EU Referendum

Showing posts with label defence. Show all posts

cameron2[i-cameron2]The heads of the Armed Forces cannot escape their share of the blame if soldiers do not have the right equipment, writes Vernon Bogdanor in today's edition of The Times. He is not popular for saying so if the limited number of comments are any guide, but he is right.

Nevertheless, it is about time somebody said it in a mainstream newspaper and, despite other calls on my time, I felt impelled to post an analysis.

Writing under the headline, "Generals must keep their noses out of politics", Bogdanor is responding to that "disingenuous" remark from Lord Guthrie on 6 March that sparked off a major row, culminating in the jibe from David Cameron last Wednesday during PMQs.

Full story on DEFENCE OF THE REALM.

Brown+snatch[i-Brown+snatch]There are several things I try to do with this blog. In bringing you a diet of posts each day, one of my aims is to avoid being derivative. My preference is to bring genuine, new or little-known information to the table, or to add fresh thinking or analysis to current topics.

Despite that, there is value in repeating existing material, and spreading the word – and it is done exceedingly well by a large number of blogs. But, in many areas where there is a narrative up and running, it is either wrong or heavily distorted, either by act or omission. In this case, mere repetition or commentary which takes the baseline facts as read simply perpetuates the errors and the distortions, helping to lock in the narrative to the point where it achieves the aura of truth, irrespective of the actual facts.

No more so is this the case than with the Snatch Land Rover, an earlier preoccupation of this blog, and in particular the reports attendant on the coroner's inquest on the death of Cpl Sarah Bryant and her three colleagues in Afghanistan in June 2008.

The basic facts of this incident are not disputed and are well established. On 17 June 2008, Bryant and four other soldiers were riding in a Snatch Land Rover which impacted a pressure plate IED. It was blown apart killing four, including Bryant, and seriously injuring one other. By common consent, the Snatch Land Rover did not provide adequate protection and, had they been better equipped, the soldiers might have survived.

What is in dispute – or should be - however, is a claim that has become a central part of the narrative, a classic example of which is here, but one that is repeated endlessly. This is that the reason for the wholly unsuitable Snatch Land Rovers being in theatre was due to a shortage of funds and a refusal by former chancellor and now prime minister Gordon Brown to permit the purchase of replacements. We hold no brief for Mr Brown, none at all, but this narrative is wrong, wholly and completely wrong – and dangerously so.

That said, I do not intend to rehearse all the details as to why it is wrong. I have already done that in my book Ministry of Defeat, a book well-known in military, political and media circles, and strenuously and quite deliberately ignored because it contradicts the narrative and tells people what they do not want to know.

The same story, is told in even more detail in hundreds of posts in my much-neglected sister blog, Defence of the Realm, a blog I have largely abandoned because – as I have found to my cost – there is little value in telling people things they do not want to know, when they prefer the prevailing narrative. Nevertheless, the whole story is there and will remain so, mute testament to the power of the narrative, for the very few who are interested.

A good place to start would be with seven linked posts, taken from my book under the generic heading "Lost before it started". The links are here: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6 and Part 7.

Viewing the disgusting performance of David Cameron during today's PMQs, however – when he sought to make political capital out of the "narrative" on the backs of fallen soldiers (matched only by the performance of Mr Brown), it is necessary to remind readers of the last chapter of the story, which led that Snatch Land Rover down the path to destruction.

The story was set out in a DOTR post here in November 2008, with further elaboration here. The essence of the story is that a batch of protected vehicles – the Australian Bushmaster – had already been ordered and could easily have been in theatre at the time to replace the Snatches, and which could well have saved Sarah Bryant and her colleagues' lives.

From this, several crucial points emerge. The first is that, even at this late stage, funding was not an issue. The cash had been allocated, the vehicles selected and the purchase approved. Why they were not then in theatre is a question for the Army, not ministers, to answer.

Secondly, even at that time, the Conservatives knew all about this transaction. They knew because I told them – giving them a full verbal briefing - and sent a full dossier down to their defence team, with all the supporting data.

Then, as now, they had all the information they needed to know that this episode – and indeed the run-up – was nothing to do with cash shortages. It was everything to do with a sequence of mistakes and incompetence by senior Army officers and civil servants, all of whom are currently covering their backs, using the narrative – not least in testimony to the Chilcot Inquiry – to hide their tracks.

Despite this, the Conservative chose – quite deliberately – to run with the narrative. That was not because it was the truth. They knew it was not. Simply, that was the politically convenient "attack strategy" which offered the most promise and the best prospects of short-term political advantage.

Out of the limelight, however, Ann Winterton, myself and others, have been painstakingly teasing out the truth, ignored by the political claque and the media, because it does not fit the narrative.

Worse still, that applies to the media. The "Bushmaster" dossier has been placed before innumerable journalists and even very recently, a senior journalist from a major broadcasting organisation checked out the information. It stood up and yesterday I was asked to give a recorded interview for television news. The footage was not used. It ran counter to the narrative. Others don't even begin to see the point and have never tried.

Yet, the information is there. The information about the Vector is also there – the vehicle that the Army chose as the replacement for the Snatch, just under 200 at a cost of nearly £100 million – a vehicle that was so dangerous and so mechanically unreliable that it had to be replaced ... by the Snatch, which then cost £5 million to upgrade.

Then there is the saga of the Panther, with 401 ordered in 2001 at a cost of £166 million which then required an additional £20 million to get 67 into theatre, eight years after they had been first ordered. No wonder the Army was short of money and vehicles.

But the Conservatives knew all that. Many journalists also knew what was going on, but chose to ignore it. The ever-staunch Booker has retailed many of the details in his column, not only for them to be ignored but censored as well. You want "powerful vested interests", look at the arms industry. There is, it seems, no way of bucking the narrative. People will believe what they want to believe – and suppress the rest.

In conclusion, I have to admit I am soured and not a little embittered by this process. When I first heard about the death of Sarah Bryant and her colleagues, I was in Paris, sitting in the shade of an armoured personnel carrier, eating an agreeable steak dinner, discussing Army requirements with a galaxy of senior personnel.

From this and other sources – some at an unbelievably senior level who have fed this blog with material most political journalists would die for – I have come to learn a great deal about the inner workings of Whitehall and the machinations of Army politics. I know what I'm talking about, and information last seen with "secret" plastered over it has found its way into DOTR. But that has been to no avail. The narrative prevails.

It actually makes writing DOTR an exercise in futility. Having neglected it for some time, I am now minded to wrap it up. I owe myself one more post, though – which has been months in the writing – on why the military adventure in Afghanistan will fail, can only fail and will lead to our eventual ignominious departure, carefully spun as a victory. That I have decided, when I get round to it, will be my swan song on that blog.

COMMENT THREAD

historye[i-historye]As a not infrequent commentator on the state of the Ministry of Defence, it might be thought that I would welcome the considerable media scrutiny to which this lacklustre department is being exposed. However, the current focus on the bonus issue does nothing but fill one with despair, as the media chases after the wrong issue, firmly grabbing the wrong end of the stick.

Highlighted, of course, was £47 million paid so far to MoD civil servants as bonuses, but the other side of the coin is put in a letter today from their union, Prospect.

Written by their National Secretary (Defence), Steve Jary, it tells us that the bonuses represent 2.8 percent of the pay bill, "removed from basic pay over the last eight years". This, Jary continues "is in line with 20 years of government policy to increase use of performance pay in the Civil Service."

The reference to "20 years of government policy" is extremely revealing, as the current system of bonus payments stems from a much-hailed (at the time) Conservative government initiative in the mid-eighties – under Margaret Thatcher – in an attempt to bring the civil service more into line with the private sector, linking pay with performance.

