EU Referendum

Showing posts with label aid. Show all posts

top-secret[i-top-secret]
One has to smile, even if a little wanly, at the letter from Richard Shaw in The Sunday Telegraph today.

He refers to Booker's piece last week ("Weather records are a state secret"), which reminded him of an incident in the 1970s when he was writing technical manuals for the Services.

If, as occasionally happened, writes Shaw, an author was refused some piece of information on security grounds, his colleagues would jocularly suggest that he ask either a defence journalist or the Russian Embassy.

One author, who had been asked to include in his manual a table showing the difference in barometric pressure at one foot intervals from sea level to over 100,000 feet, was apparently told that this was highly classified information which could be released only to someone with the appropriate level of security clearance.

He took the usual joke literally and rang the Russian Embassy which, to everyone's amazement, as it was during the Cold War, duly sent him the required details.

This also reminds me of a long-running controversy in the 70s about the number of incursions of Soviet aircraft into British airspace, testing our defences and reaction times. Flight magazine mounted a spirited campaign to obtain from the government details of the number of Soviet flights that had been intercepted by the RAF.

The government consistently refused to supply the information on the grounds of "national security", provoking an exasperated comment from Flight, that we "wouldn't want the Russians to know, would we?"

So it is today. Much of what the government withholds on the basis of "security grounds" is kept secret not for fear it might aid any putative enemy, but simply to keep its own citizens in the dark.

This I found when researching for Ministry of Defeat. Much of the information came not from official channels – or the British media – but from Arab "resistance" sites, which gave consistent and remarkably accurate information about the activities of British troops.

But then, there is that very funny episode in Yes Minister when Hacker wants to know what the Foreign Office is up to. He is advised to contact the Israeli embassy.

With Booker today recounting the bizarre tale of the MoD press officer suing the ministry for forcing him to tell lies, we have at least one consistent frame of reference to work from. If it comes from the lips of an "official spokesman", we can usually take the opposite for the truth.

COMMENT THREAD

link[i-link]At first I imagined that I was treading in the footsteps of William Morris who had written about Iceland; then I checked my facts (always a useful thing to do) and found that though Morris had visited Iceland at least twice and translated several of the sagas he had not written any books that could be called news from Iceland. He did write a poem about the country and published his travel journals, though. That's just as well because I am not exactly a follower of William Morris: a great deal to be said for his designs but his literary output is heavy going and his political ideas are mushy to put it mildly.

W. H. Auden, on the other hand, is a man I admire greatly; just in time I recalled that he and Louis MacNeice (less admired but good nevertheless) wrote a book together, called Letters from Iceland. That's all right, then. I do not mind treading in their footsteps though it is unlikely that I shall ever produce poetry one tenth as good as Auden's.

Right, on with the motley. (Hey, you have to keep up on this blog.) The government of Iceland has, as we know, applied for EU membership, which was not the cause of unalloyed joy either in that country or in the existing Member States.

Now we have a couple of updates on the situation from Hjörtur J. Guðmundsson of the excellent EU News from Iceland. This posting analyzes poll results about EU membership in Iceland.

Polls asking if people wanted to start membership talks (aðildarviðræður) with the EU have almost always resulted in a majority in favour.

Polls asking if people wanted to apply for membership (umsókn um aðild) of the EU have almost always resulted in a majority against.

Polls asking if people wanted to join the EU have usually resulted in a 50/50 situation.The first two examples obviously contradict each other. But this has an explanation. For years people in favour of EU membership have claimed it was possible to enter some kind of a non-obligational "scouting talks" with the EU just to find out what kind of a deal Iceland would be able to get.

Of course, as the talks progress the Icelanders will realize that those non-obligational, exploratory talks are more mythological than the Viking heroes of old. And as Mr Guðmundsson points out, there will have to be a referendum before Iceland actually joins. Not to mention the possibility of the government falling.

In another article on EU Observer Mr Guðmundsson deals with that familiar canard that countries in the EEA might as well join the EU because they have to adopt most of the legislation, anyway, while having no hand in shaping it. Anyone would think that Britain a fully paid up member of the European Union had any say in that legislation but let that pass.

In any case, Mr Guðmundsson says, this is not true.

In the spring of 2005 research carried out by the EFTA [European Free Trade Association] secretariat in Brussels at the request of the Icelandic foreign ministry, however, revealed that only 6.5 percent of all EU legislation was subjected to the EEA agreement between 1994 (when it came into force) and 2004.

In March 2007 a report published by a special committee on Europe commissioned by the Icelandic prime minister, showed that some 2,500 pieces of EU legislation had been adopted in Iceland during the first decade of the EEA agreement. The study also found that about 22 percent of Icelandic laws passed by the parliament originated from the EU during the same period of time.

The totality of EU legislation is according to various sources around 25,000 to 30,000 legal acts. Total Icelandic laws and regulations, however, are around 5,000. Of those there are less than 1,000 laws, the rest is regulations. Even if the entire legislation of Iceland came from the EU it would only be around 20 percent of the total acquis communautaire.

Clearly Iceland does not adopt two thirds of all the legislation of the EU; neither is it true, to turn the numbers round, that two thirds of Icelandic legislation comes from the EU.

COMMENT THREAD

afghan-guards-govt[i-afghan-guards-govt]
In projecting the progress of the counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, metrics most commonly by the media are the deaths of British soldiers and, more generally, the deaths of other coalition troops. Further "downstream" are reports of the deaths of Afghani citizens, both civilians, members of the security forces and such categories as security guards.

In the hierarchy of death, however, we have long been aware that there has been a ranking applied by the popular media – the emphasis (quite understandably) given to British troops. Much less attention is given to other nationalities and, down the scale, are incidents involving Afghanis, which are often completely unreported.

Much the same applied to the campaign in Iraq, to the extent where the death of even quite prominent Iraqis went unreported, sometimes dropped in favour of more prominent events, especially those with a domestic political content.

This, I remarked upon in Ministry of Defeat, in one instance noting that the murder of a prominent Sunni and his son in Basra – and the kidnap of five others - had gone unreported. The British media had focused on Tony Blair giving evidence to the House of Commons Liaison Committee, where he had been asked whether life was then better for the citizens of Basra than it had been pre-war.

This came up during the Frontline Club meeting yesterday, as an example of my unreasonable criticism of the media, the argument being that the news value of the Blair evidence far outweighed the murder and kidnap of a few Iraqis, even if these crimes had been committed by men in civilian clothes and police uniforms, in a fleet of 10 "official" cars with no number plates.

This, incidentally, had coincided with a six-hour curfew being imposed in Basra in an attempt to stem the growing tide of violence and a report that oil smuggling in southern Iraq had reached epidemic proportions, costing the country an estimated $4 billion a year, followed by yet another report of a rocket attack on a British base – none of which were reported in the British media.

What I had not realised, however, was that the ranking was quite formally structured. In the early days, of the occupation, one news organisation imposed a "tariff", reporting events only if they involved one dead British or American soldier, or five Iraqis. But, as the violence increased, the bar was raised where, to qualify for inclusion in a news report, three US soldiers or 25 Iraqis had to be killed. A British military death, of course, was always reported.

This, in my view, undoubtedly distorted British public perception of events – and indeed misled journalists. Relying on the metric of British military deaths as a comparator, in May 2005 Guardian journalist Jonathan Steele actually wrote that the insurgency barely existed in the south, it having been "quiet for months". British troops could pull out immediately, he declared.

Undeterred, the media is playing the same games in Afghanistan. We know, of course, that the reporting of British troops has been extremely high profile, with the toll reaching 22 for the month.

Yet, in the last two days, four Afghani soldiers have been killed in Helmand, their lives ended by an IED which hit their vehicle, and – in two separate incidents, eight and then four Afghani private security guards were killed, also by roadside bombs in Helmand, the first incident injuring four others. None of these incidents have been reported by the British media. You will have to turn to the official Chinese news agency Xinhuanet for details.

This news, however, is highly significant, for several reasons. First, it points up the perilous insecurity of the roads, where the death toll is actually far greater than the British media would indicate. Secondly, it reminds us of an important, but again ill-reported dynamic – that the Taleban is by no means confining its attacks to foreign security forces. The Afghan forces are at greater risk than our own.

