.

COMMENT THREAD