The way this has been implemented has been that a proportion of negotiated pay increases have been converted into bonus payments, rather than core salaries, and linked to personal performance assessments. That they are paid, virtually as of rote, is another issue, but the fact is that the bonuses have been subtracted from salaries, to be paid separately, not added to them.

Furthermore, there is another agenda here, which works very much in favour of the taxpayer. Unlike core salary, the bonus payments do not attract pension entitlement – something of which the union has been very conscious, suspecting (rightly) that the bonus system is a back-door way of reducing civil service pension costs. In that context, bonus payments actually save the taxpayer money.

Another point made by Jary is that, if civil servants did not do some MoD work, it would be done by military staff – at twice the cost to the taxpayer. The photograph at the top illustrates the point. It shows a tank workshop in Belgium in 1945 and, despite the poor quality, it can be seen that all the workers are in uniform.

Currently, that work is done by civilians in the MoD's Defence Support Group, which currently employs 3,800 staff, counted as "pen-pushers" by an agenda-driven media.

And, adds Jary, supply of military equipment is undertaken by teams of civil servants and military officers. Most teams are headed by military officers. If they are under-performing, blame the military hierarchy as well.

That latter point is a point well put. While the focus is on civilians, there has been next to no attention on the military, and in particular, the top brass. Yet, as the Army has contracted, the brass has increased. In 1997, there were 228 generals – one star and above – but by 2009 this number has increased to 255.

Included in that number are 43 Major Generals, the rank of a Divisional commander. By contrast, Land Command (UK) has only six divisions, of which only two actually have troops, of which only one is actually deployable – and then only in brigade formations, which also have their own commanders.

Further, for an Army which cannot actually field one Corps (typically three Divisions), we have 10 Lt-Generals – the rank of a Corps commander, the same number we had in 1997. And, of course, all the generals have their staffs and aides, plus their servants, chauffeurs and perks, collectively siphoning hundreds of millions from the Defence budget.

Within the Army, it has long been recognised that the command structure is top-heavy, and the same applies to the RAF and Navy, the latter having far more admirals than ships. Yet, time after time, successive defence chiefs have ducked the issue and refused to prune the brass.

Equally, from the media, we have silence on this issue. "Pen-pushers" and "bonuses" are a much easier target, and avoid the need to do any thinking and detailed analysis of where the waste – and the problems – lie. As usual, we have to rely on a small corner of the blogosphere to do the work.

COMMENT THREAD

[Loband: Object Removed -]

The video records a conference organised by the Cato Institute on the general theme of whether the US should withdraw militarily from Afghanistan. In a number of taut, well-presented speeches, the arguments were powerfully put, giving much food for thought.

Unfortunately, Cato has not produced a transcript, but they do have a blog which adds some interesting comments. And the theme set by Cato is very much mirrored by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. It argues that the growing influence of fanatical Taleban-style groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan has thrown into doubt the value of an expanding war effort, setting out its stall for a reduced military presence.

There now seems to be emerging a clear divide between the foreign policy establishments on both sides of the Atlantic, and the military, the latter represented by US Chief of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, who is arguing for more troops and resources.

He is clearly supported by the British military establishment, with Bob Ainsworth speaking for them, rejecting "the proposition [that] a reduced military presence will lead to less Taleban success." Actually, that is not the issue. The strategic threat – which was used to legitimise out intervention – is al Qaeda and not the Taleban. The latter is regarded as a localised problem and, as the conflict develops, increasingly difficult to separate from Pashtun nationalism.

When it comes to al Qaeda, current strategic appreciations suggest that this is no longer a significant issue in Afghanistan and, when it comes to the use of military force, it was never the case that successes against this shadowy, decentralised group have been achieved by massed military might.

We are devoting our resources to fighting the wrong enemy, so the argument goes. Preventing Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for those who would conduct external terrorist activity does not require a massive "nation-building" exercise in that country.

The drag of Afghanistan, however, was very much on the mind of Ainsworth, who delivered a long speech yesterday to the Centre for Defence Studies and the War Studies Department at King's College. In it, he referred to the forthcoming defence review, pointing up the need to "consider carefully how to apply military force in pursuit of national security."

Noting the obvious, that there are competing demands on the public purse, he went on to say that we will need to be better at spending the money we have, and more rigorous in prioritising what we spend it on. That much was picked up by The Daily Telegraph which also reported Ainsworth's observation that there did not seem to be much public appetite for increased defence spending.

He was, he said, looking for "a serious and wide-ranging national defence debate," inviting the Conservatives and the Liberals Democrats to take part, arguing that defence of the nation should always come before party politics. "We have to be able to reach beyond our political differences and put the interests of the country first," he said.

That is unlikely to happen though, and nor does it look as if we are going to get a serious debate. After Osborne's intervention yesterday he is now accused in The Times of "posturing" on defence cuts. Even a Tory frontbencher was driven to complain that Osborne had been "amateurish". It is very hard to disagree. With virtually every aspect of defence in the melting pot, we need more serious input than what he had to offer.

COMMENT THREAD

BritishBAe146STA[i-BritishBAe146STA]Opposition by innuendo continues apace, with shadow chancellor George Osborne today picking up the baton briefly wielded by Liam Fox, to hint that he might cut three of Britain’s biggest defence projects, with a combined value of nearly £30 billion.

The axe, Osborne is suggesting, could fall within weeks of a Conservative administration being elected, and in his sights is £20 billion for the Eurofighter, £4 billion for the two Royal Navy aircraft carriers and £2.7 billion for the A-400M transport aircraft.

This, though, is highly tentative, as the shadow chancellor admits that he does not know what the "break clauses" in the contracts would involve, if the projects were scrapped.

In fact, the RAF as already acquired 55 Eurofighters, costing £3.8 billion and the rest of the order is widely thought to be tied in to stringent cancellation penalties which would negate any possible savings. Similarly, the MoD has already spent about £1 billion on early work on the two aircraft carriers, and there would doubtless be penalty clauses in place if work was abandoned.

Not mentioned though is the F-35 order, slated at approaching £10 billion. Presumably some would have to be cancelled if the aircraft carriers were ditched, although the RAF might want more aircraft to pick up on the capacity which would otherwise be delivered by the Navy.

As to the A-400Ms, the precise status of the commercial dealings between the government and Airbus is a closely-guarded secret, but even if the UK walked away from the project, it is not clear whether the £500 million already invested would be returned. Even if it was, cancellation would release very little money. The RAF desperately needs lift capacity and either or both C-130Js or C-17s would have to be bought to make up the shortfall.

Offering some possible flexibility, however, is BAE Systems which is offering a militarised version of its BAE 146 regional jetliner (pictured), with converted airframes available for the knock-down price of £3 million apiece.

BAE Systems at present owns some 47 of these aircraft, leased to regional airlines, but many of them are soon to be released as the airlines acquire new equipment. Conversion costs to military specification, including a cargo-carrying capability, are relatively modest.

Furthermore, the BAE 146 was designed for short-haul operations out of regional airports with tight noise restrictions, so it is capable of making steep climb-outs and descents, and can operate from short, unprepared airstrips with minimal modifications. This makes it optimal for military uses, albeit it can only carry half the load of a Hercules and it lacks a rear loading ramp.

However, acquisition of a number of these aircraft could be sufficient to ease the pressure on the current RAF fleet, especially if they were pooled with other coalition aircraft in Afghanistan, allowing C-130s from other nations to be used when needed, in return for BAE 146 capacity.

Innovative options such as these would seem to offer more scope for dealing with the current defence crisis. If not saving money in the longer-term, they enable cash flow to be managed, deferring major expenditure and flattening the peaks. Slowing down the Eurofighter production and stretching the F-35 programme – which has not in any event been finalised – while proceeding slowly on the carrier build – would have like effect.