Nor indeed are just the security forces are risk. There is also a steady and largely unreported toll taken of construction workers, another incident recently reported in Khost. And just over a week ago, 13 Afghan road construction workers were kidnapped in Paktia.

All these issues have a much wider significance. On the one hand, the strategic plan for Afghanistan is progressively to hand over responsibility for security to Afghan forces and, on the other, much depends on the coalition and aid agencies being able to deliver reconstruction. Where both the security forces and construction workers are so much at risk, neither is going to happen, even discounting the unreliability of the local police.

The other significant issue here – one we have noted before – is the media-supported demand to increase helicopter lift for British troops, to enable them to be transported without using the road network, to keep them out of harm's way. Yet, that very process – effectively abandoning the network to the Taleban – could delay progress, by exposing local security forces and others to greater risk.

Meanwhile, in Lashkar Gah, in the city's main bazaar, turban seller Haji Lala says Taleban black is still the most popular colour. "Everyone wants black, like the Taleban. I sell 40 or 50 a month." It may be an indicator of where ordinary people think the province is heading, notes Australian writer Jerome Starkey.

Whichever way the province is heading, it seems not unreasonable to aver that we will not find out from the British media. Whether it is even reasonable to suggest that they should tell us is another matter. The very firm view I heard expressed on Wedenesday was, effectively, that it was not. What matters, it seems, are news values – not the actual news.

COMMENT THREAD

la-nueva_provincia[i-la-nueva_provincia]Leaving the travails of Afghanistan for a moment, we have the opportunity to read Antonia Senior in The Times, warning about greens under the bed. "Once the lure of communism seduced the idealistic. Today's environmental ideologues risk becoming just as dangerous," she writes.

Over on Watts up with that, we have a record of an "historic snow event" in South America. We also have unusual snow in the Alps and, here in Yorkshire, we've had to have the central heating on – like it's er ... cold.

The real world, however, is making not the slightest impact on the climate change industry, which seems more and more like the Taleban each day ... both want to crawl back into the stone age, the difference being that the warmists want to do it on a global scale.

Meanwhile, a recent report reveals that the US government has provided over $79 billion since 1989 on policies related to climate change, including science and technology research, foreign aid, and tax breaks.

A similar study in the UK would doubtless show that a proportionate amount had been spent by our own government and, as the US study reports, there are trillions to come. With that sort of money at stake, it is no wonder that the skeptics are having a hard time. It really is the same with the EU and, indeed, the defence industry. Money talks while the truth is dressed in rags.

With that happy thought, we can always revel in the fact that the drug companies are about to make a killing out the 'flu vaccine and major industries throughout the EU stand to make up to £4.6bn from selling carbon permits to power companies, for them to add their costs to our bills. Wind farms are going to add to our grief and, as always, the media has lost the plot.

Ever get the feeling you're in the wrong business?

COMMENT THREAD

TUVALU_1446551c[i-TUVALU_1446551c]
Embraced by the BBC and occupying nearly half a page in the print edition of The Daily Telegraph - the warmists' favourite newspaper – is an outrageous "puff" for the rather seedy government of Tuvalu, proclaiming that it is set to become the world's first zero-carbon country.

Missing from the on-line edition, however, is the short, but telling phrase which tells us that the state "relies on foreign aid as its main source of income". As such, the government is playing to its paymasters who have long exploited the totemic significance of an island that is supposed to be threatened with submergence as a result of rising sea levels due to climate change.

The premise is, of course, absolute tosh, debunked fully in the Booker column in March. That piece, incidentally, came under sustained attack from the warmists, via the Press Complaints Commission, which has been seen off.

Any halfway respectable and honest journalist would be questioning why about £12 million is to be spent on this fatuous and wasteful project, in a tiny, impoverished country, and why it is being used for a transparent propaganda exercise instead of being used to more worthwhile ends.

The uncritical presentation of this story, however, tells you a great deal about the modern media. It no longer offers news, but simply projects a series of narratives, shaping a "world view" to which the receiver is expected to conform. Any deviation from the narratives is treated as an abnormality, to be shunned, all in the interests of securing conformity.

It seems extreme, nevertheless, to categorise the media as the "enemy", but that it has become, by act and default in failing to challenge those influences which are encroaching on our freedoms and prosperity, while actively supporting those who would do us harm. The worst is that too few people recognise it for what it is, or has become.

COMMENT THREAD

Blackhawk+brit[i-Blackhawk+brit]
As another British soldier is reported killed in Afghanistan, two investigative sleuths from The Daily Mail, Tim Shipman and Matthew Hickley, breathlessly tell us that the announcement came "as Lt Col Richardson revealed that American, Dutch and even Australian helicopters are being used to launch British combat operations in Afghanistan." UK forces have used coalition aircraft to "seize areas of ground" from the Taliban, said the Colonel.

The Daily Telegraph goes one further as star reporter Rosa Prince scribes these immortal words:

The Daily Telegraph understands that American Chinooks were used for a combat mission as part of the Panther's Claw operation within the last month. Lieutenant Colonel Nick Richardson, spokesman for Task Force Helmand confirmed that UK forces were forced to rely on foreign helicopters.

These fearless hacks can however, shelve their dreams for nominations for the next Pulitzer prize for investigative reporting. The MoD Website for 23 June – nearly a month ago – blandly informs us that:

More than 350 soldiers from The Black Watch, 3rd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland (3 SCOTS), have launched an airborne assault into one of the last Taliban strongholds.

Twelve Chinook helicopters, supported by 13 other aircraft including Apache and Black Hawk helicopter gunships, a Spectre gunship, Harrier jets and unmanned drones, dropped the British soldiers into Babaji, north of Lashkar Gah, just before midnight on Friday 19 June 2009.

Not only did we rely on helicopters (with the MoD thoughtfully providing a pic – see above), we were "forced" to rely on a USAF Spectre gunship, Harriers (USMC – ours have gone home) and probably US Predator UAVs. Since 90 percent – or thereabouts – close air support is provided by US assets, we are routinely "forced" to rely on F-15s, F-16s, B-1 Lancers, A-10s ...

And then, of course, on the ground, we are "forced" to rely on Danish Leopard II tanks, on their APCs, on Estonian APCs and even the Ex-MoD Mamba mine protected vehicles which we sold off for a song.

But Hey! This is a coalition effort. We are not alone ... and have not been for some time. But then, here's another "scoop". During WWII, the US stripped out the armour from its one and only armoured division and sent the Shermans to the 8th Army. To win the battle of el Alamein, we were "forced" to rely on foreign tanks.

Shock! Hold the front page!

COMMENT THREAD

Mi-17+3[i-Mi-17+3]
With the newspapers still full of news and comment on Afghanistan, no-one can now complain that it is the "forgotten war" any more. That we now have a "debate" though has not proved an unalloyed blessing – we are still in "more heat than light" territory.

It is to Matthew Parris, therefore, that we turn for an alternative view, specifically to his column in The Times.

Something of a curate's egg writer (good in parts), he retains the capacity to surprise - as he does today, having established a reputation as a convinced "outer" - telling us that, "Our forces will have to stay in Afghanistan. But Britain must resist being sucked deeper and deeper into this disaster."

Parris takes the view that it is time to stop striking poses over Afghanistan. Effectively, he says, the politicians are perfectly right to act as a check on the generals' ambitions – there are too many examples in history where giving the military its head has led to disaster. And, in any case, to hand them a blank cheque, "forgets that military chiefs are humans, not gods, and will always ask for more." Thus, he writes:

No extra troops. No extra money. Less for Whitehall-directed aid projects and more for smaller, independent charities. A clipping of Nato/Isaf’s ever-multiplying wings. No wild talk about gender equality and human rights. A scaling-down of ambitions for state-building and democracy. This is the sober new direction. There is no possibility of our hopes for a new Afghan dispensation taking shape, but no reason why the existing dispensation, intelligently propped, should collapse.

Put more prosaically, we should cut our cloth according to our means, instead of getting caught up in the hysteria of the moment, pledging more and more blood and wealth, in a never-ending spiral that could drain our resources and our patience.

