EU Referendum

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a400mkaroo1024[i-a400mkaroo1024]Sometimes, days go by with nothing really significant to report on Defence of the Realm. Other times, the news floods in and it's a job keeping up. Yesterday was one of those days, and we've not finished yet. That European white elephant, the Airbus A400M, has reared its computer-generated head again.

Actually, although the A400M is a military aircraft, this is a political project and, once again, we have the real world impinging on the fantasy construct in which the "colleagues" have invested so much time, money and political capital.

As we left it in March with a contract break in the offing on 1 April – giving the opportunity to the prospective purchasers to cancel – the decision on whether to walk away was postponed until 1 July.

However, with the deadline now racing closer at the speed of an Airbus computer graphics designer, no agreement on the future of the project is forthcoming. But, like the "colleagues" confronted with a "no" vote in a referendum, this lot cannot take no for an answer either. Thus, they have simply extended the deadline for another month.

This zombie-like behaviour – the aircraft proving impossible to kill - was agreed on Monday by the defence ministers of the seven European customer nations.

Needless to say, this is a European month, so it isn't really a month after which the project comes to an end. Explained by French defence minister Herve Morin, the agreement to extend the deadline by one-month is actually a short discussion break to allow time to look into the issues, "in particular the financial questions with the company. "

The outcome of this break is then to decide whether to grant another six-month delay, this one being used to renegotiate the A400M contract with Airbus in an attempt to keep the project alive.

That development represents a partial victory for the French and Germans, who wanted to move straight to a renegotiation. This, however, was blocked by Britain which is getting increasingly concerned at both the costs and the delays. So the answer to a British objection to a six-month delay is to have a one month delay … followed by a six-month delay.

Whether Britain will stay the course still has not been decided. Quentin Davies, representing the MoD has admitted the talks were "difficult" and is warning that there will have to be "a very great deal of progress with (Airbus) in order to save this project."

However, just to add further interest to a messy situation, Airbus has confirmed that the lead customer, Germany, definitely will not see the first delivery before 2014, with the overall delivery timetable having been further delayed.

It then gets even more interesting with the news that the Chinese have completed building their first Airbus model under licence, and are now in a position to challenge the British wing-making monopoly.

Whether that is used as a threat to keep Britain on board is anyone's guess but, if there is a stitch-up in the making, the RAF had better reconcile itself to the prospect of flying computer graphics rather than real aeroplanes. At least, though, that will keep the carbon footprint down.

COMMENT THREAD

a400maustaire1024[i-a400maustaire1024]If there was only one reason why the UK should pull the plug on the A400M – and there are many – it came yesterday in a comment from Airbus Chief Executive Tom Enders, as retailed to us by Reuters.

This smug, overpaid, cerebrally-challenged excuse for a human being has the unmitigated gall to tell us that the heap of machinery he is trying to palm off as an aeroplane should be kept going because 40,000 jobs in Europe are directly linked to the project, including 15,000 in Spain. "You can't just look at the plane as a product," he says.

Notwithstanding that any aerospace manufacturer who calls an aircraft a "plane" should not be allowed to live, what this human garbage needs to understand is that the A400M is a product, a machine that is supposed to do things, very specific things, one of which is to fly. It is not a job creation scheme for euroweenies. Furthermore, it is a product that was promised by his dismal excuse for a company and one which it has singularly failed to deliver.

"Are budget restrictions going to put at risk the programme, which still needs investment?" Enders asks the Spanish newspaper ABC. "It means asking if Europe is prepared to not go ahead with the A400M and what alternatives there are."

Wrong questions. "Europe" is not an entity – it is a continent. The people who have the misfortune to be saddled with this overpriced, non-performing heap of junk are soldiers, and they need military airlift, not computer-generated pictures. If he can't deliver – and it is very clear that he cannot – then there are companies that can – on time, to price and to specification.

That is the crunch. It is about time the defence contracting industry woke up and smelt the coffee. The purpose of military equipment is to equip the military, for the sole purpose of enabling that said military to do its job. It is not there for any other purpose and, if the industry cannot deliver, on time, to price and to specification, then it needs to go to the wall.

If he is worried about all those jobs, well perhaps Mr Tom "it's not just a product" Enders could give all those 40,000 euroweenies packs and rifles and send them off to Afghanistan where they can do something useful. I am sure Lockheed could arrange the transportation.

When they get there – with him at their head – he and his fellow euroweenies could then reflect that, in the military, if you do not deliver on time, to price and to specification, the wrong people die. "You can't just look at fighting wars as a product," you know.

COMMENT THREAD

Fox+FLA[i-Fox+FLA]Defence questions yesterday brought up a rash of questions on the A400M, but first in the offing was a question on the "air bridge" – the RAF shuttle service between the UK and the operational theatres. That brought an intervention from Conservative shadow defence secretary which had him walking into a bear trap, eyes wide closed.

Launching into the attack, the egregious Fox demanded that defence secretary John Hutton admit that the main reason for the constant delays experienced in the service was "simply that the TriStars we are using are clapped out, with only 44 percent of the fleet fit for purpose".

Actually, that is not the problem. In terms of airframe hours – by which aircraft age is measured – the TriStars are relatively youthful machines. But we shall let that pass as this was but a launch pad for Fox's substantive attack. Directing all his guns at Hutton, he thus charged:

The future strategic tanker aircraft, which is the replacement aircraft for both troop transport and the re-fuelling tanker, was supposed to be in service in 2007 initially: we are now told that it will be at least 2011. On top of the Nimrod delay of 92 months, the Astute submarine delay of 47 months and the Type 45 destroyer delay of 42 months, is not defence procurement another fine mess Labour has got us into?

Hutton – no fool he, with something of a reputation as a military historian – evidently knew his recent defence history better than the shadow secretary. "No," he said, "and the hon. Gentleman should be very careful citing those examples, because those were all contracts let by the former Government. They were not let on proper terms, and that is especially true for the Astute contract - and he should know that."

Unabashed – or perhaps not hearing the answer – Fox launched his next salvo, demanding: "Is not the prevarication that we have seen exactly what we are now seeing with the A400M military transport fiasco? If that project is cancelled, and we are the last to pull out, we may be at the end of the queue to buy the necessary alternative capabilities - losers yet again."

The last point is well made. If we leave it too late, then indeed we are at risk of being at the end of the queue, as other buyers – in a worse state than us – rush to sign up with Lockheed for replacements, leaving the RAF stranded with its ageing fleet of C-130Ks.

Hutton tells us that the MoD will make a decision on the A400M in July, but you can bet that, behind the scenes, frantic negotiations are taking place to overcome what Fox calls the "A400M military transport fiasco".