Mr Osborne, therefore, has not necessarily sketched a path to salvation and, in fact, may be all at sea when it comes to cutting government spending. The need for a scalpel rather than an axe is indicated, but whether he has the skill to wield this precision tool has yet to be demonstrated.

COMMENT THREAD

trident_faslane[i-trident_faslane]The Times is putting out a story this morning that the Conservative leadership is "backtracking on spending commitments for Britain's Armed Forces and could yet shelve plans to replace Trident."

The trouble with these sort of stories – this one by Tom Baldwin – is that you really do not know whether this is for real, or whether this is the Tory party testing the water in order to gauge public reaction.

What is becoming very clear is that the Tories are all over the place when it comes to defence. Only last year – and for some time before that – Liam Fox was pledging that the three main "big ticket" defence projects would be carried over. These were the Trident programme, the navy's carriers and the army's FRES programme. And then there was talk of increasing the size of the army.

Although commonly cited as costing £5 billion, the carrier programme is more like £20 billion if you include the aircraft and infrastructure costs. This with FRES at £16 billion and Trident puts the commitment close to £60 billion, tying up the procurement budget for many years to come.

Now, it seems, the Tory hierarchy are not quite so sure, and – we are told – are relying of their commitment to a strategic defence review (SDR) to hold off having to make any firm commitments. But then, if the Party is really testing the water, and the public reaction to any cutbacks is hostile, they have a problem.

The "big ticket" programmes, for all their eye-watering costs, are only part of the equation. The accumulation of small and medium projects – not least the MARS replenishment fleet replacement for the navy, the A400M air transports for the RAF and the Future Lynx programme for the army all add up to a tidy penny.

Then there remains more than a little strategic confusion. Fox, in a recent speech was anxious to talk up the Russian threat, with reminders of that country's "re-armament" programme.

This threat, we have considered to be somewhat overstated, especially when Putin had to call on elite troops from the Moscow region to overpower Georgia last year. And a recent report on the state of Russian defence industries lends credence to the view that the Bear is no longer a significant conventional military threat.

That Fox seems to feel the need to talk it up suggests that he is listening very closely to the UK defence industry, which would much prefer spending on conventional capabilities to deal with inter-state wars, rather than see the focus on counter-insurgency, from which there are lean pickings for domestic producers. But then, with Charles Guthrie advising the Tory team, this is only to be expected.

The Tories could, of course, put the speculation to bed by declaring their hand now – making it clear that the UK can no longer afford to finance a military capable of autonomous action in a high-intensity inter-state war. This, though, would need a further declaration of where Britain sees itself in future conflicts, how it would manage its alliances and what precise capabilities it deems essential.

These grown-up questions, however, demand a level of clarity and – to an extent – political courage, which has not yet been apparent from the Tory opposition. And while deferring decisions until after the election may seem an easy way out, events seem to be forcing the pace.

And then, of course, there is the Irish referendum on the horizon. If the Irish fail to deliver a "no" vote and the "colleagues" gets their treaty ratified, the EU military ambitions will climb higher up the political agenda – with profound spending implications.

Having made a meal of attacking Labour on its defence credentials, the electorate may be in the mood to demand something a little more substantive from the Tories than the fare on offer, especially if there is an undeclared agenda to cut spending or, even worse, an intention to buy in to the EU's martial ambitions.

Silence on these issues would appear no longer to be a credible option.

COMMENT THREAD

Liam-Fox[i-Liam-Fox]A major public speech by a shadow defence secretary of an opposition party which will in all probability win the next general election should, by any normal measure, be an important event. It is in that light that we approach yesterday's keynote speech from Liam Fox to the UK Defence Conference 2009.

We have summarised the speech on Defence of the Realm, with no detailed comments of our own, to avoid an intrusive "footprint" which might distort the message Dr Fox wishes to convey. This, presumably, is the platform the Conservative Party will present at the general election.

The main thrust of this "platform" – which will come as no surprise – is that a new administration will conduct a strategic defence review. Its purpose will be to define what Britain's strategic interests are and where they exist at home and abroad.

Unless you have clear foreign policy objectives you cannot have a proper defence strategy, says Fox. This will allow the strategic environment and the threats posed to our interests to be assessed within reasonably predictable limits. It will then determine the capabilities we need to protect those interests.

There is much sense in this approach. Defence capabilities – barring the insurance policy of home defence – should very much be the servant of our foreign policy, they being simply one instrument in a broader portfolio,

However, there is a significant omission here from Fox's speech. There is no mention of the European Union. Yet to a great and increasing extent, our foreign policy is determined either by or in consultation with the EU, yet we also have our own independent line, in relation to the United States.

Therein lies a major problem, in that this current government has been struggling (and failing) to resolve the conflict between incompatible and often conflicting foreign policy objectives. That Fox does not even acknowledge that conflict augers ill for any attempt by a Conservative administration to resolve it.

Further, there is no recognition that the UK no longer has (nor has had for some time) the capability for wholly autonomous military action. Any future action will either be in the context of a multi-national alliance, or with the material support of our allies.

Here, the conflict between the US and the EU presents the really difficult problems. In terms of physical and doctrinal interoperability, we can work with one set or the other – but it is very difficult to equip and structure our Armed Forces to work effectively with both.

Furthermore, each set has its own capabilities, the US bringing far more to the table than the EU. In that, effectively, we cannot provide a full suite of capabilities, our procurement programme and indeed our structures must be determined by our choice of ally. Trying to satisfy both leads to confusion, duplication and lack of cohesion.

We see, therefore, from Fox, a certain amount of evasion. He has identified a core issue, but he has not addressed it. Whether he will ever do so is a matter of conjecture.

COMMENT THREAD

One of the most frustrating – if not distressing – aspects of the defence debate is the way the issues are being over-simplified and used as political footballs, with the heavy emphasis on the cult of the personality.

The Sun is playing its usual dire games in this respect, picked up by that revered politician, John Redwood, who treats them with some approval.

What is distressing in this context is the willingness of so many to take what they read in the newspapers (and hear or watch on on the broadcast media) at face value. Our more sanguine readers will always assert that they never believe anything the media tells them, but a surprising number of people still slavishly follow the lines they are fed from this source.

Never more has this been so obvious than in the defence debate. The media would have us believe that the issues can be boiled down into the simple "Punch 'n' Judy" pastiche, where "wicked", idle and incompetent politicians are contrasted with "Our Brave Boys" and their upright, forthright and courageous leaders.

Life is never that simple, but the media would have it that way. But its simplistic approach does "Our Boys" no favours. We are dealing with complex problems here, and this playground approach to life-and-death matters confuses rather than illuminates the debate. The Sun says that "Our Boys" deserve better. Indeed they do - not least from the media.

More on Defence of the Realm.

Defence+debate+010[i-Defence+debate+010]From the defence debate today, Ann Winterton speaking (albeit to a somewhat less than packed House):

I came across a quotation the other day that seemed especially apt for this debate on the UK's defence. In his "The Art of War", Sun Tzu wrote:

"And as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions."

That succinctly describes the dilemma facing those charged with the procurement of arms, vehicles and systems for our armed services on active duty on behalf of the UK.

In order to plan comprehensively for the defence of the UK, one has to predict future difficulties and conflicts that could threaten, directly or indirectly, our nation and its interests. It would seem that the present counter-insurgency challenges facing our troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan—part of the war on terrorism—have not been accurately predicted by the military or by politicians. The Home Secretary recently talked about splitting the responsibilities of the Home Office to improve prospects in the war on terror. Perhaps the MOD needs to give a higher priority to counter-insurgency work, and to the necessary procurement for it, because the war on terror will most certainly not go away.