Injecting a practical note – where so many people, including this writer, have difficulty in defining why we are there and what we are supposed to do – the one thing about which there is clarity, in principle, is that we should be training and equipping the Afghan security forces.

At a certain level – as was the case in Iraq – they should be able to continue the fight, more or less unaided, and we can depart with honour. We are not there to win the "war" – that is for the Afghanis to do for themselves.

That said, there is a certain weariness with the way the debate is going – bogged down in ever-increasing idolatry for the Saintly Dannatt and ever more arcane discussions about how many helicopters can dance on the tip of a needle (or is it a pin?).

Squaring the circle, the one thing the British are not doing, to any great extent, is training up the Afghan Air Force, a much needed capacity that, without which, the host government has no more chance of prevailing than we do without air power.

Under the circumstances, the most logical way to resolve the current helicopter shortfall is to plan a phased withdrawal of all British helicopters from theatre. They should be replaced progressively with Mi-8 MTVs – aka Mi-17s - (pictured), forming new RAF squadrons, which could then continue operations. Other "Russian" models could also be purchased.

Into these new squadrons should gradually be absorbed Afghani aircrew, with the aircraft increasingly serviced by indigenous ground crew, until such time as the Afghanis are reliably capable of autonomous operations.

That a start could be made very quickly, in terms of obtaining machines, is evident from a recent US initiative, in obtaining a number of helicopters for the Pakistani Army.

When they arrived, Gen David Petraeus, praised the speed with which the delivery was made. "Within two or three weeks of request from them for helicopter support, we wheeled four Mi-17s just refurbished out of the back of a Colt," he said. That just goes to show what can be done when there is a will.

The US was also able to provide "training assistance" and, as an example of what it is doing for the Afghans, it is leasing aircraft to train USAF pilots, who in turn can pass down their skills.

We, of course, have our own capabilities. With five Mi-17s already operated by the RAF in Afghanistan, plus the models at Boscombe Down in the UK, we already have a cadre of trained pilots who could train many more. And there are plenty of machines available on lease, with skilled ex-military flying instructors, who would be more than happy to speed up the process.

The point of this is that it would demonstrate a very clear commitment to an exit plan, with very visible and easily measurable metrics. When the squadrons are trained and fully operational, we leave – barring technical advisors.

There is a world of difference between fighting an endless war in a foreign land, co-opting the host nation forces in the fight, and actively and clearly setting out to train the host nation to fight for its own objectives – against a declared and honourable exit strategy.

Of this, one suspects, even Matthew Parris might approve – although we suspect that the RAF might rather resent being deprived of the opportunity of obtaining some more "toys" of their own, which is what much of this helicopter spat is all about. But then at least they would not have to wear out their own fleet so, possibly, everybody should be happy.

Somehow, though, there has to be a worm in the apple. It can't be that easy.

COMMENT THREAD

explosion_ied[i-explosion_ied]One worries about some of the so-called experts called upon to pronounce on various aspects of the Afghani campaign, as to whether they really know what they are talking about.

One such who gives rise to not a little concern is Professor Michael Clarke, director of the Royal United Services Institute, who is sternly holding forth on the objectives of the Taleban today in The Times.

He tells us, very much in line with British commanders in the field, that Taliban commanders have made Helmand their key objective, then going on to inform us that "new recruits to their units flow in from Pakistan, but they are not well trained or well led."

Undoubtedly, it is the case that many Taleban recruits are poorly trained and led, but as a sweeping statement this sits ill with the observations from Jason Burke in The Guardian. He recently reported a "new peril for British troops in Afghanistan" telling us that the Taleban "have learned modern warfare." Imagination, greater firepower and strengthening of Taliban's ideological bond, he wrote, leaves the coalition facing higher casualty rates.

More recently, we read Sean Rayment's excellent account in The Sunday Telegraph of last week's attack on soldiers of the 2nd Bn, The Rifles, killing five of their number and seriously injuring three more.

According to Rayment, the Rifles patrol first triggered an IED as they entered an alleyway inside a small hamlet. One soldier died instantly and seven others were seriously wounded. Following standard drills, the patrol withdrew to a more secure location so that the wounded could be treated. And there, waiting for them was a massive IED which detonated killing another three soldiers, one of whom had been wounded in the first blast.

Meanwhile, a group of four soldiers who had left the area to secure a helicopter landing site discovered another IED which had been laid to destroy the approaching helicopters. Without the ability to defuse the bomb, the troops had no choice but to order the helicopter to land inside their base, leading to further delays in getting aid to the wounded. One other died on the operating table after he had been airlifted to Camp Bastion. And en route to their base, two more IEDs were discovered. Fortunately neither detonated.

Rayment asserts that the Taleban has predicted the troops' movements and had laid their devices where they would have their most devastating effect – tactics which demonstrate a high degree of planning and some sophistication. But then, as Burke notes in his piece, the tactics of the coalition forces have been studied closely – and the Taleban commanders have learned from them and adjusted their tactics.

Professor Michael Clarke, therefore, does not seem to have the measure of the Taleban in his own analysis and nor would it be advisable to rely on him for his declaration that, while IEDs can be devastatingly effective even against the most heavily armoured vehicles, "they are the technique of the terrorist; not decisive and not the weapon that will win a campaign."

Would that Clarke had read today's newspapers, listened to the radio and watched television. The two bombs which caused such havoc and misery to the men of The 2nd Rifles have reverberated around the world, the effect here magnified by the intensive media publicity.

Clarke, in fact, is terribly, terribly wrong. The IED is a "war winner", not as a military weapon but as a propaganda tool, weakening the resolve of the home front and the politicians as they see the coffins, one after the other, make their final journeys from the aircraft bearing them from foreign fields.

Yet, Clarke is the "expert". It is he who gets to pontificate in The Times and, no doubt, has the ear of the powerful and the mighty. And it is the quality of analyses such as his that is going to lose us the war.

COMMENT THREAD

Eurocorpse[i-Eurocorpse]
Charles Grant, writing in The Prospect magazine (restricted access), is worried about the EU "unravelling", citing in particular the failures of the common foreign and the defence policies.

Had he read Gen Dannatt's speech before he had written his piece, he would have been even more worried. Buried deep within the script was one short paragraph, one sentence of which effectively buried the idea of a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF).

Grant's worry would of course depend on his understanding what Dannatt was saying, which was not entirely transparent bearing in mind that the CGS – as is common with tribal groups – was speaking in a code impenetrable to normal people.

Referring to the structure and equipment of a future Army, Dannatt warned about being "seduced by elegant concepts that offer success from one particular medium," calling in aid the experience of WW2, Kosovo and the 2006 Lebanon war, which exposed the fallacy of Douhet's and Mitchell's overemphasis on air power.

Then came the "killer punch" when he observed that "those experiences also expose the sterile thinking of proponents of the Effects Based Approach and the Revolution in Military Affairs in the 90's."

One has to smile here because, until very recently, Dannatt was one of the staunchest proponents of the "Effects Based Approach" which was spawned by the Revolution in Military Affairs. To give its more familiar name, this is the Future Rapid Effects System or FRES.

It was this project that brought this blog into the military arena, when it became apparent that it was to be the core of the expeditionary concept, with light-weight airmobile platforms, and thus was to form the teeth of the ERRF.

That force, in accordance with the Helsinki Headline Goal, was supposed to be operational by 2010, which explains why Dannatt was so insistent on a 2010 in-service date for FRES. As it is, the grandiose Capability Improvement Chart of 2005 (shopping list) remains but a distant dream.

But, with FRES now dead in the water, and Dannatt contemptuously dismissing his love-child as "sterile thinking", the ERRF has nowhere to go. By next year, it may be European, but it will not be rapid, it will not be capable of reaction and it will not be a force.

Sadly for the "colleagues" though, the non-force was also reliant on the implementation by 2005 of the EU Strategic lift joint coordination, with a view to achieving by 2010 necessary capacity and full efficiency in strategic lift (air, land and sea) in support of anticipated operations.