Here again, though, Fox's triumphalism might be a tad misplaced. Although the A400M was ordered on the Labour watch, the project gestation stretches back into the mists of time – placing its genesis very firmly with the previous Conservative administration. In fact, after years of the very "prevarication" of which Fox complains, where the then government had been blowing hot and cold for some many years, on 16 December 1994 the UK rejoined what was then known as the Future Large Aircraft project.

This was announced by the then defence secretary Malcolm Rifkind, lodging the UK firmly in the programme. Thus, when Tony Blair in May 2000 finally agreed to order 25 A400Ms, he was merely setting the seal on a process initiated by the Conservatives those six years earlier.

Hutton could perhaps have reminded Fox of this, but – presumably – chose not to. But the fact remains that neither Labour nor the Conservatives have clean hands on this project and, if it had not been John Major's enthusiasm for remaining at "the heart of Europe", we probably would not be in this current mess which even has the New York Times scratching its head in amazement.

COMMENT THREAD

Airbus+A400M+22[i-Airbus+A400M+22]Now admitting the obvious, Thomas Enders, chief executive of EADS has conceded that the ill-fated Airbus A400M project may have to be scrapped. "The aircraft can't be built under the current conditions," he has told Der Spiegel. "It is better to put an end to the horror than have horror without end."

This is brought to us courtesy of The Daily Telegraph tucked into a down-page piece in the business section, which in itself is remarkable. In any grown-up newspaper, such a story – with its massive political and strategic implications should be front-page news.

But, after a diet of corporate bullshit from Airbus – which rivals even the "spin" from the height of the Blair era - we are finally getting to the crunch. Airbus has acknowledged that its A400M military transport venture has degenerated into a disaster. The aircraft is over-weight, its turbo-prop engines built by Rolls-Royce and France's Snecma are under-powered and there have been serious glitches in the software from MTU Aero Engines.

That is what we know about, but there have also been rumours of serious problems with the navigation software. There have also been huge problems with production integration, with component mismatches between the different satellite manufacturing centres, and a lack of design co-ordination. In other words, there are not the normal "teething troubles" that you get with any new aeroplane. They are systemic problems which strike at the heart of this doomed project.

The final admission of defeat, when it comes, will cost EADS dear. An outright cancellation will mean that it will have to repay €5.7bn in advance fees to its customers, plus as yet unspecified non-delivery penalties.

Political ramification go even further. The A400M was always a political project, aimed at giving the putative European Army its own independent airlift capability, securing political and operational independence from the United States. To that effect, the euroweenies set up in 2001 their European Airlift Co-ordination Cell as an embryonic EU air force.

The eventual aim was to pool the transport fleets around the common airframe of the A400M, in what was intended to be the "European Air Transport Fleet". A formal 12-nation agreement, in the form of a declaration of intent, was signed in November 2008.

Without the A400M, the "colleagues" will have to go cap-in-hand to the US for new airframes. Those will be subject to US law which imposes restrictions on their deployment and access to technology. The great dream is about to crash and burn.

For the UK, however, this creates more immediate problems, as the lack of the A400M will create enormous stresses on an already over-burdened RAF. The Lord Pearson and Lord Moonie are already on the case, with a sheepish government telling us that, "we are considering our options with partner nations and the company."

It had better consider its options pretty damn quick, or all we will be able to do is despatch colour photographs of A400Ms – which are the only thing EADS has yet been able to supply. A little bird tells us that the Taleban may be less than impressed, as indeed will we at the crumbling of yet another vainglorious European project.

UPDATE: Reuters is now reporting that the MoD is considering a new order for C-17s. "We are naturally concerned by delays to the A400M programme and ... the MoD is considering various contingency plans including procuring additional assets for example C-17," an MoD spokesman says.

COMMENT THREAD

a400mlake1024[i-a400mlake1024]The troubled Airbus A400M project remains, er … troubled.

Yesterday, the Daily Mail was warning that the a customers' revolt could lead to the whole project being cancelled, with a break-point approaching on 1 April when the contract can be terminated in the event of non-delivery.

At this time, the only thing Airbus military has actually delivered is 28 colour photographs of the machine - all computer generated, for want of the real thing, which still has not left the ground.

The Times was also suggesting that the MoD would walk away from the project, and was looking at "alternative options".

However, after talks between the seven countries that ordered the aircraft on the sidelines of an EU defence ministers' meeting in Prague today, Reuters reports that customers have given the project a 100-day reprieve. They have thus agreed to postpone any decision on cancellation for three months from 1 April, during which period, "no state would take a decision without consulting the others".

With deliveries to the RAF possibly delayed until 2016, it is hard to see that 100 days will make that much of a difference, so it will be interesting to see what Airbus will do to make the UK change its mind about walking away.

The prospect had the Lord Pearson asking today in the Lords whether there was "any hope that the CargoLifter programme, the A400M, is thankfully slipping from postponement to cancellation", only for government spokesman Lord Davies of Oldham studiously to avoid answering the question and move on to another topic.

The government, however, is rapidly running out of options. With the bulk of the UK tactical transport fleet set to be grounded by 2012, it needs rapidly to look for alternatives, the most likely being the C-130J Hercules. In contrast with the euroweenies, Lockheed Martin have happily announced they have so far taken 257 orders and delivered 171, the euro-score being 180 ordered – none delivered.

Such is the popularity of the C-130J that the manufacturers are to increase the production rate from 12 aircraft a year in 2008 to approximately double by 2010. Lockheed Martin also says it is currently "in detailed discussions" with several countries about further orders. But, even with the increased rate of production, there is a backlog of 86 aircraft, which means that new orders cannot be accepted until well into 2012.

The government had better get its skates on, or it will be reduced to posting colour photographs of supplies to troops ... by overland mail.

COMMENT THREAD

link[i-link]The wonderful thing about being an eco-warrior is that your world vision allows you to see things in black and white … capitalism is baaaad, recycling is goooood, etc., etc., (never mind that one depends on the other). Rather like Conservatives, Europhiliacs and other faith-driven believers, there are no greys.

One tiny problem for those zealots intent on wiping away the tears of Mother Earth, however, is that the closer they get to real-life implementation of their fantasies, the more that problems begin to stack up – the Severn barrage being one classic example.

Here, we learn that this £22 billion monument to greenery is not going to be £22 billion after all. Another £2 billion is needed … to cover green issues. This is necessary, we are told, by a consultant hired by the government, who attributes the sum to the cost of replacing the natural habitats that could potentially be destroyed by the barrage.

The beauty of this is that the requirement to replace habitats comes straight out of the EU's Habitat Directive. This means that, in pursuit of the EU's renewable energy quota, the greenies are running slap into another requirement.