I am often reminded of the phrase "boys and toys" when I hear about the huge expenditure on procurement in the UK's defence budget, not least because I have always believed that it is not what we spend but how we spend it that is more important. For example, the RAF's budget is haemorrhaging because of the Eurofighter—that fantastically expensive creation of European integration—and if we enter into tranche 3, which will provide for ground attack, the aircraft will be too fast to be of any use as close air support in counter-insurgency work.

Similarly, the Royal Navy is besotted with the idea of its two future aircraft carriers, which inevitably absorb most of its funding. However, should not we ask whether those vessels will fit the requirements of the future? They will certainly be of limited value in counter-insurgency work, where the requirement is often as simple as inshore patrol vessels. The Army has been painfully restructured to fulfil the original concept of FRES—the future rapid effect system—to wage war against a conventional army at a distance, as part of the European rapid reaction force, double-hatted with NATO; yet that unattainable pipe dream seems to have been downgraded to the provision of medium-armoured vehicles.

The three examples I have briefly described, with the extra parts bolted on to form the complete packages, are very large funding projects indeed. During the Westminster Hall debate I secured on FRES, the Minister announced that its cost had risen, almost overnight, from £6 billion to £14 billion and I believe that it has now gone up to £16 billion in only a short time. Once again, the question has to be posed: can the UK afford such expensive procurement without compromising lesser but equally important projects with immediate needs, such as those to provide maximum protection and support for our troops on active service in Iraq and Afghanistan? The final question is the $64,000 one: will a future British Government be prepared to continue funding those expensive projects?

The MOD is making great strides in base protection from indirect fire, which includes the introduction of counter rocket, artillery and mortar—C-RAM—about which I asked an oral question on 22 January, following a tragic incident at Basra palace camp. Improved body armour has been supplied. The VIPIR thermal imager is excellent. Mastiff and Bulldog vehicles have been introduced and there are improved electronic counter-measures against improvised explosive devices. As has been said, there are additional medium-lift helicopters: eight mark 3 Chinooks, which are to be downgraded to mark 2s, to ensure that they actually work, and six Merlins from Denmark, which are exceptionally expensive aircraft. In addition, among other items, we now have the underslung grenade launcher and better communication kit.

Where we might be going wrong, however, is that the military, or perhaps even politicians, seem to want advanced technical toys that cover 100 per cent. of all possible requirements. I have already mentioned tranche 3 of the Eurofighter, but there is also the joint strike fighter, the Merlin helicopter and electric armour on new vehicles. Then, on cost only rather than technology grounds, there are the two carriers, Astute submarines, A400M transport aircraft, air-to-air refuelling replacement and the MARS—military afloat reach and sustainability—programme to replace all the Navy’s ageing supply ships. They are all incredibly expensive, and often need massive logistical back-up, yet we simply do not have the manpower to service them without taking personnel from other duties. Nor could we contemplate their potential loss, because we have insufficient financial resources to replace them, even if they could be procured at short notice, which is nigh on impossible.

Over the past three years, I have consistently pursued the issue of counter-insurgency, where the enemy is unknown and is indistinguishable from the local population. That was the main reason I was so sceptical about the original concept of FRES. It is essential for counter-insurgency work to have aerial surveillance, yet I am not entirely convinced of the reliability of unmanned aerial vehicles, which do not come cheap by any means, especially when the Iraqi air force has at least 12 SAMA CH2000 small aircraft fitted with XM15 electro-optical surveillance turrets for less than the price of one Lynx helicopter. However, the Minister will be relieved to hear that it is pleasing that the Army Air Corps now has four Britten Norman Defender 4S AL Mk1 aircraft, which I trust are still in Iraq. I recently tabled a written question on that point. They operate at a fraction of the hourly cost of other aircraft and are no doubt doing a superb job.

With the correct surveillance equipment, an expensive platform is not necessary to deliver results. With the contraction of UK forces in Iraq to Basra air base, for example, the limited routes into Basra should be under aerial surveillance 24 hours a day, seven days a week, as should those routes going south to protect the supply lines from Kuwait. That should not be too expensive, but I wonder if the Royal Air Force and the Army Air Corps would work together and co-operate on such a project.

Moreover, insurgents are upping the ante, as it were, by taking out Warriors and Challengers, but it takes them considerably longer to lay the much larger charges needed than to lay an IED—improvised explosive device—against a Snatch Land Rover. That provides the golden opportunity, if there is adequate surveillance, to catch and deal with the insurgents.

There should not be a shortage of helicopters, as there are plenty of Bell helicopters—commonly known in the American slang as "Hueys"—which can be leased at a 10th of the hourly cost of a Lynx. They can also operate well in the heat of Afghanistan and fly when conditions ground the Lynx.

At present, many of the requirements in the field of defence arise from dealing with insurgents resisting democracy and the UK simply cannot afford to fight that kind of a war by using the most expensive equipment, which is not always the best for the conditions. We can succeed, however, by using practical, cost-effective means such as the electro-optical surveillance turret within a simple platform. We can build vehicles with a balance between protection, speed and manoeuvrability, although it has to be said that reports about the Panther Command and Liaison vehicle have not been all that encouraging. As it seems that many, if not most, future conflicts will have to deal with insurgency, Britain needs a force that is both equipped and trained for insurgency work, which can be achieved at a fraction of the defence budget.

I end my brief contribution by saying that I believe the Secretary of State acted properly and appropriately in announcing an inquiry into the incident involving the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines on 23 March. I trust that the inquiry will have a beneficial long-term effect on counter-insurgency work and that the UK will be better equipped in future to deal with these extremely difficult situations.

I don't know where she gets her information from, but this MP seems remarkably knowledgeable.

COMMENT THREAD

link[i-link]It is a given that Reagan "won" the Cold War by outspending the Soviet Union, forcing it to compete in the arms race and thus driving it into bankruptcy, this precipitating its collapse.

Inevitably, things were more complex than that, and some might argue that the economic effects of the arms race were an unintended, if beneficial effect of a the "Star Wars" policy, in which Reagan actually believed.

Nevertheless, the idea is enough of a "hook" to remind us that there is always a significant economic aspect to most wars, and to assert that, as Reagan used the economic weapon against the USSR, so too – even if unwittingly – insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan are using the same weapon against us.

This is brought home by Booker, today, in his column who picks up on our piece about the relative costs of Army helicopters.

At least now, a much larger number of people will be aware that the Army Lynx helicopter, designed for use in northern Europe and hopelessly unsuited to hot conditions, is costing £23,000 an hour while the upgraded Vietnam-era Hueys - known as the Bell 212s (pictured top left) – are much better suited to hot conditions and able to carry a bigger payload, and cost a mere (by comparison) £2,000 an hour.

The issue here, however, is far wider that just cost of individual pieces of kit. At stake here is capacity – the ability to deploy enough resources in counter-insurgency operations to have a decisive effect, without breaking the bank.

Short of total war, as in the Second World War, where military spending takes priority over everything, the military will always have to compete for funds against other public spending priorities. And, where there are other more popular (or potentially vote-winning causes) there will always tend to be a shortage of funds.

Shortfalls, therefore, are a fact of life and, while lobbying can have an effect, it will not always be successful. Therefore, if it is to prevail in operational theatres, the military has to find ways of maintaining or improving its capabilities at less cost.

AIR+-+Lynx+004[i-AIR+-+Lynx+004]The use of cheaper Hueys is a good example of how this can be done, and we are talking about real money. Although we have already bought the Lynx helicopters (example pictured right), the Army (and Royal Marines) only have 86 Mk7s (less now after losses) on its inventory and they have to last a long time – until at least 2012.

Each aircraft consumes spares and has only so many airframe hours. Once they are used up, the aircraft must be scrapped or very expensively re-built. And, while the Army is heavily engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, it still has many other commitments, and much continue to train for conventional warfighting. It cannot afford to use up its entire fleet simply on its counter-insurgency operations.