With Airbus only able to produce computer graphics of the A-400M, however, the only thing that approaches "full efficiency" in euroland is the flag-waving and parade department. As long as you don't want the euroweenies to go anywhere and actually do any serious (or any) fighting, they are just the people you need.

Then, to put a final cap on their ambitions, incoming CGS General Sir David Richards is making it clear that any future British military adventures of any scale with be conducted under an allied umbrella and those allies will be the Americans.

We hope now that little Charles Grant is weeping in his cups. All the "colleagues" have left is not so much Eurocorps as a eurocorpse.

COMMENT THREAD

Now+Zad+008[i-Now+Zad+008]Today, the domestic political focus will be on the election of the Speaker in the House of Commons, an event that will absorb much time and energy both of the media and the political classes.

That this election should be necessary and that so much attention is being devoted to it, however, demonstrates how inwards-looking our politicians have become – all at a time when great events should be demanding theirs and the nation's attention.

Not least is the violence in Iran following the rigged election but, of direct and immediate importance is the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan where there is a sense that events are coming to a head. And with so little reporting in the British MSM of actual events, there is also a sense that we are sleepwalking into another disaster, the effects of which are incalculable.

What is particularly remarkable though is that after the flurry of publicity over the weekend and the urgent and important issue of inadequate vehicles supplied to our troops, but politicians and the media had slipped back into their normal torpor, ignoring what seems set to become a major crisis.

That is not the case with the US media, where the Washington Post devoted a lengthy article to the situation in Now Zad, which we recorded in one of our Sunday pieces.

Today we also see Associated Press reporting on the same area, with an account of some of the ongoing fighting, all under the headline, "Afghan firefight shows challenge for US troops".

[Loband: Object Removed -]

Written by Chris Brummitt, he offers an eyewitness account of an operation where, "Missiles, machine guns and strafing runs from fighter jets destroyed much of a Taliban compound," but he then records that "the insurgents had a final surprise for a pair of US Marines who pushed into the smouldering building just before nightfall."

As the two men walked up an alley, we are told, the Taleban opened fire from less than 15 yards, sending bullets and tracer fire crackling inches past them. They fled under covering fire from their comrades, who hurled grenades at the enemy position before sprinting to their armoured vehicles.

We then learn that the assault capped a day of fighting Saturday in the poppy fields, orchards and walled compounds of southern Afghanistan between newly arrived US Marines and well dug-in Taleban fighters. It was a foretaste, writes Brummitt, of what will likely be a bloody summer as Washington tries to turn around a bogged-down, eight-year-old war with a surge of 21,000 troops.

Significantly, though, Brummitt also agues that the fighting was on the outskirts of Now Zad, "a town that in many ways symbolises what went wrong in Afghanistan and the enormous challenges facing the United States. It is in Helmand province, a centre of the insurgency and the opium poppy trade that helps fund it."

The point, of course is that, in 2006, the town of Now Zad was a British responsibility yet, as Brummitt records, British and Estonian troops, then garrisoned there, were unable to defeat the insurgents. They were replaced last year by a company of about 300 US Marines, who lived in a base in the centre of the deserted town and on two hills overlooking it.

Even now, a year later, the Taleban hold much of the northern outskirts and the orchards beyond, where they have entrenched defensive positions, tunnels and bunkers. The Marines outnumber the Taleban in the area by at least 3-to-1 and have vastly superior weapons but avoid offensive operations because they lack the manpower to hold territory once they take it. There are no Afghan police or troops here to help.

"We don't have the people to backfill us. Why clear something that we cannot hold?" said Lt-Col Patrick Cashman, commanding the battalion occupying Now Zad and other districts in Helmand and Farah provinces, where some 10,000 Marines are slowly spreading out in the first wave of the troop surge.

Cashman says the Marines did not intend to allow the Taleban free rein in parts of Now Zad, but was unable to give any specific plans or time frame for addressing what he acknowledged is "a bad situation."

For all their better equipment ands resources, therefore, the US Marines – who have now been in-place for over a year – do not seem to be making much more headway than the British before them, with the same limitations on "Clear, Hold, Build" that the British Army is experiencing – the subject of some criticism.

The trouble is that, in a country the size of France, with Helmand roughly the size of Wales, there are never going to be enough troops to hold the territory. That suggests that the basic approach being adopted by both the US and British is flawed. Although it might be fine in theory, on practice it is never going to happen, in which case we really should be looking at an alternative strategy – or admitting defeat and getting out altogether.

This makes Afghanistan a highly political issue yet, where there is any attention being given to foreign adventures, our politicos are looking at pre-war Iraq. But, as Peter Hitchens in the Daily Mail remarks, "Who needs an inquiry into the Iraq War? It's over. Nobody will be brought to justice. Isn't it time Parliament debated our dubious involvement in Afghanistan, and sought to end it?"

Despite this, we all know this is not going to happen. The Speaker's election will get a hundred-fold more time and attention, and the Iraq inquiry has already had far more attention than current operation in Helmand. This lack of focus is dangerous – to the troops on the ground and to us as a nation. For our neglect, there will be a price to pay.

COMMENT THREAD

british+troops[i-british+troops]It is rather ironic that, on the day an inquiry into the Iraq war is announced, a gaggle of defence correspondents should go into print in The Guardian complaining about how the MoD is controlling the reporting of the war in Afghanistan.

Fronted by Stephen Grey, the piece observes that thirteen British soldiers died last month in Helmand province, but their deaths were reported, for the most part, in small paragraphs on the inside pages of newspapers.

The reason for this, according to Grey is because journalists find it almost impossible to reach and report from the frontline of the conflict. For instance, when the Royal Marines launched a fierce hand-to-hand battle last Christmas in the muddy poppy fields of central Helmand, four soldiers died - but the only news that escaped was a press release from the Ministry of Defence.

Thomas Harding, defence correspondent for The Daily Telegraph is then quoted, telling us that there has been a devastating breakdown of relations "Dealing with the Ministry of Defence is genuinely more stressful than coming under fire," says Harding. "We have been lied to and we have been censored."

This is an issue about which we reported back in April, putting us once again ahead of the game – for what good it does us, as there is an almost universal lack of concern about what quite clearly is a deliberate and concerted programme of news management by the MoD, the depth of which is quite remarkable and pervasive.

This has got to the state now where journalists are taking the risk of being blacklisted and refused access to report from the frontline, and at last speaking out about the government's attempt to control the news agenda.

It is "lamentable", says one Fleet Street foreign editor; The Times correspondent Anthony Loyd describes it as "outrageous" and Christina Lamb of The Sunday Times calls "indefensible". Even the fearless Tom Newton Dunn of The Sun joins in, branding the MoD's actions "redolent of Comical Ali", although why he should be complaining is anyone's guess as even when he is given a red hot story he does not publish it.

Nevertheless, we do get a little insight into how controls are exercised, with Grey noting that almost all journalists travelling with British forces are ordered to email their copy to the military's press officers in Helmand before publication. Many fear that negative coverage could mean trips back to the frontline are cancelled or delayed.

At the root of tensions between media and the MoD, we are told, is the nature of the conflict in southern Afghanistan. The war in Helmand is so intense, so dangerous and so rural that covering it independently is almost impossible for any white western journalist. Most reporters travel as "embeds" (there are only four or five slots available a month for national newspaper journalists); the way these trips are allocated, and the conditions imposed, contribute to fraught relations.

Harding – who speaks from personal experience – gives us more background: "They manipulate the parcelling-out of embeds to suit their own ends … They use it as a form of punishment to journalists who are off-message or critical of strategy or tactics."

Earlier this year, a trip of Harding's to Helmand was cancelled, he said, because of "helicopter shortages". He later heard privately from a press officer that it had more to do with his campaign against the army's continued use of the Snatch Land Rover, and his tough questions to the chief of joint operations. Another reporter had a trip blocked after writing a critical feature about conditions for army soldiers.

Newton Dunn does, however, add to our knowledge, telling us that the Foreign Office, the Department for International Development and Cabinet Office - who all have members sitting on a committee called the Media Management Group, which regulates who gets what trips out to the battlegrounds - all "want coverage of (non-existent) reconstruction and tree-hugging", according to. "Downing Street and the Foreign Office are incredibly restrictive about what comes out of Afghanistan," he adds.