Anyhow, the consultants in question is Peter Kydd, of Parsons Brinckerhoff, who also warns that the compensation package for displaced economic activities would also have to be factored into final costs. Not least is the Port of Bristol, one of the country's largest docks. This would be forced out of its present site. These costs have not been quantified but "could run into tens of billions of pounds."

By the time the two-year consultation process has finished, there is a very real chance that the original cost estimates – themselves uncertain – could have doubled or more, making this scheme even more insane than as at originally conceived, putting the greenies, the climate change believers, economists and just about everybody else in conflict.

All of which rather suggests a new collective noun for the greenies – a "conflict" seems rather appropriate.

The ironic thing is that this scheme has been mooted seriously ever since 1925 (see picture) when an official study group was commissioned. Then it was turned down on economic grounds, only to be reactivated in 1975 when again it was rejected on as not being economically viable.

However, there were more studies carried out in 1979 and 1986 and with the current studies we now have about as many computer-generated simulations as the Airbus A400M.

The only thing that seems to have changed is that the frequency of studies is increasing, a phenomenon which possibly offers a long-term solution. We could launch an endless series of inquiries, locking the greenies in a room and letting them battle it out – while rest of us get on with our lives.

COMMENT THREAD

AirbusA400M+LL[i-AirbusA400M+LL]The Airbus A400M has been delayed again and the earliest the RAF can expect an in-service date is 2014, with deliveries unlikely to start until a year earlier, some seven years later than originally promised. That is a period longer than the whole of World War II. Possibly the in-service date may be even be delayed until 2016, with the aircraft grossly overweight and not fully "mission capable".

Oh for those heady days of May 2000 when that wonderful Mr Tony Blair, imbued with the spirit of European co-operation, so presciently decided to order 25 of those shiny new Airbus A400M military transport aircraft.

How wise he was to spurn the entreaties of US President Bill Clinton, rejecting the tried and tested Lockheed C-130 Hercules, going for the new dawn of European military aviation, free from the oppressive dominance of the United States.

And how pleased the "colleagues" all were, with David Jennings, a spokesman at Airbus Military, welcoming Britain into the fold, even though Germany was not to follow until over a year later. Brimming with confidence, Jennings happily announced that Airbus would launch the programme at the end of the year 2000 and begin deliveries in 2006.

However, with the RAF originally expecting an in-service date by 2007, the delivery date started to slip and by 2004 the in-service date had become 2011. But, even if the shine on the Great European Project was getting just a tiny little bit tarnished, up to 6 February this year the RAF was telling us that its 25-strong fleet would be complete by 2011.

With Airbus categorically denying "rumours" of delay, it was still looking a bit flakey. But never fear! Those Europeans really know what they are doing. A little late, perhaps, but 2011 it was going to be.

Then, tucked into an obscure publication called Hansard – which nobody bothers reading any more – was a question by Ann Winterton asking for the latest estimate of the in-service date for the A400M. Thus quoth the unfortunate Quentin Davies:

Airbus Military has announced a series of delays in the development and production of the A400M programme, and has recently indicated that first deliveries to customer nations will be three years after the achievement of first flight of the A400M prototype. Airbus has indicated that first flight will occur no earlier than the second half of 2009, and has also announced a slowdown in its production plans. Early A400M production aircraft will be delivered to some of our partner nations and therefore the first UK delivery would occur at least six months after Airbus delivers the first A400M. This suggests that initial UK deliveries could not start before 2013 and therefore the estimated in-service date of the A400M (defined as acceptance into service of the seventh aircraft) would be 2014.

Hey! Seven years later than the original estimate, with an in-service date now at least three years later than the last estimate of 2011, the shine has most definitely worn off Mr Blair's brave new project. The RAF is in the deepest of deep doo doo.

In June last year there were already warnings of "significant risks" that there would not be enough transport aircraft to fly British forces in future operations if there were any delays in bringing in replacements for the ageing fleet of C-130s.

Then, as many as nine of the older Hercules C-130Ks had been taken out of service early due to wing "fatigue" and five others are due to be retired next year. Even then, with the A400M not due to arrive until the following year, a grave "shortfall of capacity" was being predicted.

By last year we had 42 working Hercules aircraft, but the older C-130Ks were only flying because of a £15.3 million refit, which can only keep them in the air until 2012.

That is not the least of the problems. The newer C-130Js are taking such a hammering on operations (plus losses to enemy action) that several could need an intensive refit by 2012. And it gets worse. Because the bulk of the C-130 fleet was supposed to be retired, there is a shortage of engineers and spares to keep the full fleet running.

And just in case you were thinking it couldn't get worse, it just has.

The delays in the programme are costing Airbus a small fortune and the firm is running out of money. Thus it is indeed slowing down the programme and the MoD's estimates – as of yesterday – are looking unrealistically optimistic. Airbus is now saying that "the first significant wave of operational aircraft would not be delivered before 2014." Since we are down the queue, the chances of us making an in-service date of 2014 are nil. Add another two years at least, sixteen years since Mr Blair's happy little deal.

To add to our joys, there are serious problems with the software and the early versions will not be fully "mission capable". Furthermore, the aircraft coming off the production line are 12 tons heavier than planned. Even with a massive weight reduction programme, only seven tons is potentially capable of being removed from later production versions – and then that is not guaranteed.

This leaves an aircraft with a slated 37-ton capacity over 1,780 nautical miles coming in as a sub-30 ton machine, compared with the 20-ton capacity of the RAF's C-130Js. But then the C-130Js are currently priced at £38-40 million, against the A400M which at current euro exchange rates works out at £98 million – well over twice the price for considerably less than a fifty percent increase in load-carrying capacity.

Then that's "Europe" for you. Twice the money for less performance just about sums it up. But this is not funny. Blair has seriously screwed us – lives are at stake here and our operational capability is seriously at risk. He must be very proud.

I am cross-posting this on Defence of the Realm.

COMMENT THREAD

a400mmont1024[i-a400mmont1024]It does not really matter how much they deny it, or how many soothing words the Europhiliacs utter. Actions speak louder than words.

From the very first, before even the European Union was formally launched, there had been an attempt to launch a European Army, giving rise to the European Defence Community (EDC). And, although this attempt failed – scuppered by the French Assembly in 1954, the ambition has never gone away.

Thus we read, courtesy of the IHT the latest development aimed at bringing this ambition to fruition, with an agreement between "EU governments" to establish a joint military air squadron.

So far, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Spain have signed on to the initiative, which will be implemented by the European Defence Agency.