What applies to helicopters, though, also applies to other kit. Already, we established the huge cost of operating Warrior MICVs, at £250 per mile.

While we have been unable to establish the costs of running vehicles like the Mastiff, it is likely to be around the quarter of the cost per mile of running tracked equipment. Furthermore, even Thomas Harding of The Telegraph are prepared to concede that the Mastiff armoured trucks are "more resilient against mines". Their utility is easily confirmed by the US Marine Corps which recently reported that, in more than 300 attacks since last year, no Marines have died while riding in what are now termed Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAP).

But where some of the really big bucks are spent is not by the Army, but by the RAF in providing air support. In addition to the figures on helicopter operations, therefore, Tory MP Ann Winterton also obtained data on some of the RAF's costs.

AIR+-+Harrier+003[i-AIR+-+Harrier+003]In particular, she asked for the costs of the primary (and only) close air support aircraft provided by the RAF in Afghanistan, the £14 million Harrier. The results again are staggering. According to defence minister Adam Ingram, the cost per hour averaged over the six GR7 and two GR9 Harrier aircraft operating is no less than £37,000. This includes forward and depth servicing, fuel, the cost of one Flight Lieutenant pilot, training support costs and the cost of capital charge and depreciation. It does not include, however, the cost of the ordnance. Bombs are extra.

One issue here is that, in Afghanistan, the targets are very often of low economic value, either small clusters of Taliban armed with cheap weapons, or converted civilian vehicles, often worth considerably less than the cost of the bomb used to target them, much less the cost of delivery.

This problem can confronted by the United States in Vietnam, and was one of the reasons why the famous piston-engined Skyraider was returned to service. Other reasons were its ability to fly slowly and thus deliver ordnance with greater precision than fast jets, and its considerable endurance, enabling it to loiter over the battlefield and deliver ordnance within minutes of a target being identified.

ALXSuperTucano_5[i-ALXSuperTucano_5]It modern terms we already have an aircraft on the register that could do an equivalent job. This is the Short Tucano, operated as a basic trainer by the RAF. Already, however, a ground attack version has been developed. Notionally, it can only carry a third of the Harrier's load (although the Harrier usually has to carry underwing fuel, reducing its carrying capacity) but that still amounts to five Paveway 540lb bombs.

Unlike the Harrier, which has such pitifully short endurance that it can only be despatched, once a target has been positively identified, the Tucano has a massive 6 hours 30 minutes endurance.

As to the costs, the RAF paid just over £1 million for its aircraft and the total cost per hour is £5,411. For every Harrier hour, you could fly six Tucanos and still have change. That would allow you to have aircraft continually orbiting the battlefield, ready to deliver ordnance in the style of the WWII "taxicab" Typhoons, as and when needed. For sure, that would erode your cost advantage, but the capability enhancement would be significant.

The thing is, such ideas are not new. We applied them in WWII, in the Korean War and the US in Vietnam. Every time the shooting dies down, however, the military forgets the lessons and goes back to buying expensive new toys.

Those lessons, it seems, must again be re-learnt. War, as much as anything, is an economic enterprise and the military (and its political masters) might do well to devote more time and energy to getting more bangs for our bucks.

COMMENT THREAD

There is an extraordinarily silly piece by Leo McKinstry in today's Sunday Telegraph. He compares the behaviour of former England cricket coach Duncan Fletcher, who resigned after the lacklustre performance of the English team, with that of defence secretary Des Browne over the Iran hostages affair.

Part of the McKinstry thesis is that "a national humiliation should be followed by resignation," which is fair enough. But he wants Browne to fall on his sword and, because he does, his argument fails, even in its own terms. He is simply not comparing like with like.

While there might be parallels, the relationship between the English team and Fletcher is roughly that as between the Cornwall's boarding party and the Captain of HMS Cornwall or, perhaps, Commodore Nick Lambert.

On the other hand, the relationship of Des Browne to HMS Cornwall is closer to that of David Collier, the chief executive of the England and Wales Cricket Board, with the English team. Thus, only if McKinstry wants to keep Fletcher in place, and howl after the blood of Collier, does his argument stand.

A similar, although almost certainly unintended confusion exists in the Sunday Times piece by Mick Smith on the Nimrod, which we flagged up earlier.

The story is a sound piece of journalism, reporting that the fleet of Nimrod surveillance aircraft currently undergoing major upgrades to MR4 standard will contain the same ageing and leaking fuel systems that caused last year's disaster in which 14 crew died.

As with McKinstry, though, the confusion arises with allocating the responsibility. The headline (written by the subs) reads, "MoD accused of cost-cutting on crash plane," while Smith's piece starts: "The defence secretary, Des Browne, is facing accusations that the government has put cost-cutting before the welfare of the services by failing to remedy safety faults…".

Smith points out that the fuel pipes that leaked in the disastrous Nimrod crash last year are single skin, and they are being retained in the upgraded aircraft. Yet modern versions are double skin. Keeping the single skin pipes "to save money" is described by an anonymous pilot as "totally reckless.

Raising such an issue is perfectly responsible journalism and it is right and proper that Smith should have written his story in this way. But there are limits to what you can get in and the issues are far more complex than can be allowed for in one piece.

Firstly, the Nimrod upgrade project is already in trouble. In 2004, the MoD was heavily criticised because it was then £400 million over budget and 71 months late. Retro-fitting new fuel systems would add to the costs and delays, forcing the existing MR2 models to be kept in service even longer than their now much-extended phase-out date of 2010. That, of course, would create its own problems.

Secondly, double skinning is not a panacea. An outer skin can make inspection of the inner pipework more difficult, concealing corrosion or stress fractures. Then, differential stresses between the two skins (and their fixings) can actually induce fractures that would not have occurred in a single pipe. The combination of this phenomenon and inspection difficulties could lead to precisely the sort of catastrophic failure that double-skinning is designed to prevent.

In a new aircraft, these issues would be considered very carefully, and the design team would eliminate any such problems. But the Nimrod is not a new aircraft and introducing a new system in an old airframe is a laborious and expensive exercise that carries no absolute certainty of success. All or any combination of strengthening the pipe material (or making sections more flexible), changing the design of fixings and/or couplings, increasing inspection access (and inspection frequency) and reducing design life, may be a valid option.

Keeping the single skin, therefore, may be "totally reckless", but it may not. It may not even be motivated, in whole or part, by the need to save money. Delay and the consequences of delay on operations may be an equal or greater consideration.

Either way, Des Browne is neither competent nor qualified to make the decision, which will have rested on detailed and complex technical evaluations, conveyed to him by his advisors. That is the nature of so much modern government. On issues such as these, the minister has to trust his "experts".

It would help if we had an independent technical capability – say through the House of Commons Select Committee system – to second-guess these decisions, but as it stands, we have to rely on the technical competence of the contractors, the RAF and the MoD. And mistakes do happen. But to pin them solely, or at all, on a politician – a layman in engineering terms – does not seem to be the complete answer.

Herein lies a fascinating conundrum which goes to the heart of the nature modern government – as to whether the systems of accountability developed in the 18th Century and before are still adequate.

Looking at the Nimrod project as a whole, this, as we pointed out on Thursday, was commissioned in 1996 - by a Conservative defence secretary, Michael Portillo. The original proposal had been for a brand-new (American-built) airframe but the prime contractor, BAE Systems, played the "jobs" card and an unpopular Tory government caved in and bought British.

Anyone looking dispassionately at the project could have seen problems. A new-build was always a better option. So, at the heart of Browne's current travails is a poor, politically motivated decision by the Tories. But it could have been overturned in 1997 by the incoming Labour government, when the new defence secretary, George Robertson, took over.