It goes without saying that Nick Gurr, the MoD's director of media and communications, denies there are penalties on journalists who write anything critical. "You only have to look at who we bring out to see how determined we are to engage with everyone," he says.

Grey concedes he has something of a point - critics of army tactics including Harding, Loyd and even himself do get asked back. Even Al-Jazeera is offered occasional embeds. However, when a journalist manages to reach the war zone, many describe their frustration at the low priority given to getting them out to the frontline, as well as sometimes relentless control by "minders".

Christina Lamb was one of the first to report close-up on fighting in Helmand, when she was caught in an ambush in the summer of 2006. She was "effectively blacked" for two years, only returning in September 2008. The new slot she was given meant she saw no frontline action. "I was told quite candidly the main priority was Tom Newton Dunn of the Sun, not me."

The Guardian's James Meek, embedded in Helmand in 2006, says he was allowed to speak freely, and had no problems with minders. However, he was sent to a relatively quiet zone, and his requests to visit bases where soldiers were engaged in combat were refused. "I was told quite candidly that the priority was the tabloids and television because it was important for recruitment," he says.

Grey cites a Fleet Street foreign editor who argues that the government's media strategy seems to be based mainly around "the Sun and an EastEnders actor". He is referring to Ross Kemp, who made two TV series in Helmand. Newton Dunn, however, says he is equally frustrated: "I can get out only once a year, and only through kicking and screaming."

If reporters do get a story, they are still controlled by the MoD, thanks to the Green Book - a contract drawn up jointly by the ministry and media organisations' editors, supposedly designed to give maximum press freedom while preserving operational security ("Opsec"). Its application, however, angers some reporters. In practice, they say, the Green Book is sometimes used to pressure them into removing facts that are merely embarrassing or politically inconvenient.

In Helmand, journalists say embeds are required to email their copy to the ministry's press information centre before sending it on to their own newsdesks, though Gurr insists there is no Green Book requirement that copy be sent to the centre; it could also, he says, be vetted by people in charge on the frontline. "There are no hard and fast rules here," Gurr adds.

You would expect an amount of self-justification from Gurr but, whatever he might claim, it is entirely true that the MoD is controlling jornalists in order to convey what senior officers refer to as the "official narrative" of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This gets so bad that, in the absence of sufficient independent access to Helmand, news organisations are often willing to use interviews with soldiers gathered by army press officers, or video shot by the MoD's Combat Camera Team. Thus, while you read what might appear to be newspaper generated copy, some of the stories you see have been generated by MoD journalists.

The result, says Harding, is clear. "We have constantly been told that everything is fluffy and good - and we, and the public, have been lied to."

COMMENT THREAD

William_Hague_pie[i-William_Hague_pie]William Hague, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, lives up to that rhyme again. Before the ending of this parliamentary session he will make a major speech about the changes in foreign policy we are likely to see when he is in place. He does make speeches once every year or so, none of them memorable and all rather vague on matters of reality.

He has given ConHome a taster of what he will say and answered a few questions. Three main changes are being promised:

First, we would create a fully fledged National Security Council, comprising all relevant senior ministers and chaired by the Prime Minister. This would be a decisive break from the sofa style decision making of the last twelve years, which has often led to decisions being made without all the necessary information being considered or understood. Second, we would be firmly opposed to the greater centralisation of power in EU institutions, which reduces democratic accountability in Britain. Third, we would give a greater emphasis than in recent years to the role of the Commonwealth, a unique network covering a quarter of the world's population. These are a few examples but I will be making a major speech defining our whole approach to foreign policy before Parliament rises for the summer recess.

Hmmm. Why do I feel underwhelmed by these ideas? Well, let us have a closer look at them.

Number one is not precisely a policy, more of an administrative arrangement. Creating a National Security Council for no particular reason that I can see is something any Prime Minister and any Foreign Secretary can do at any time without changing or even announcing policies. The two take decisions about foreign policy and whom they consult is entirely up to them.

What of number two? Another Conservative prevarication about the EU, I am afraid. Being “firmly opposed to the greater centralisation of power in EU institutions” is very nice, indeed, but what will they do? Policy implies some action or attempted action and some commitment to a course of those actions.

What will the Conservative government and its Foreign Secretary do to prevent further centralisation of power and what methods will they use to reverse that trend? That is the question Mr Hague ought to be answering; that is the problem he ought to be working on if he wants to be taken seriously as a real Foreign Secretary rather than just a man who will say anything that comes into his head.

Number three may resound with some Conservative core voters but ever fewer, I suspect. What on earth does he mean by giving "a greater emphasis than in recent years to the role of the Commonwealth"? Greater emphasis in what way?

Does he mean that the Commonwealth will put pressure on certain members, such as Zimbabwe to clean up their political act and actually succeed? Because if he believes that I have a very nice bridge I can sell him.

Does he mean some kind of preferential agreements? Apart from the sheer stupidity of that and the unlikelihood of Commonwealth countries changing their trading patterns to suit us (especially as those memories of Britain changing her patterns in the seventies still rankle), there is the minor problem that international trade is EU competence and has been since Britain's accession.

If he is thinking about a defence network then he had better remember that there is this little problem called the United States. At least two important Commonwealth countries, India and Australia, are now major regional powers and have their own agreements and arrangements with the United States. Their interests are in the Pacific Ocean and South-East Asia; their worry is China and its client state, North Korea; their view of the world has little to do with Britain or Europe. Are they really going to change all that and start tugging their forelocks to the British government? I think not.

Does this mean that our future Foreign Secretary really has no idea what foreign policy is or what is going on in the world? I am afraid the rest of the interview, which gives plenty of opportunity for Mr Hague to make rather hackneyed and extremely vague comments about slavery and NATO as well as show his misunderstanding of China merely confirm that. Can't wait for the speech itself.

COMMENT THREAD

Hannan[i-Hannan]Painful though it might be, one must again applaud young Daniel Hannan for today's contribution on his clog. This is another intelligent journalist (no one ever said he wasn't bright), who is halfway towards getting the message.

Writing his own version of a manifesto for a new Speaker, Hannan has him declare:

My first act will be to convoke a Speaker's Conference on how to reassert the independence and integrity of the House of Commons. That conference will explore ways to restore the sovereignty of Parliament, by taking powers back from ministers, from quangos and from courts, domestic and foreign.

We also get from this inspired approach a further declaration, which is both perceptive and accurate:

The terrible truth is that it has become almost impossible to have an honourable career simply as a parliamentarian. As long as every backbencher aspires to become a frontbencher, this House will fail in its primary role: to act as a check on the Government.

This does Hannan's putative speaker conclude, "We shall not regain our moral authority until we first assert our political authority." He, whether in the persona of a Speaker, or as Hannan, is so completely right. This is indeed the same message which Camilla Cavendish is attempting to convey, without the precision or lucidity.

Whether such a man can be found is moot, but the idea of a Speaker leading a Commons rebellion against the executive is extremely attractive, if remote. However, since such this is not likely to happen through the "usual channels", it is as good an idea as any. One thing though, none of the so-far declared or interested candidates in any way match up to this message.

Without actually saying as much, though, Hannan is actually arguing for separation of powers, the achievement of which would take a Herculean effort, not least because it would require major primary legislation and a complete reform of the electoral system.

Furthermore, Hannan's input points up the huge gulf there is between his "radical" thinking and the received wisdom, articulated in part by his colleague Philip Johnston in the Daily Telegraph op-ed.

Argues Johnston, "The expenses crisis must not be used as an excuse to smash our system to pieces," whence the man rails against the "modernisers" who will seize this chance to push for inter alia a written constitution. "The basic structure of the system is a good one and it works," he writes, then suggesting that, "What we need now is some fine-tuning."

Oddly enough, Johnston mentions the data 1689, without mentioning The Glorious Revolution when Parliament overthrew King James II of England and assumed his powers, building the foundations of our current parliamentary democracy.