Notably, the UK has not signed up – although that is the way things happen. The "colleagues" set up the structure first, with us sitting on the sidelines and then, when it is fully established, we enter into a co-operation agreement and then, step-by-step we get sucked in until, in the fullness of time, British officials and politicians become the most enthusiastic supporters.

Ostensibly, this initiative is to improve the transport capabilities of the "colleagues" to far-flung operations such as Afghanistan, Africa or the Middle East. But, of course, it is not such thing. Aircraft sharing and joint-leasing could easily be arranged without going to the extent of developing full-blown squadron structure. This is all about political integration – as it has always been.

Needless to say, at the core of this capability will be the long-delayed Airbus A400M, which the IHT is still fanatasing about being ready in 2009 but, however, long it takes, the EU will wait patiently for the opportunity to adorn them with the ring of stars – the core of an emerging EU air force.

To follow is a Franco-German heavy-lift helicopter project, in which other EU member states will be encouraged to join and, with that – in slow steady stages – the EU "force" will grow.

Also, it seems, ministers have agreed that at least one of Europe's five operational aircraft carriers will be at sea at all times. These would be escorted by destroyers and frigates from various other EU nations, which would also provide refuelling and other logistics vessels. Two of those, of course, will be British carriers and, right from the very start, these have always been "pencilled in" as part of the EU's European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF).

Since 1999 when Romano Prodi declared overtly the ambition to create a European Army, teasing us that we could call it Mary Ann or Margaret, but it would still be a European Army, the writing has been on the wall.

An independent military is, of course, a vital part of the state-building to which the EU aspires. Today, it is a little bit closer and, tomorrow, it will be closer still, drawing closer as each day passes to its ultimate ambition. Those who cannot see the shape of the end game are either blind, stupid or knaves (or all three).

COMMENT THREAD

dicon[i-dicon]It was only a few months ago – in April - that, with Goebbels-like confidence, the MoD website was proudly announcing the delivery of the first set of wings for the RAF's future transport aircraft, the Airbus A400M. They had been flown to Spain to be fitted to other parts of the aircraft.

But they're going to have to wait a long time for the complete thing.

Posted on Defence of the Realm.

COMMENT THREAD

AIR+-+A400M+003[i-AIR+-+A400M+003]The European Air Transport Command (EATC) – the putative EU Air Force, agreed in principle by France and Germany in June 2001 – has acquired a new member, Holland, adding to the two original members plus Belgium, to make a group of four members.

The Netherlands Ministerie van Defensie signed up on 23 May, agreeing to the basis on their military transport aircraft should be pooled and how to manage the Command, which is based in Eindhoven in The Netherlands. However, the site, for the moment, will not become a central base.

According to Defense Industry Daily, the aircraft from the participating nations (mostly C-160 Transalls in France and Germany, plus some C-130H Hercules transports in Belgium & Holland) will continue to be stationed and maintained at their own air bases.

As presented, however, reports suggest that the command is newly formed but the operation was actually agreed in June 2001, initially as a European coordinating cell for air transport. It started operations in Eindhoven in June 2002 and Germany and France continued to pursue goal of European air transport command, as a model for other joint commands.

It was then relaunched after a Franc-German initiative in January 2003 and, on 1 July 2004, it became a European strategic air transport centre. The intention always was, therefore, that it would become a "European strategic air transport command" and the plan is that the Airbus A400M will become its key capability once that aircraft had come into service.

Three of the four countries now involved have ordered the A400M (France - 50, Germany - 60, Belgium - 7) and, says DID while the Dutch have made no firm decision on replacing their ageing C-130H-30s, their membership of the Command begins to weight the scales for that eventual decision.

And of course, DID adds, it also furthers the objective of creating a parallel EU military structure outside of Nato – which was the intention all along.

COMMENT THREAD

Now there is a headline you'll never see in The Sun - a line guaranteed to have your reader move on to pastures new, and especially our "toy-phobic" constituency.

But, back in the real world – the one where our government spends increasing amounts of money for very little return – the MoD has published its response to the Defence Committee's report on FRES, provoking a press release from the Committee which, sadly, has about as much hope of getting space in the nation media as a weather report from Outer Mongolia.

With not a little justification, the Committee feels it is vindicated by the response to its main charge, that there have been delays in delivering the Army's new armoured vehicles. Not least, the MoD has not sought to deny that we are looking at 2017 before we see the first tranche of vehicles in service.

But the real show-stopper, buried in the MoD report is an admission, for the first time, that keeping the weight of the new vehicles down is not the main priority, in order to allow air-portability, and that protection has the higher priority. Thus says the MoD:

The question of the relative priority of force protection in theatre and air deployability has been resolved. Whilst both are important, protection in theatre is a higher priority than air deployability by A400M/C17.

Initially, the weight limit was set as 22 tons, allowing transport by the ubiquitous C-130 Hercules, then it was upped, with the proviso that vehicles could still be transported by the Airbus A400M, which is expected to form the backbone of the RAF's tactical transport fleet. But now, the MoD is conceding that not only is transport by the A400M not a priority, it is even prepared to rule out the possibility of transport by the bigger C-17 Globemaster transports, which are capable of carrying 65-ton main battle tanks.

All this is brought about by the operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, where Warriors and even Challenger tanks have succumbed to the theatre scourge – the IED, and where protection from the RPG is also at a premium. And, to counter both weapons, the MoD is conceding the need for increased levels of protection.

This is precisely the conclusion the US forces have drawn and defence secretary Gates is seeking to expedite the delivery of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, now aiming to phase out the entire armoured Humvee fleet. In the meantime, their own FRES equivalent, the Future Combat System (FCS), while not actually cancelled, has been quietly put on the back burner.

As for FRES, although the name remains, the concept is effectively dead. The original idea was to trade weight for high-tech surveillance and communication systems which would allow the enemy to be detected before it got into range. This would allow it to be taken out by long-range, stand-off weapons, dispensing with the need for heavy armour.

Now, the armour takes priority and we are effectively to get a new series of medium/heavy-weight vehicles which will amount to little more than an upgrade of existing vehicles like the Warrior.

The original concept, though, was vital for the emerging rapid reaction forces, enabling military forces to be flown rapidly to trouble spots, complete with its equipment, without having to wait for sea lift or overland transport. Effectively, therefore, the whole idea of airborne rapid reaction forces is also under threat. In time, we may even be able to say goodbye to the European Rapid Reaction Force.

The political implications of this are, to say the least, interesting.

COMMENT THREAD

Defence+debate+010[i-Defence+debate+010]From the defence debate today, Ann Winterton speaking (albeit to a somewhat less than packed House):

I came across a quotation the other day that seemed especially apt for this debate on the UK's defence. In his "The Art of War", Sun Tzu wrote:

"And as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions."