Two other defence secretaries, Geoff Hoon and John Reid have since been involved in the project and only now is Browne in the hot seat. If the current incumbent is to be held responsible, this is the equivalent of the party game, "pass the parcel". The last one holding the post gets the blame. Who, under those circumstances, would be willing to take on a portfolio?

On the other hand, what more usually happens is that, with so many people sharing the responsibility, the blame is diluted and no heads roll. Not least, because the decision was originally made by a government which is now in opposition, the politicians are compromised and criticism is thus muted.

In these circumstances, therefore, how we manage the process of government, minimise failure and hold people to account when they do fail, are serious issues and need answers. They are ones, though, that newspapers can hardly handle – although the occasional, thoughtful op-ed would not go amiss. Think-tanks might make a contribution, but nothing seems forthcoming, and you cannot expect anything currently from an opposition which is more interested in political point-scoring than serious politics.

That leaves the blogs. We at least are free from editorial constraints – which frustrate serious defence correspondents – and, if some writers could get past "tee-hee" political gossip and "pub talk", the blogsphere could make a contribution to a debate that we badly need to have.

Such ruminations, however, do not have a big market. Smith's piece will be read by, perhaps, a million people. McKinstry's stupidity will get an audience of several hundred thousand. This piece will get no more than two or three thousand readers. It may be enough – quality rather than quantity - but, although unlikely, it would be nice to see a broader debate.

AIR+-+Lynx+001[i-AIR+-+Lynx+001]Millions of pounds are being frittered away on operating inadequate helicopters in Iraq and Afghanistan, when more capable helicopters are available at a fraction of the cost. The Army is paying £2.3 million per hundred hours of flying operations, on one helicopter type, when it could be paying £200,000.

This has emerged from a series of Parliamentary questions asked by Tory MP, Ann Winterton, who tabled questions on the operating costs of Army Lynx tactical helicopters compared with Bell 212 (Huey) helicopters, which are also operated by the Army.

According to defence minister Adam Ingram, the baseline costs per hour of operating Lynx Mk7s are a staggering £23,000. This includes both fixed and marginal costs incurred in using the aircraft, comprising servicing costs, fuel costs, crew capitation and training costs, support costs and charges for capital and depreciation.

In addition to that, costs are incurred as a result of the operational use and particular climatic conditions experienced in theatre. These costs cover additional wear and tear, additional spares and additional equipment and are paid for by the Conflict Prevention Fund. A total of £11 million has been claimed against the fund in financial year 2006-07 for additional operating and capital costs for Lynx Mk7's operating in Iraq, of which six are believed to be in service.

By contrast, the cost per hour of operating the Bell 212 helicopter (pictured below), which the Army uses in Belize and Brunei, is a mere £2,000. Furthermore, this is the total cost, as the machines are provided through lease contracts and are not owned by the MoD.

Bell+212[i-Bell+212]
The price is based on firm monthly charges which are inclusive of all costs (less fuel) associated with the provision of serviceable helicopters. The monthly charge payable by the MoD includes leasing and operating costs. Approximately one third of this monthly charge is attributable to operating costs.

As to performance, although the Bell 412 is based on the Vietnam era Huey, it has been substantially upgraded and was selected specifically by the Army because of its - according to the Army Air Corps's own website - "unique abilities include flying in hot and often humid conditions whilst also being able to carry considerable loads." That includes the ability to lift up to 13 troops.

By contrast, the Lynx is an aircraft optimised for high speed anti-tank operations in temperate Northern Europe. While it once held the world speed record for helicopters, it performs poorly in hot and high conditions – either or both of which are found in Iraq and Afghanistan. In both theatres, there are times when it has been unable to operate between dawn and dusk, leaving troops without air cover. Additionally, as opposed to the 13 troops that the Bell 212 can carry, the Lynx is limited to nine.

Brunei2[i-Brunei2]Overall, the cost differentials are staggering. For a typical flying profile of 100 hours per month for Lynx Mk7s, the Army is paying £2,300,000 for each machine, when it could be paying £200,000 to operate a Bell 212. Annualised, this works out at £27.6 million for each Lynx, equating to £25 million more than operating a Bell 212. With a fleet of six Lynx helicopters in theatre, this works out £150 million in unnecessary costs, on top of which there is the £11 million Conflict Prevention Fund payment for the Iraqi fleet alone. Potentially, the Army could save over £160 million a year by leasing Bell 212s in Iraq or, more importantly, could operate 100 of these aircraft and still have change.

As we pointed out as recently as yesterday complaints of "underfunding" have been a constant refrain in the defence debate. And, while we would not disagree that there are serious shortages of funds in some areas, the answers to these questions reinforce our argument that we are not always getting value for money.

In the continuous pursuit of more complex machines, we actually end up getting less capability at considerably greater cost. We need, therefore, to reframe the debate and look in more detail at what we are actually getting for our money.

COMMENT THREAD

Mail+001+H[i-Mail+001+H]It is unlikely that the prominence of the front page content of The Daily Mail this morning was entirely dictated by news values. And, if the message is not clear enough, the implied snub is made that much clearer by the headline spanning pages two and three (pictured below).

Its declaration, "An absolute credit to the Army", referring to the two women soldiers who were killed by a bomb in Basra on Wednesday night makes a marked contrast to the relegation of the Iran hostages story, which has to wait for pages six and seven for treatment.

Mercifully, none of the newspapers seem to have used the AP photograph of Seaman Batchelor, one of the captured boarding party (below left), who was snapped holding hands with not only mummy but auntie as well, a picture which does not exactly convey the martial values of this once great nation of ours. It is some small compensation that The Daily Telegraph and others carry an account of what our servicemen are still capable of doing.

In terms of news management, one can now see a certain amount of logic in the way the MoD spin meisters are handling the Iran hostages issue. By not holding back with an official Board of Inquiry, and holding a high profile news conference, objectionable though it may be, they have achieved a sort of "closure" and will now hope that the media circus will move on without looking too closely at the underlying, and even more embarrassing issues.

Mail+002+H[i-Mail+002+H]Here, of course, the blogs could come into their own, pursuing the aspects of the incident that the media have neither the patience nor the capability to follow but, throughout the whole affair. And, although that is precisely what we intend to do – although not with the same intensity of the least two weeks - it is quite remarkable how little comment there has been from the British blogosphere, and how superficial and ill-informed has been such comment as has found its way onto the net.

For robust and informed comment, you have to cross the Atlantic, where Michelle Malkin and her Hot Air blog, plus Redstate, National Review and others have led the way. Little Green Footballs, meanwhile, has the video showing how badly the hostages were treated.

Matching the silence of the (British) blogs has been a distinct lack of comment from the main political parties. In the early stages of the incident, this was understandable, as none would want to be seen to be handicapping the process of freeing the hostages. Now, however, when it is quite evident that the government is intent on burying the issue as fast as is humanly possible, the opposition should be in full cry, demanding answers to the hundred and once questions raised by the affair.

arthurbatcheloraz4[i-arthurbatcheloraz4]For sure, with Parliament in recess for the Easter holidays, the opposition is robbed of the opportunity to grandstand in the Commons, but, in some ways, getting your message into the media is actually easier. With mainstream government business in temporary suspension, the media is short of political copy and there is a good market for robust comment from opposition spokesmen.

The problem is though that, like the British blogs, the opposition – and especially the Conservative Party – has nothing interesting or original to say. We saw a taster of the line defence spokesman Liam Fox is going to take, when in his one and only BBC interview, the point to which he gave his main emphasis was the "shortage" of helicopters, which is by no means the most important of the issues to emerge and nor is it particularly relevant.