But that was the last time we had true separation of powers and, while the UK has muddled through with that less than perfect system, as executive has become bigger, more powerful and more intrusive, the counterbalancing power of parliament has been eroded, to the point now where we have reached a crisis.

Thus failing to take the obvious lesson from the history he, himself cites, Johnston then goes on to offer a series of fatuous suggestions for improvement which exemplify the incoherent "tinkering at the margins" approach. So do we get this gem:

Make all laws promulgated in Europe subject to proper scrutiny on the floor of the House of Commons and not shuffled off to a committee that hardly anyone knows exists and whose reports are hardly ever read. The impact on the sovereignty of the UK Parliament as a result of membership of the EU is at the root of many of our current problems.

The intellectual inconsistency between the first and second sentences is staggering. If Johnston thinks that, "The impact on the sovereignty of the UK Parliament as a result of membership of the EU is at the root of many of our current problems," how does he believe that "proper scrutiny" of EU laws will make any difference, when Parliament is powerless to change them?

Equally fatuous, therefore, is Johnston's suggestion that there should be a cap on the number of Bills per session, to perhaps a dozen major pieces of legislation at most. This is at a time when the domestic legislative programme has never been so thin, while the bulk of legislation affecting us all continues to pour out of Brussels. The wish is in the process of coming true, but it is not parliament that is capping the number of Bills, it is Brussels.

Adopting some, or all, of these ideas will not solve everything, concludes Johnston. Again he is wrong. They will solve nothing. Bring on Hannan's Speaker.

COMMENT THREAD

During a Starred Question in the House of Lords yesterday the Noble Minister, the Lord Malloch-Brown admitted to being stumped not once but twice. Luckily his supporters, Lord Dykes (yes, him again) and Baroness Ludford (yes, her again) came to his rescue.

Lord Stoddart of Swindon asked

Her Majesty’s Government whether they have commissioned a recent survey of the attitudes of United Kingdom citizens to the European Union; and, if so, whether they will publish the results.

The answer is that they have not commissioned anything of the kind and have no intention of doing so; and if they did commission a survey they would never publish its results because they are unlikely to show what Lord Malloch-Brown and his cohorts would like us to think.

Then again, the FCO has been kind of busy:

My Lords, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has recently commissioned some focus group work which does not provide any quantitative results like a survey but has helped us better understand people’s level of knowledge about the EU and the types of EU activity they were interested in. We will publish information from the focus groups on the FCO website.

Lord Stoddart mentioned one or two recent poll results but these were pooh-poohed by the Noble Minister who was later to be stumped by questions about supply of milk to schools and, much more importantly, since that milk supply is hardly needed these days, labelling of food.

Lord Dykes thought the results were absolutely wonderful as so many people were still in favour of the project despite the fact that the government has not made a particularly good case for it. In particular the government has not reminded people that:

There are 1 million British companies now in the EU doing business; nearly 2 million Brits living in other EU countries, including Spain; 3.5 million jobs directly linked to membership of the EU; and 50 million individual journeys to EU countries, mostly on low-cost airlines, were taken last year. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, is independent Labour but why is he so nervous and old-fashioned?

Setting aside the usual personal insults, and for Lord Dykes there can be no greater insult than "independent", one wonders where the noble peer has been all this time if he has not noticed the government trotting out those old canards endlessly.

Baroness Ludford informed the House that as an MEP she was fully aware of the possibility of her being voted out, though if she is top of the list in her region, that seems extremely unlikely. What she forgot to explain was how that made any difference, EU legislation not being dependent on either elections to the Toy Parliament or the choice of a new Commission. Baroness Ludford does not seem to have taken in anything Gisela Stuart said yesterday.

Good points were made by Lords Pearson of Rannoch, Howell of Guildford and Tebbit. A very stupid point was made by the Barness Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde. So what else is new?

Vaclav+Klaus[i-Vaclav+Klaus]My first reaction to the suggestion that I should blog again about the Czech Republic and the Constitutional Lisbon Treaty was "yeah, whatever", which is the way I react to people's suggestions that I should do something I don’t want to do. But, well, whatever, I'd better bring people up to date.

First of all, here is the full text of President Klaus's statement made in the wake of that vote in the Senate:

I must express my disappointment that following unprecedented political and media pressure from both foreign and domestic sources, some Czech Senators retreated from the publicly expressed views they held until recently, undermining thereby their own political and civic integrity, and have agreed with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.

They thus turned their backs on the long-term interest of the Czech Republic, putting before that the short-term interests of current governmental office-holders as well as their own personal interests.

It is a sad evidence of another failure on the part of a significant element of our political elite, which parallels other bad moments in Czech history. Our politicians
have always found some cowardly reasons for actions of this sort: We are too small, too weak; we do not mean anything in the European context; we must conform even if we do not agree with what we are conforming to.

This is something I reject. We either regained our sovereignty after November 1989, and together with it the responsibility for the fate of our country, or it was all a tragic mistake. This is a very topical point to make in the year of the twentieth anniversary of November 1989.

Now I will wait to see if a group of Czech senators, as some of them previously announced, request our Constitutional Court for another scrutiny of the Lisbon Treaty in relation to our Constitution. If this takes place, I will not be considering my decision to ratify the Lisbon Treaty or not before the Constitutional Court issues its decision.

My views on this matter are known and clear. I cannot afford to be resolutely against something at one moment, and then, because it fits in with my personal political career objectives, to pretend to change my opinion.

Let me emphasize that for this moment, the Lisbon Treaty is dead, because it was rejected in a referendum in one of the Member States. That is why my deciding on the ratification of this Treaty is not the issue of the day.

It is good to see that he is placing blame where it belongs – on the shoulders of Czech politicians because history tells one that the latter are apt to blame other people for their own shortcomings.

The outgoing Prime Minister, Mirek Topolanek, for instance, has been trying to convey the impression that he does not really like the treaty but that he is being forced into supporting it because otherwise the Czechs will be sidelined within the EU. Presumably, if things go wrong and questions are asked why nothing was gained and much was lost by the Constitutional Lisbon Treaty, he can wring his hands just as President Beneš did in the run-up to the Second World War and afterwards.

It is, as ever, a pleasure to hear unelected Commission President Barroso talk absolute rubbish, solemnly and uncritically reported by the Financial Times:

"This is very good news," said José Manuel Barroso, European Commission president. "The vote reflects the Czech Republic's commitment to a more democratic, accountable, effective and coherent European Union."

Fascinating. I wonder if the Commission President has actually read the treaty; or maybe he just does not know what the words democratic and accountable mean. Given his political career the latter is entirely possible. He is, after all, a man who has gone from being a Maoist to being President of the European Commission with a few stages in between but no real changes in his views, one suspects.

Meanwhile, Die Welt, of all newspapers is suggesting that the EU could work very well with the treaties as they are now and there is no real need for the Constitutional Lisbon Treaty, should it fail at the second Irish referendum. That may have more reference to the situation in Germany than in the Czech Republic.

COMMENT THREAD

Hastings[i-Hastings]I have mixed feelings about Max Hastings. I only met him once, and he seemed more than a little remote (which is one way of putting it). My feeling was as if I had become the sort of substance one scrapes off the bottom of one's shoes.

Nevertheless, I have read most of his books and still regard his "Overlord" as the best written account of the 1944 Normandy campaign – not that he was "there" of course. Others of his books are not as good and, with many of his contemporary opinions, I profoundly disagree.

Even then, as with other commentators – some of whom one instinctively distrusts – Hastings occasionally writes something which makes you sit up and say, "Yes! You are right!", even if only because it accords with one's own thoughts and prejudices.

In The Daily Mail today is one of those pieces, this one headed: "Thatcher's legacy - and why America is falling out of love with Britain all over again."

Hastings takes the scenario of how the extraordinary transformation wrought by Mrs Thatcher – the victory in the Falklands War, and the prosperity of the past 20 years – caused American respect to Britain soared. We achieved recognition as a remarkable comeback story, a reliable supporter on the world stage, an important player among second-division powers.

Thus, asserts Hastings, for the past quarter-century, the British have been able to hold their heads high in America. The future, though, looks different. Britain is understood here to be the worst casualty of the economic crisis in the developed world. It is plain that our success and apparent wealth of recent years have been much overstated. Then comes the bombshell.