That succinctly describes the dilemma facing those charged with the procurement of arms, vehicles and systems for our armed services on active duty on behalf of the UK.

In order to plan comprehensively for the defence of the UK, one has to predict future difficulties and conflicts that could threaten, directly or indirectly, our nation and its interests. It would seem that the present counter-insurgency challenges facing our troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan—part of the war on terrorism—have not been accurately predicted by the military or by politicians. The Home Secretary recently talked about splitting the responsibilities of the Home Office to improve prospects in the war on terror. Perhaps the MOD needs to give a higher priority to counter-insurgency work, and to the necessary procurement for it, because the war on terror will most certainly not go away.

I am often reminded of the phrase "boys and toys" when I hear about the huge expenditure on procurement in the UK's defence budget, not least because I have always believed that it is not what we spend but how we spend it that is more important. For example, the RAF's budget is haemorrhaging because of the Eurofighter—that fantastically expensive creation of European integration—and if we enter into tranche 3, which will provide for ground attack, the aircraft will be too fast to be of any use as close air support in counter-insurgency work.

Similarly, the Royal Navy is besotted with the idea of its two future aircraft carriers, which inevitably absorb most of its funding. However, should not we ask whether those vessels will fit the requirements of the future? They will certainly be of limited value in counter-insurgency work, where the requirement is often as simple as inshore patrol vessels. The Army has been painfully restructured to fulfil the original concept of FRES—the future rapid effect system—to wage war against a conventional army at a distance, as part of the European rapid reaction force, double-hatted with NATO; yet that unattainable pipe dream seems to have been downgraded to the provision of medium-armoured vehicles.

The three examples I have briefly described, with the extra parts bolted on to form the complete packages, are very large funding projects indeed. During the Westminster Hall debate I secured on FRES, the Minister announced that its cost had risen, almost overnight, from £6 billion to £14 billion and I believe that it has now gone up to £16 billion in only a short time. Once again, the question has to be posed: can the UK afford such expensive procurement without compromising lesser but equally important projects with immediate needs, such as those to provide maximum protection and support for our troops on active service in Iraq and Afghanistan? The final question is the $64,000 one: will a future British Government be prepared to continue funding those expensive projects?

The MOD is making great strides in base protection from indirect fire, which includes the introduction of counter rocket, artillery and mortar—C-RAM—about which I asked an oral question on 22 January, following a tragic incident at Basra palace camp. Improved body armour has been supplied. The VIPIR thermal imager is excellent. Mastiff and Bulldog vehicles have been introduced and there are improved electronic counter-measures against improvised explosive devices. As has been said, there are additional medium-lift helicopters: eight mark 3 Chinooks, which are to be downgraded to mark 2s, to ensure that they actually work, and six Merlins from Denmark, which are exceptionally expensive aircraft. In addition, among other items, we now have the underslung grenade launcher and better communication kit.

Where we might be going wrong, however, is that the military, or perhaps even politicians, seem to want advanced technical toys that cover 100 per cent. of all possible requirements. I have already mentioned tranche 3 of the Eurofighter, but there is also the joint strike fighter, the Merlin helicopter and electric armour on new vehicles. Then, on cost only rather than technology grounds, there are the two carriers, Astute submarines, A400M transport aircraft, air-to-air refuelling replacement and the MARS—military afloat reach and sustainability—programme to replace all the Navy’s ageing supply ships. They are all incredibly expensive, and often need massive logistical back-up, yet we simply do not have the manpower to service them without taking personnel from other duties. Nor could we contemplate their potential loss, because we have insufficient financial resources to replace them, even if they could be procured at short notice, which is nigh on impossible.

Over the past three years, I have consistently pursued the issue of counter-insurgency, where the enemy is unknown and is indistinguishable from the local population. That was the main reason I was so sceptical about the original concept of FRES. It is essential for counter-insurgency work to have aerial surveillance, yet I am not entirely convinced of the reliability of unmanned aerial vehicles, which do not come cheap by any means, especially when the Iraqi air force has at least 12 SAMA CH2000 small aircraft fitted with XM15 electro-optical surveillance turrets for less than the price of one Lynx helicopter. However, the Minister will be relieved to hear that it is pleasing that the Army Air Corps now has four Britten Norman Defender 4S AL Mk1 aircraft, which I trust are still in Iraq. I recently tabled a written question on that point. They operate at a fraction of the hourly cost of other aircraft and are no doubt doing a superb job.

With the correct surveillance equipment, an expensive platform is not necessary to deliver results. With the contraction of UK forces in Iraq to Basra air base, for example, the limited routes into Basra should be under aerial surveillance 24 hours a day, seven days a week, as should those routes going south to protect the supply lines from Kuwait. That should not be too expensive, but I wonder if the Royal Air Force and the Army Air Corps would work together and co-operate on such a project.

Moreover, insurgents are upping the ante, as it were, by taking out Warriors and Challengers, but it takes them considerably longer to lay the much larger charges needed than to lay an IED—improvised explosive device—against a Snatch Land Rover. That provides the golden opportunity, if there is adequate surveillance, to catch and deal with the insurgents.

There should not be a shortage of helicopters, as there are plenty of Bell helicopters—commonly known in the American slang as "Hueys"—which can be leased at a 10th of the hourly cost of a Lynx. They can also operate well in the heat of Afghanistan and fly when conditions ground the Lynx.

At present, many of the requirements in the field of defence arise from dealing with insurgents resisting democracy and the UK simply cannot afford to fight that kind of a war by using the most expensive equipment, which is not always the best for the conditions. We can succeed, however, by using practical, cost-effective means such as the electro-optical surveillance turret within a simple platform. We can build vehicles with a balance between protection, speed and manoeuvrability, although it has to be said that reports about the Panther Command and Liaison vehicle have not been all that encouraging. As it seems that many, if not most, future conflicts will have to deal with insurgency, Britain needs a force that is both equipped and trained for insurgency work, which can be achieved at a fraction of the defence budget.

I end my brief contribution by saying that I believe the Secretary of State acted properly and appropriately in announcing an inquiry into the incident involving the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines on 23 March. I trust that the inquiry will have a beneficial long-term effect on counter-insurgency work and that the UK will be better equipped in future to deal with these extremely difficult situations.

I don't know where she gets her information from, but this MP seems remarkably knowledgeable.

COMMENT THREAD

EU+celeb[i-EU+celeb]Despite the best efforts of the BBC, which is desperately trying to stoke up some enthusiasm, the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, to be celebrated by the "colleagues" in Berlin on Sunday, is looking to be the non-event of the half-century.