The limp-wristed response may be a function of the "girlie boy" line taken by the Boy King, who does not want his Green-Blue party to be associated with such nasty, manly issues like defence (even if women are getting killed and captured) but there must be millions of voters out there who have been appalled by this incident and want answers which the government is quite evidently unwilling to deliver.

There is, therefore, an opportunity for the opposition to shine, demonstrating an ability to get to grips with serious issues of the day and to back the government into a corner on matters that are of real interest to a very large number of potential Conservative voters. Unfortunately, it looks as if the Party is going to duck the challenge, projecting an image that is closer to Seaman Batchelor with his mummy and auntie than to one of a party which is fit and ready to govern.

COMMENT THREAD

aeron+chair[i-aeron+chair]According to Reuters, defence secretary Des Browne has "castigated armchair pundits" who criticised how the naval personnel behaved. He is said to have told Sky News, "We ought to be very careful about commenting from the comparative comfort of wherever we are, when we are not out there on operations, about decisions that operational commanders and other people make."

This of course, is the line the military often takes, thus arguing for a license to do whatever they deem fit, whether competently or not, free from the inconvenience of being held responsible for their actions.

The killer phrase is more usually "armchair general", although "pundits" will serve. This is calculated to defuse criticism, especially from "gobshite civilians" whose role in the greater scheme of things is to pay the bills (such as for transporting 15 marines and sailors from Heathrow to Devon in not one but two helicopters ... how much did that cost, I wonder?) and keep their mouths shut.

When it comes to comfort and "armchairs", however, we would have a long way to go to match the splendour of the MoD.

Amongst other gems in their £2.3 billion head office refurbishment, was the purchase of 3,100 luxury Herman Miller Aeron chairs — the kind used by David Dimbleby on the BBC's Question Time — which have been described as "the most comfortable office chairs in the world". The cost is reputed to be more than £1,000 each, and not a few of these will be polished by well-upholstered uniformed rumps.

And dare we wonder what sort of chair Des Browne has in his office?

COMMENT THREAD

Ilves[i-Ilves]Small European nations, such as the three Baltic states, cannot easily sustain the cost of maintaining a dual defence arrangement with Nato and the European Union.

So said Estonian President Toomas Ilves (pictured), at a press conference in Helsinki with Finnish President Tarja Halonen, both leaders agreeing that the best solution for nations like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is for the EU to increase collaboration with Nato and establish a joint approach to European defence systems.

This is according to Defense News which has Ilves complaining that, while large European countries might be able to afford a dual system, the smaller ones cannot. Estonia, for instance, is both a Nato member and a nation within the EU. "In defence terms," he says, "this demands we dedicate time and resources to our Nato role and EU defence systems. This is costly for small nations. The vital dimension is that the EU and NATO must collaborate more closely."

This blows apart any claim that the EU defence identity is complementary to Nato, simply providing an alternative political framework for deploying the same military forces in areas where there is no Nato interest.

Hence does the Estonian president complain that it makes no sense for Europe to have two powerful parallel organisations that have "little contact with each other." He believes it would be much better "if small European nations could co-ordinate their defence arrangements with a single European defence organisation, rather than having to budget for two parallel organisations."

"National defence costs are rising at a time when European nations are being called upon to support Nato's international crisis missions and contribute to the EU's rapid response forces," added the Finnish president. "The issue of dual defence arrangements is one that needs to be examined."

This is, of course, precisely the issue to which we have been drawing attention for some time, so it is helpful to get formal acknowledgement that Nato EU members are having to finance what amounts to two separate defence polities.

This has been evident in the British struggle to support the war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, while also building up the incompatible equipment and structures needed to meet the specifications for the European Rapid Reaction Force.

One area where Ilves is wrong, though, is in believing that large European countries can necessarily afford a dual system. The UK cannot afford huge white elephants like the Eurofighter, and it cannot afford two carrier groups and the Army's FRES programme, and support two wards, all on the current defence budget.

Our government has to admit that this, and – if it is going to maintain its commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan – cut back its support for building a European defence identity. Otherwise, it must put much more money into the defence budget and come clean with the British public, identifying the additional expenditures as part of the price of further European integration.

COMMENT THREAD

al+Amarah+explosion2[i-al+Amarah+explosion2]Attacks on the Basra Palace base are intensifying, says the Radio 4 BBC Today programme, which this morning ran a short piece on how the Army is coping. Soldiers, we are told, are routinely getting only three or four hours sleep a night, as they are exposed to incessant mortaring.

Despite this, a young Army officer interviewed claimed that the Army is "getting the upper hand" and "has the ability to track and defeat this enemy".

The piece follows this officer and his troops, who form the "Quick Reaction Force", chasing down the attackers … in Warrior mechanised infantry combat vehicles. Predictably, by the time they arrive at the co-ordinates from which an attack had been mounted, there was no sign of the enemy, although the piece recorded that, on this occasion, the patrol was ambushed and a gunfight erupted.

As is so often the case, the report was superficial. The previous night, a patrol had captured a car in which rockets and bombs had been found, but we were not told how this came about. But no insurgents were captured or killed.

Once again, therefore, we seem to be in the same situation that frustrated the ground patrols at the Abu Naji base in al Amarah, before it was abandoned because of the incessant attacks (the picture above shows the effects of one). By the time they arrived, the insurgents had long gone, hence the need for a helicopter response – which we know was occasionally provided by the United States.

Why this resource is not available remains one of those modern-day mysteries, compounded in this event by another. The patrol described by the Today programme, arriving at the scene, did not appear to know the whereabouts of the mortar crew which had mounted the attacked. Yet, as we discussed in our earlier piece, the technology exists to pinpoint and follow attackers, using advanced electro-optical equipment fitted to fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.

Here the mystery deepens. Despite my comments about the lack of equipment and the failure to learn from Northern Ireland, it seems the Army was well able to learn the lessons.

Defender[i-Defender]
As the picture and narrative above shows, in December 2003, three Britten Norman Defender aircraft were ordered for use in Basra - each equipped with the formidable electro-optical equipment which has been so successful in tracking insurgents - the first aircraft entering service with the Army on 1 October 2004 - just 9½ months later.

It also appears that these aircraft were available in al Amarah. We also know that the base there was equipped with Mamba counter-battery radar, which means that some of the key elements needed to deal with the mortar threat were in place.

What appears to have been missing were the helicopters to convey troops rapidly to the scene, and an effective patrol strategy.

AIR+-+Sama+008[i-AIR+-+Sama+008]This notwithstanding, currently, there are no indications that the Defenders are still in use. There is no reference to them on the Army Air Corps website, they do not appear on the main MoD site and no official photographs seem to have been published. And, even if they were still in use, three aircraft are not enough to mount 24/7 standing patrols covering all the British bases. This might explain why we are resorting to using the Iraqi Sama aircraft (the model here seen over Basra air base).

Operational security is one thing but, on the face of it, it would appear that the lack of information on our capabilities is aimed more at concealing inadequacies than protecting our troops. And, despite having its reporter on the ground, the BBC did not even seem to notice.

COMMENT THREAD

AIR+-+Sama+003[i-AIR+-+Sama+003]Earlier this month we picked up the fact that the British Army was relying on air support from the Iraqi Air Force, flying cut-price, militarised versions of a Canadian-designed light aircraft – the Sama CH2000 - flying out of Basra Air Station.

Through a Parliamentary Question tabled by Ann Winterton , we now learn that the support provided is no occasional outing. In the last two months some 70 sorties have been flown, backing up our Army.

In many ways, this is exceedingly good news. In the first instance, it can do no harm to the morale of Iraqi personnel to have provided such a valuable service to the British Army. Secondly, one is reassured that the Army is getting cover from these invaluable aircraft. Fitted with the MX-15 optical surveillance turret and data links, they are as capable as the Nimrod MR2 and the Merlin helicopters used for land surveillance, which are fitted with exactly the same equipment.