Beyond our economic woes, we are told, it is dismaying to hear sharp criticism in Washington of the British contribution in Afghanistan. We think we are trying pretty hard - spending £3billion a year and accepting a steady drain of casualties in the battle for Helmand province. Yet many American soldiers and strategists are unimpressed. Hastings continues, a section worth quoting in full:

'The British Army is not the force it was 20 years ago,' claims a U.S. general who has held a senior command in Afghanistan. 'It is casualty-averse and lacks boldness. It is too ready to call in air support rather than "mix it" with the Taliban. I would describe most of the British commanders and officials involved in Afghanistan as defeatists.'

I reeled before this barrage. I told the general that the British Army thinks it is making a pretty impressive effort in Afghanistan. Indeed, the British soldiers who have striven so hard in Helmand, and have paid so heavily in casualties, are doing everything that could be asked of them.

Our Government faces special problems because the war is unpopular at home. This is why Gordon Brown last week rejected the Army's case for sending 2,000 reinforcements out there.

My American friend, however, returned to the assault. He said: 'You people kid yourselves that the Afghans like you. They don't. They tell us that you behave towards them with imperial condescension. They say your soldiers treat Afghan soldiers as if they come from a lower caste.

This last charge was echoed by a civilian strategist I met, who also has a lot of Afghan experience. I suggested that the Afghans tell all foreigners what they think they want to hear. British soldiers hear bitter criticism of the U.S. Army, and especially of its carelessness about civilian casualties.

But it seems to me less important whether the allegations against us are justified than that a substantial body of Americans believes them. No one in Britain should fool themselves about the US attitude to our withdrawal from a combat role in Iraq, marked by a ceremony outside Basra last week.

The Americans perceive the British Army as having suffered a defeat. They see us as leaving southern Iraq with our tail between our legs. Contempt for our showing there increases scepticism about what we are achieving, or not achieving, in Afghanistan.

Hastings then writes:

… I was shocked by the vigour of criticism of our performance on the ground by influential people in Washington, both in and out of uniform. If you read any of the half-dozen most prominent American books published about Iraq and Afghanistan during the past year, you will discover that the British are mentioned only in a few sentences, most of these unflattering.

If there is one thing more depressing than being engaged in a tough, maybe unwinnable war on the other side of the world, it is receiving a 'C' grade from our senior partner for our part in it. I believe that we must keep trying in Afghanistan, not least to demonstrate our support for the U.S. But we should not fool ourselves about our standing in American eyes. Economically, politically and militarily, Britain does not look impressive.

The key assertion is, of course: "The Americans perceive the British Army as having suffered a defeat. They see us as leaving southern Iraq with our tail between our legs. Contempt for our showing there increases scepticism about what we are achieving, or not achieving, in Afghanistan."

Hastings, hedging his bets, writes: "It would be good to be able to dismiss the doubts and criticisms … Yet most touch a nerve." Readers of this blog will know that we have come to the same conclusion. Our "take" most definitely accords with the "perceptions" he records. He suggests we must keep trying in Afghanistan, not least to demonstrate our support for the US. I would agree.

But mere "trying" is not enough. We must succeed, and we have a lot of ground to make up.

COMMENT THREAD

A bit of a slow news day for the time being - although matters are looking a little grim in Georgia - so it might be time to catch up on the latest developments (or otherwise) to do with the Constitutional Lisbon Treaty.

To absolutely nobody's surprise the Irish Minister for European Affairs, Dick Roche, has announced that the second Irish referendum will be held in the autumn.

He added that as part of the process of steering its way out of recession Ireland needed to secure its position within the European Union.

Speaking in Berlin to the German Council on Foreign Relations, the Minister said he wanted to deliver the message that Ireland was coming to grips with its problems and taking decisive action to bring the Government's finances under control, ensure the health of the banking system and improve competitiveness.

He remained a little vague on how exactly the treaty will improve Ireland's economic position but, perhaps, vagueness is all that one can offer at this stage.

Over on ToryBoy blog Jonathan Isaby, correctly in our opinion, is predicting a possible unwelcome headache for David Cameron as a result of the Irish referendum. Then again, the probability of an autumn vote has been very high for some time. David Cameron et al should have been prepared and the words "we shall not let matters rest there" are not exactly an indication of preparedness.

The Czech Senate will be voting on the treaty tomorrow (Wednesday, May 6) and it looks like it will pass, though there will remain the question of the presidential signature. President Klaus has, so far, insisted that he would wait for the second Irish result. Poland's President still has not signed it and Germany has not ratified either [scroll down to second question].

COMMENT THREAD

cfl[i-cfl]The Daily Mail is in outraged mode at the news that power firms are " handing out energy-saving lightbulbs to dodge their obligation to help families cut carbon emissions."

Local councils, we are told, say the free distribution is part of an "outrageous" attempt by the businesses to shirk their responsibility to install more meaningful energy saving measures in homes.

Thus does Paul Bettison, chairman of the LGA's environment board, say: "The failure of energy companies to really help householders cut their fuel bills is an outrage. Energy suppliers should be filling our lofts and walls with insulation, not filling our cupboards with light bulbs."

That last bit has a personal resonance as we have received so many free lightbulbs under various schemes that we have more than we can possibly use for the next ten years, even supposing we wanted to use the damn things.

But what the Mail doesn't make clear is that this is in response to the government's Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT), part of the deal whereby the energy companies avoided a windfall tax, accepting instead a statutory scheme requiring them to fund domestic energy reductions.

As the Defra website helpfully explains, the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) is a statutory obligation on energy suppliers to achieve carbon targets by encouraging households to take up energy efficiency and low carbon measures.

It is the Government's principal driver of household energy efficiency and carbon reduction. It is open to suppliers how they meet their targets, but they will typically promote subsidised offers on loft and cavity wall insulation, as well as a wide range of high-efficiency lighting, heating systems, appliances and energy saving devices.

But the canny suppliers have found that, simply by putting seemingly endless quantities of lightbulbs in the post to their hapless consumers (who have to pay for them through their bills), they can achieve their notional targets, even though most of the lightbulbs – as we have found – cannot be used and therefore will not deliver any real energy savings.

However, what these bulbs are doing, according to The Times is far from wholesome. In China, it reports, a heavy environmental price is being paid for the production of "green" lightbulbs in cost-cutting factories.

Large numbers of Chinese workers have been poisoned by mercury, which forms part of the compact fluorescent lightbulbs. A surge in foreign demand, set off by a European Union directive making these bulbs compulsory within three years, has also led to the reopening of mercury mines that have ruined the environment.

So, one "environmental" policy here leads to an environmental disaster elsewhere. The "silver lining" of largely mythical energy saving creates a dark cloud in China. But, no doubt, the greenies feel that poisoning a few thousand Chinese workers is but a small price to pay for their obsession. Since they are going to end up killing us all, they might as well start with the Chinese.

COMMENT THREAD

Booker+AFG[i-Booker+AFG]After last week's piece, Booker returns to the subject of Afghanistan with a vengeance this week, taking on the man signing himself "Praetorian", claiming to be the Operations Officer for 3 Commando Brigade which has just returned from Helmand.

It was last week that Booker argued that "our military humiliation in Afghanistan is a scandal - and the cover-up is an even greater one," under a strap line, "The under-funded British Army is being forced to make the same mistakes in Afghanistan that it made in Iraq". Praetorian did not so much disagree as simply, in lofty style, dismiss Booker's arguments outright, stating that he did not recognise the situation that Booker described, claiming he was "out-of-date and ill-informed."

We are not at all ill-disposed to argument and discussion, although a rebuttal was denied us when The Sunday Telegraph published two lengthy comments from Praetorian but failed to post either of the comments I had placed on the site. What is not acceptable though is this lofty dismissal, claiming with the authority of rank and position and on the basis of supposed experience, a situation that simply does not accord with the facts.

Thus it was that Praetorian had it that we – the British military mission - had secured the five major population centres in Helmand and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams had "exploited this security to deliver tangible, effective and sustainable reconstruction and development." During our tour, the man added, "you could count the number of security incidents in these areas on the fingers of your hands."