But it is not only the lack-lustre performance of the EU in the celebrations department which seem to suggest a certain lack of confidence in the project. There are other clues, slender perhaps but which could suggest that the tectonic plates are moving.

One such is a piece in the IHT about the Airbus A400M military airlifter. Once touted as a key link in its strategy to create a unified military force independent of NATO and the United States, the paper says, the project has become more a symbol of an evolving trans-Atlantic security relationship than of an emboldened EU trying to emerge from the American security umbrella.

If that is the case, then it represents a major shift in the ambitions of the European Union. The A400M was to be at the heart of an EU joint airlift command, with Germany and France already committed to becoming its founder members, so we may be seeing a recognition that the process of European defence integration has stalled.

It could be that too many of the EU members (and particularly the UK) are lined up alongside the United States in prosecuting the "war on terror". Those members are too busy to be enthusiastic about putting any energy into developing a European Rapid Reaction Force that is focussed on a mythical enemy and unspecified threats.

Hinted at in my earlier piece, we did not expect to get such early confirmation, with defence secretary Des Browne committing to send more helicopters to Afghanistan. "I do believe that we need more helicopters. I want the option to provide more to operations to increase the flexibility commanders have," he is cited by The Daily Telegraph as saying, adding: "I have no doubt that if I can get them more they will find good ways of using them. I will probably have more to say about this in the not-too-distant future."

The implications of this are far more profound than the media has even begun to realise. Despite the attempts to paint a picture of doom and glom in Iraq, which my co-editor has noted, the situation is far from unpromising. Even the Telegraph in yesterday's leader was forced to concede that there were "signs of hope".

At a European level, this does suggest that the EU, under the tutelage of Chirac and with the support of Schröder, backed the wrong horse. By failing to support the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it has lost more influence that it has gained.

That this is reflected in a loss of self-confidence might be indicated by another issue, the unexpected turn-around in the long-standing dispute with the United States over Airbus subsidies.

There was a time when the EU would have relished the fight with the US, just for the sake of it, but the Gulf Daily News is now telling us that it is suing for peace, seeking to bring the dispute to a rapid end. Not least of the reasons it the fear that while the two aviation giants of Airbus and Boeing battle it out, China sneaks in, having approved a plan to build large passenger aircraft, and takes the market from them both. For once, the trans-Atlantic squabble is being overshadowed by a greater threat.

China probably features somewhere it the EU’s latest move on its other great project, the Galileo satellite navigation system. As of yesterday, the EU commission announced that it would consider handing responsibility for the system to a public body if the consortium of companies charged with building it falls.

Since that is more than an outside possibility, and a public body would almost certainly fail to attract the financing that would enable the system to be commissioned, we are perhaps looking at the failure of the EU’s largest and most ambitious project to date, an outcome which, according to England Expects the commission itself seems to be predicting. Already shaky, one could then see the Union's self-confidence plummet.

Putting all this together, with some of our previous ruminations, and then drawing the conclusions we have may be a case of adding two and two to make five. But there is another straw in the wind, again courtesy of England Expects, who predicts that there will be no "road map" for the EU constitution in the Berlin declaration on Sunday. Effectively, that will mark the last rights for a project that has had more resurrections than a Wembley stadium full of Lazaruses.

It will we believe, also mark the end of the European Union's ambitions to become a political rather than an economic union. Fifty years on, it has lost its way. There will not be another fifty years. The winds of change are blowing too strongly.

COMMENT THREAD

Possibly it is the sign of age but I find that I have started too many postings with the words: “allow me to reminisce a little”. Sadly, I am doing it again.

Two memories spring to mind: one is of not so long ago universities in Britain. Actually, in the late sixties and early seventies when lecturers and outside experts who expressed an unpopular view on such subjects as the nuclear deterrent, the Vietnam war or the Soviet Union, were likely to be met by angry student demonstrations, sometimes led by young and ambitious lecturers (as described so superlatively by Malcolm Bradbury in his 1975 novel “The History Man”).

There are many people around who recall the speed with which university authorities caved in to demands that “fascist” or “imperialist” speakers be uninvited.

The other memory goes further back. My mother was a university lecturer in Budapest and, as such, had to participate in entrance examinations and interviews. Among the many questions on the application forms there were several about the applicant’s parents. What were they in 1947 and in 1939? (This was some years ago.) What was their educational standards? And so on.

Certain people’s children had no chance of getting in. I particularly remember a story of a girl, who, in my mother’s opinion, was absolutely brilliant. She was not going to get into that or any other university as her father had been an army officer under Horthy.

And so it has come to pass that both these memories are once again revived. This week we have seen the chancellors of various universities agreeing, nay, promoting the government’s idea that information about parents of university applicants should be sent on to the relevant departments to make it easier to weed out those whose parents come from the educated bourgeois classes. How else is one to interpret this new instruction?

The argument is that the government would like to see more young people from poorer or more disadvantaged backgrounds going to universities. Oddly enough, we used to have a system for ensuring that children whose parents had not had higher education should still acquire it themselves. They were called the grammar schools and a brilliant institution they were, too.

Neither the HMG nor HM Opposition seem very keen on the idea of reintroducing them. They prefer fiddling with social engineering.

The second tale from our academia is far more terrifying. The Daily Telegraph reports that the University of Leeds (sadly, the one at which I studied for my BA) has cancelled a talk to be given by a world-famous political scientist, Matthias Küntzel.

This is how David Pryce-Jones describes him on his blog:

Küntzel is a political scientist from Hamburg University, with an additional research fellowship at an institute in Jerusalem. An eminent authority on Iran, he has published a good deal about the messianic fervour of that country’s leadership. In particular, he has shown how Nazi propaganda and subsidies in the Hitler period laid the groundwork for modern Muslim anti-Semitism. And that was to be his subject at Leeds, under the title, "Hitler’s Legacy: Islamic anti-Semitism in the Middle East."

The university authorities received angry e-mails from various Islamic organizations, who, inevitably, denounced the man and his (well-proven) thesis as “racism”. (Also in today’s Telegraph there is an excellent article on the subject by Jeff Randall.)

They were not directly threatening but the spineless university authorities, just like their predecessors of thirty and forty years ago, pleaded security worries and caved in. Dr Küntzel has lectured on the subject all over the world and this is the first time he has actually been banned … woops … sorry …. I mean asked not to lecture for his own safety.

As he says, very mildly in the circumstances, “this is a worrying trend”. Coming just after the threats against anyone who steps out of line on the great climate change scam, this is more than worrying. It is truly frightening.

And, of course, our universities get their income almost entirely from the taxpayer. Why should we put up with this?