But most of all, with the Sama costing a mere £360,000, this proves the point that a land surveillance capability need not cost the earth – or the £14.2 million that the MoD is planning to spend (average) on each of the Future Lynx helicopters which will give the British Army the same capability as the Samas (but not until 2014).

Islander[i-Islander]Interestingly, since 1989, the Army has been operating the "cheap and cheerful" Britten Norman AL1 Islander on surveillance duties, mainly in Northern Ireland – where so much experience has been gained on counter-terrorist operations. The same equipment, especially if fitted with the MX-15 turret, would be ideal for operations in southern Iraq, and would cost far less than the RAF Nimrods and the Merlins which, at the moment, are the only British aircraft providing this capability.

One wonders why the Army needs to relearn the lesson it gained in Northern Ireland, or perhaps it takes the view that, as long as the RAF is providing the service "free of charge" it need not invest in its own future. Certainly, any organisation that would prefer to spend £14 million on a capability that it could have for a fraction of the price cannot be said to be short of funds.

COMMENT THREAD

Petraeus[i-Petraeus]As we reach the fourth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, the airwaves are full of wailing and gnashing of teeth as the moonbats debate the merits or – more usually – otherwise, of the military action. Given less attention – and much less than it deserves – however, is another debate, this one on how the military should gear up to fighting and winning the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

For the Americans, that debate has been underway for some time and, yesterday, the AFP agency acknowledge the outcome, with a piece headed: "War remoulds army into boots-on-the-ground counter-insurgency force".

The US military, it says – citing "analysts and military officials" - is strained and stretched by the bloody conflict, but it has been forced to adapt and relearn how it fights its wars.

General David Petraeus (pictured above), the new US commander in Iraq, spent the past year writing the Army's first counter-insurgency manual in two decades, reviving a military art that had been all but lost after the Vietnam War. Troops are training for urban combat at mock Iraqi villages in the Mojave Desert, and counter-insurgency is the subject of the day at military academies and in the pages of journals. A new generation of combat-tested military leaders is in command.

But the agency also reports that "some generals worry it [the US Army] may lose its edge in fighting high-tech conventional wars," a fear very much reflected in British military circles, not least by Air Chief Marshall Sir Michael Graydon (retd), who we recorded saying that "We mustn't fall into the trap of becoming a peace-keeping militia." He declares: "An ability to conduct full-scale military operations is the foundation for successful peace-making and peace-keeping."

What is interesting here is that, while the United States military also confronted this issue in a big way during the Vietnam era, the UK has never engaged in the debate in the same way – or to the same extent. Previously, British counter-insurgency operations have absorbed a relatively small part of defence budgets, so the military were never forced to make a choice between conventional and counter-insurgency operations. But, as forces have contracted and we have taken on commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, gearing up for counter-insurgency operations is having a significant impact, especially on the Army.

Equally interesting is that many of the arguments that emerged during the Vietnam era – especially over the use of airpower – were never really resolved. Yet, if they are being re-addressed by the Americans, so far in the UK the debate has not really taken off - at least, not in public.

One element of that debate is about (or should be about) the costs of technology, which is getting so expensive that even wealthy countries like the US have difficulty in affording it. Another is that the increasing sophistication and performance of military hardware, which is now out of balance with the primitive nature of the enemy that is being fought.

45144277[i-45144277]The classic example of both elements is the Apache attack helicopter (pictured right) which, in British hands, ended up costing £60 million each. A hugely complex machine designed for killing Warsaw Pact tanks on the plains of northern Europe, it is now being used to kill Taliban fighters who are able to field nothing more sophisticated than 4x4 pick-up trucks and ancient Russian machine guns.

What needs to emerge from the debate is the definition of military equipment which embodies sufficient capability to do the job yet which is sufficiently affordable to permit the purchase of enough units to meet operational demands. There is no point having equipment that is capable of meeting all contingencies which ends up being so expensive that not enough is bought, or it is too expensive to use.

To this problem we have alluded in our piece yesterday when we pointed out that hi-tech MX-15 optical surveillance equipment is at the moment carried by a variety of platforms, ranging from the Nimrod MR2 and the Merlin helicopter, to the Iraqi Air Force Sama 2000s. More to the point, this same equipment will be fitted to the Future Lynx, which, at an average of £14.2 million per airframe, will end up being used to carry out exactly the same task as the £360,000 Sama 2000.

Auster+002[i-Auster+002]It is in the use of helicopters generally that costs are getting out of hand. Before they became available, many of the functions at present carried out by them were done by fixed wing aircraft, latterly the Auster AOP9 which continued in service until 1965. And while it could not perform all the duties of a helicopter, its short take-off and landing capabilities did allow it to perform air observation, casualty evacuation and utility transport operations. Undoubtedly, something similar could perform many of the duties currently undertaken by helicopters – especially if fitted with the MX-15 optical surveillance equipment – at a fraction of the cost.

Similarly, where helicopters are needed and there is absolutely no alternative, instead of always using Lynx, Chinooks or Merlin helicopters, we could for some of the tasks fly the updated version of the Vietnam era Huey, known as the Bell 412. This costs a fraction of what the other types cost to buy and operate.

Bell+412[i-Bell+412]More particularly, the Lynx struggles to operate in the hot conditions of Iraq and, doubly suffers in the hot and high conditions in Afghanistan. There, it has been reported that the extreme heat and thin, rising air of the Helmand desert has limited the Lynx to operations between dusk and dawn, when temperatures fall to acceptable levels.

On the other hand, the "unique abilities" of the Bell 412s include "flying in hot and often humid conditions whilst also being able to carry considerable loads", for which purpose the Army has acquired six military versions which it employs in the predominantly jungle areas of Brunei and Belize – but not in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly, the Pakistani Air Force, which must operate in conditions very similar to those in Afghanistan, flies Bell 412s.

avtweet_1[i-avtweet_1]It is not only in the use of helicopters, however, where the debate is needed. When it comes to air support, the role of more economic equipment also needs to be discussed. The USAF went through the arguments extensively in the 1960s as sophisticated, high performance aircraft like the Phantom became available. Too fast to allow accurate delivery of close air support, and so large that it presented an inviting target to ground fire, cheaper and more effective alternatives were soon employed. Amongst those was the piston-engined Skyraider and the T-37 basic trainer (pictured), which became a potent warbird.

About the same time, the British equivalent, the Jet Provost, was upgraded to become the Strikemaster, giving good service in the Oman insurgency, alongside Hueys which were able to operate in the desert heat.

tucano_ZF142_clouds[i-tucano_ZF142_clouds]For our air support in Afghanistan, however, we operate Harrier GR9s – upgraded versions of the GR7 – hugely expensive machines with limited payloads. Their one advantage is the ability to make vertical take-offs and landings, but neither of these attributes are used. For the type of support needed in the region, the Tucano used by the RAF as a basic trainer could do the job. And, at £5 million, per aircraft, the cost is less than that paid to convert a GR7 to GR9 standard, allowing us to buy many more.

What does emerge from this is that money is not always the issue, and despite claims to the contrary, the Armed Forces are not actually short of money for equipment – buying better, as can be demonstrated with the Bell 412, can also mean buying cheaper.

Getting in the way though is the determination of the military to buy those increasingly expensive and complex "toys". For the UK to afford to go to war - and win - this process must be reversed.

Thus, in a similar contest, said Ed E. Heinemann, designer of the B-26 Invader, the A-1 SkyRaider and the A-4 SkyHawk: "The obstacles to any simplification may seem insurmountable, and the reasons for more complexity are many and powerful. But if we permit this Frankenstein of complexity to continue to work at its current plodding, insidious rate, it will slowly overwhelm us to impotency."

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