That tour, as we recounted in a separate post, started on 8 October and, within days of taking over, in just one of those "major population centres" – Lashkar Gah – the Brigade was pitched into battle with major Taleban forces attempting to take over the provincial capital. With US and Canadian forces called to assist, an additional 1400 Afghani troops were also drafted in and it took ten days of continuous fighting before victory was declared.

During the rest of the tour, noted by Booker in today's piece, we were able to identify 69 further "security incidents" in just that one "major population centre", set out in another post. Not all of these were centred on the town itself and some were recorded as part of ongoing operations by the Brigade. But the detail indisputably gives the lie to the impression Praetorian sought to give – that the areas under British control were secure. The evidence shows that they are far from secure.

Booker also shows, with an account of the threat to RAF Chinooks which provide a vital support role, just how tenuous is the grip of British forces in the province, the details rehearsed in our post and also in The Daily Telegraph yesterday.

Far from offering the security to the Afghanis that Praetorian claims, the British forces have major problems of their own. We are, basically, one major incident away from a monumental domestic crisis of confidence which could castrate the military effort and lead to the termination of our participation in the ISAF operation.

Whether Praetorian is lying, or not, is moot. He certainly labours under the handicap of working for an overarching organisation, the MoD, which lies freely, an organisation which distorts, prevaricates, bullies and "spins" to the extent that, amongst those who know, it has lost any confidence or trust.

Further, within the military, fresh from its debacle in Iraq, we see a dysfunctional organisation, unable to come to terms with its own failings – or even the fact that it has failed – locked in a state of denial from which its seems unable to escape. This is an organisation that has lost more credibility that it can begin to imagine.

Most likely though, Praetorian sufferers from the very problem of which he accuses us – he is ill-informed. But there is much more to it than that, helpfully elucidated in a paper carried by Small Wars Journal reproduced from the Marine Corps Gazette.

Analysing the pressures on the military to come up with optimistic assessments of its own performance, author Bing West makes the following observations:

In sum, garbage and lies reside inside any large organisation in the form of optimistic forecasting. A healthy human mind accentuates the positive. Thus, we stress that a particular surgery has a 90 percent success rate, rather than to admit there's a 10 percent chance of dying. We hold onto our losses when the stock market goes down, because selling is an admission of failure, even when it's the rational choice.

Similarly, it's especially tough for a commander to objectively assess his own battlespace. Hence there is a need in the Afghanistan war for an independent risk assessor who can expertly calculate the rough odds of succeeding in the mission of nation building versus the size of the US force commitment.

In his paper, Bing discusses various metrics used in different conflicts to assess performance and likelihood of success, demonstrating that flawed choices, or incomplete data, can distort perceptions – either way. Praetorian, within the "bubble" that he inhabits, no doubt has his own set of metrics in which he is entirely confident, allowing him to make his assertions in the sincere belief that he is right.

However, the problem in an insurgency – certainly in the "guerrilla warfare" phases - is that incidents tend to be widely dispersed in space and time. Most areas, most of the time, will be free from violence. Furthermore, the enemy is highly adaptive, changing tactics rapidly in response to security force action, altering the tempo at will, in accordance with counterinsurgency activity.

This we have seen in Iraq and see again in Afghanistan, where the response to a failure to tackle the security forces head-on led to guerrilla tactics, relying on the ambush, the bomb and harrying indirect fire – plus the tactics of the urban guerrilla, which include extortion, murder, kidnap and intimidation within the civilian population.

Thus, the only way one can get a "feel" for which way the insurgency is going is to assess the totality of available information. And because the metrics are constantly changing, there us a need for intuition as well as hard analysis. Since so much depends on public sentiment, both here and in Afghanistan, that is as valid a tool as any.

Nevertheless, one metric alone speaks of failure. During March, the number of roadside bomb attacks in Afghanistan for the first time exceeded the number in Iraq, with 361 bombing incidents recorded, compared with 343 in Iraq. That, in itself, tells you that the Taleban is active and had not lost its core strength.

On the other hand, a metric often quoted in support of claims of "success" is the "fact" that seven million school-age Afghans were this year studying in 12,600 schools across the country. When compared with about one million six years ago, this is seen as a real sign of progress.

However, it is still the case that roughly half of Afghan children - mostly girls - are still not in school. And the overall situation is extremely fragile. For instance, we are told that insurgent attacks and crime killed around 70 Afghan teachers, students and education workers over the past year, and wounded another 140. Violence linked to the insurgency also stopped 240,000 students from attending school, mainly in southern and eastern Afghanistan.

There have also been multiple attacks on schools over the past years with scores of buildings burnt down or blown up, as well as students and teachers threatened. About 480 schools are still closed because of insecurity and, although the government reopened nearly 100 this year, keeping them – and other public facilities - open is becoming a major part of the battle.

The latest in this battle came on Friday 1 May, when the Taleban blew up a health clinic in the Lakan area of Khost province, eastern Afghanistan. Four rooms were completely destroyed. In another incident, a high school serving over 1,300 students was dynamited in Nadir Shahkot district of the same province. Seven out of 18 classrooms were destroyed. This is the third school to be destroyed in the past month in that district.

Another metric – one favoured by the media – is the death rate for coalition soldiers. Here, there is less than good news. On Friday also, five soldiers were killed – three American and two Latvians. They were attacked with small arms and RPGs at an outpost in Kunar province near the border with Pakistan. About 30 troops were stationed at the outpost and several others were wounded.

Two days before that, a German soldier was killed and nine were injured in two separate attacks in the northern Kunduz province, where the army is suffering more frequent insurgent assaults. The soldier who died was killed in a roadside ambush, with four injured. The other five were injured in a suicide bombing – but only slightly. They were in a Dingo MRAP.

German officials now admit, "It's become more difficult there [in Kunduz] than it was four years ago," and, as if to emphasise this, on Friday evening there was another roadside bomb in the same province, damaging a police vehicle. Fortunately no police were killed or wounded.

Earlier, on 18 April, a Taliban commander was killed after he led a raid on a police checkpoint in the province. Police returned fire, killing the rebel commander. In the neighbouring Baghlan province on 27 April - where it is normally peaceful - Taleban fighters stormed the Birka district headquarters and set it on fire.

That week, on the Tuesday, a British soldier was killed north east of Gereshk by an explosion, while patrolling on foot. Additionally, two civilians were killed and seven others, including five children, were wounded when a rocket hit a residential area in the Lashkar Gah district – another of those "security incidents" that isn't supposed to be happening.

These "security incidents" are breaking out with increasing frequency. Also that week the US military battled with Taleban southwest of Kabul in the strategic province of Logar - the site of a multi-billion-dollar Chinese project to develop a copper mine. Ten insurgents were killed.

Elsewhere, in the British sector of Helmand, on the same day, Afghan and US forces killed five Taleban in Nahr Surkh district. The joint force had been attacked from several compounds while on a reconnaissance patrol, and had returned fire.

Through such metrics, the impression gained is of a country on the edge. But most disturbing of all is a recent report in The Independent indicating that the flood of aid continues to be misspent. Apart from anything else, 40 percent of the international aid budget is returned to aid countries in corporate profit and consultant salaries

Far from improving the lot of Afghanistan, conspicuous spending by the elites and foreign workers is increasing the disparity of wealth. And, with the rural aid programme stalled, displaced workers and refugees are pouring into the city, a dispossessed, poverty-stricken mass that is a natural recruitment ground for the Taleban. Not for nothing was Kabul referred to in a recent Channel 4 documentary variously as a "city under siege" and a "city waiting for the Taleban".

The problem is that no one seem to be able to get a grip, thus leaving the "bubble dwellers" like Praetorian mouthing their mantras and relying on their flawed metrics, convincing themselves – but few others – that they are doing a marvellous job.

In a repeat of Iraq, we can see them still doing it as the British Army packs up its bags and leaves Afghanistan for the last time, defeated again but refusing to accept it. Unable to confront the reality of the situations it has to deal with, it prefers the cosy world of make-believe where the word "defeat" has been abolished.

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