COMMENT THREAD

Airbus+A380+model[i-Airbus+A380+model]European governments have been interfering with commercial decisions in Airbus, shock!

Louis Gallois, chief executive, watching the company go down the pan and unable to make decisions in its best long term-interests, is now complaining about it. Even bigger shock!

That is the thrust of a Financial Times interview with Gallois, and all of a sudden the issue becomes very boring in its predictability.

The chief executive has attacked European governments "for haggling over the spoils at the struggling aircraft maker" without having regard to its long-term fate. He tells the newspaper: "I was very surprised to see that every government, the British, the French, the Germans and the Spanish were all saying we want the best share of the cake, we want composites and high technology and so on."

He then declares, "My job was to save Airbus and give a future to Airbus … I saw a lot of people wanting the best share of the cake and the size of the cake was not important to them. I said it was most important that in 20 years we still have an Airbus."

The way the company is going, he will be very lucky indeed – although Gallois will have moved on much earlier, if he has any sense. Already, the writing is on the wall, with the last remaining customer for the A380 freighter, UPS, calling for its order to be postponed and then, finally, according to Reuters and others, cancelling it completely, joining rival FedEx which cancelled an identical order last year.

What now transpires is that the cancellation was unexpected. UPS did agree to a delay in taking deliveries of its 10 aircraft beyond 2010, but then EADS and Airbus confirmed a news leak that Airbus would temporarily stop work on the cargo version. UPS responded with a statement saying it had lost confidence that Airbus could fill its orders in a timely manner, and decided to walk away.

Nevertheless, Airbus is exuding confidence that it can start delivering the passenger version of the A380 in October, and it will probably make that happen by dint of pouring resources into making it happen – should the unions co-operate, and not go on strike.

Even now, the company is talking about even more outsourcing, contracting and then moving work to low-cost countries, plus the prospect of enforced redundancies, something it has avoided talking about before now.

Despite all this, though, the company is asserting that there will be no delays to deliveries of the A400M military airlifter. But this is from a company that denied that there would be any delays to the A380 – and look where we are now.

The sad thing is that the world actually needs Airbus. Even the most rabid Atlanticist will recognise that handing a near monopoly of civil aircraft building to Boeing is good for no one. Competition on a world scale is very necessary for suppliers of what is a global industry.

It says something, therefore, that the company and the European governments that effectively control Airbus, through their loans to meet start up costs of each model, have made such a mess of what once looked like a successful business.

But then, European governments messing up a joint enterprise… Definitely dog bites man.

UPDATE

Spiegel Online has an interesting commentary. It cites the "left-leaning daily" Berliner Zeitung, saying: "The case of the wobbly company Airbus shows just how widespread economic nationalism is. More than that, though, Airbus says a lot about Europe itself - about how the European Union functions and about where the limits to cooperation are ..."

COMMENT THREAD

airbus.span[i-airbus.span]As expected, Airbus Chief Executive Louis Gallois yesterday announced his much delayed "Power8" plans to restructure his ailing company, shedding 10,000 jobs in the process. The jobs comprise 5,000 directly employed staff and 5,000 workers contracted from other firms and redundancies will be phased over the next four years. Additionally, Airbus intends to sell all or part of six factories.

Most of all though, Gallois railed against the "nationalist infighting" that had dogged the company from its inception, a "poison" that threatened to destroy it. "We need to be interested in the future of Airbus and for that we need to be one integrated company," he said

Despite the unions having been fully involved, and a careful spread of the job cuts to ensure equity between plants (to the detriment of the overall restructuring), there were still protests at Airbus factories in France at Meaulte and St. Nazaire. Jean-Francois Knepper, chairman of the European works council warned that there would be strike calls. But, he said, "perhaps a strike is not enough,"

Airbus+factory[i-Airbus+factory]Britain is to lose 1500 jobs, but the plant in Filton, near Bristol, is being given extra work, making carbon fibre composites for the wing of the A350. Other deals include setting up the main plant in Toulouse, France, for sole assembly of the A350 while the Hamburg plant will build the smaller A320.

These, however, are only the headline issues. Gallois is also committed to slashing operating costs, targeting reductions of € 2.1 billion from 2010 onwards and additional € 5 billion of cumulative cash flow from 2007 to 2010. Although much of this will come from reducing the headcount, operational efficiencies are also needed.

Therein lie some of the risks, as Airbus is considered by some commentators to be light on engineering and development skills, and is hard pressed to manage the A380 remedial work, the A350 redesign and the ongoing development for the military airlifter, the A400M.

Airbus+wing+3[i-Airbus+wing+3]Some of the slack will be made up by outsourcing some of the structural development and manufacture to risk-sharing partners, which will roughly double, while "lean manufacturing" is planned in the remaining plants, bringing expected productivity increase of 16 percent by 2010.

Yet, despite Gallois wanting to leave national infighting behind, he has been forced to maintain inflexible national work-share arrangements, which suggests that he has not yet got a complete grip on the company with is dominated by Franco-German politics, so much so that both Merkel and Chirac had to be consulted over the job cuts

The proof of the effectiveness of the changes, however, will be in whether the company can claw back some of the business it is losing to Boeing, and make up time on some of its projects. Little can be expected of the A380 but, in the wings, serious decisions are awaited as to the fate of the A400M, which looks like coming in late, overweight and short on range and payload.

Far from being out of the woods, therefore, Airbus may be heading for even more stormy waters, with its troubles only just starting.

COMMENT THREAD

Sun+002[i-Sun+002]At the heart of the dishonest and inadequate Defence Committee report on "The Army's Requirement for Armoured Vehicles: the FRES programme" lies a failure of the Committee to explain what FRES actually is.

That, most likely, stems from the fact that the MPs themselves do not understand what it is.

Although I have done this before (not least, here, here and
here), let me attempt to summarise it in this post for, without that basic understanding, you cannot even begin to appreciate the issues involved.

Essentially, this is a child of the post Cold War period, when the US and European government started to confront the idea that dealing with the world's hotspots required highly mobile, air-portable forces which could be shipped out at very short notice to deal with trouble as it arose, rather than letting the situation deteriorate to the point where larger ground forces would be required.

The concept crystallised in 1998 when the MoD decided that the UK Army required a fleet of armoured vehicles to fulfil what was termed the "expeditionary role", which was envisaged in the Strategic Defence Review, and then formalised as the "rapid reaction force", aimed at serving both the EU and Nato requirements.

Now, the trouble was and is that the basics of armoured warfare were incompatible with the requirements of air-portable rapid reaction forces. In the former, this had evolved to spawn two main vehicles, the Main Battle Tank (MBT) and the Mechanised Infantry Combat Vehicle (MICV), the first providing the direct firepower, the second providing the infantry support.

link[i-link]In the MBT had evolved the optimum balance of three requirements: speed and manoeuvrability, armoured protection and firepower, emerging in its current form as the Challenger II (pictured) in the British armoury (and the Abrams in the US armoury), weighing in at around 65 tons.

To enable the maximum number of vehicles to be delivered, however, it was necessary to restrict weight to that which could be carried by the most common military airlifter, the C-130 Hercules, dictating a maximum weight of between 18-22 tons. This meant that military planners had to develop an armoured vehicle which could afford the same overall protection and performance of the MBT but came in at less than a third of the overall weight. (Pictured below is the "SEP" prototype platform, being considered for FRES: various versions will be produced, including an APC and a "direct fire" MBT equivalent.)

link[i-link]Ostensibly, this would have been impossible, except for the emergence of new technologies, enabling vehicles to shed weight, in the form of less armour, in exchange for three attributes: "situational awareness", "network capability" and high-precision stand-off weapons.

Using an elaborate system of high-tech sensors and reconnaissance systems, the new forces could detect the enemy earlier and at greater distances than before. With advanced electronic networks, that information could then be shared in real time, so that all mobile assets would be immediately informed of the presence of threats that could harm them, long before they came into range. Then, with those threats located, a whole range of weapons could be employed to destroy them, without their ever posing any danger to the lightweight vehicles.

LAND+-+IED+023[i-LAND+-+IED+023]That was the theory which drove what became known as the Future Rapid Effect System. But, by late 2003, the shooting phase of the Iraqi invasion had passed and the war had moved into an insurgency. There, the enemy's weapons of choice became the roadside bomb (IED) and the RPG fired by insurgents in civilian clothes who would not declare their identities until the moments they fired.

For dealing with this situation, any idea of relying on "situational awareness" and stand-off weapons, which underpinned the whole concept of FRES, became totally unrealistic.

Meanwhile, to deal with the insurgency, as we recorded, our then CGS Mike Jackson was trying to make do with "Snatch" Land Rovers. But, as the wider lesson of the insurgency were learned, planners were left to look at ways of improving the protection of FRES vehicles.

The task was effectively trying to square the circle, which they attempted by using additional sensors and self-defence equipment, plus increasingly esoteric forms of armour. Each added to the weight, eventually making the proposed vehicles too heavy for the C-130 and, possibly, too heavy for the A400M, should these ever be acquired.

Thus, at the heart of the conundrum is a conflict – which the Defence Committee acknowledges - where "the MoD", it says, "wants a vehicle which has sufficient armour to protect soldiers from IEDs and RPGs but which it also light enough to be transportable by air."

FRES+001[i-FRES+001]Now we come to the nub. The Committee says that seeking a perfect solution is "unrealistic" and that it is high time the MoD decided where its priorities lay. And that is where the dishonesty lies. The underlying decision is not one for the MoD but one for the politicians.

Essentially, what we are talking about are two different things – FRES-type vehicles for conventional warfighting, and completely different vehicles for counter-insurgency operations. It was never the case that "dithering" over the final shape of FRES cost any lives. The demands of the two types of warfare are so different that it is impossible to combine the requirements for both in a single platform. We need two completely different ranges of vehicles and the lives were lost because of the failure to provide suitable, non-FRES vehicles.

Currently, we still need the decision as to whether we are going to undertake "warfighting" or counter-insurgency operations – or both. And that, as we say, is a decision which must be made by the politicians.

Where the MoD has gone wrong, if it has, is in not making that abundantly clear to the Defence Committee - not that the MoD was actually asked. Now, it is left to Lord Drayson to explain the facts of life to the MPs. The FRES programme, he says:

…should not be confused with the recent urgent operational requirements to procure additional protected patrol vehicles to complement Snatch Land Rovers in Iraq and Afghanistan. The recent and very rapid procurement of vehicles such as Mastiff, Vector and Bulldog, is not related to the FRES requirement. These patrol vehicles are important additions to the capabilities at the disposal of commanders, but are separate from the FRES programme.

But, in fact, it is not the MoD informing the Committee. It is the Army brass. They, collectively, want FRES. They want an army equipped for high-tech "warfighting" and do not want to buy counter-insurgency equipment that will affect their plans for acquiring their shiny new toys. Nor indeed do they want an Army which is primarily equipped for counter-insurgency.

ARMY+-+Dannatt+006[i-ARMY+-+Dannatt+006]That much was the real message CGS Richard Dannatt was giving last October, effectively a plea to pull out of Iraq, thereby saving FRES and keeping the Army in the shape the generals wanted.

For the political glitterati (aka clever-dicks), of course, all this will pass them by without disturbing so much as a hair on their carefully coiffured little heads. Yet, at those different levels, political and technical, the Defence Committee report marks an important turning point in the decline of this nation.

Future historians will see in it evidence of the total failure of the parliamentary system, a victory of the Army over the politicians and a retreat from any attempt by this nation to recognise what is needed to deal with the growing threat of militant Islam. For, what the report does is fail to recognise that the Army needs to equip to deal with the Islamic counter-insurgency, wherever it occurs, and that FRES is not the answer. More importantly, it fails to understand that role of the Army brass in sabotaging attempts to ensure that our armed forces are properly equipped to deal with the job at hand.

Thus, the MPs have let the Army brass get away with it. Meanwhile, as ill-equipped troops are pulled out of Iraq in an ignominious retreat, the national interest – to say nothing of the interests of our troops in the field and those of the Iraqi people - has been put on the back-burner.

COMMENT THREAD

POL+-+Merkel+034[i-POL+-+Merkel+034]Over at England Expects you can read a disturbing account of the state of play on the EU constitution, and the role of German chancellor Angela Merkel in pursuit of a resolution to the issue.

But, whichever way you cut it, hers is a high risk strategy with only a limited chance of success and, set against that, are the risks of re-opening old wounds which emerged during the French and Dutch referendum campaigns. It is something of a mystery, therefore, as to why she should be expending so much political capital on such a hazardous venture.

monnet[i-monnet]Part of the reason, however, may rest with the original reasons why the EEC was set up in the first place. And, to understand this, one must go back to 1950 when the "father of Europe", Jean Monnet, launched what became known as the Pleven Plan for a European Defence Community, held together by a European Political Community. This was to be bound together by the first version of a European Constitution, which is very similar to the document on offer today.

Monnet's action at that time was calculated specifically to anticipate Chancellor Adenauer's ambition to re-arm, building afresh a new German army. With memories of the Second World War still raw, Monnet (and indeed Adenauer) knew that the French would not permit German re-armament, except within a European framework, and that was precisely what Monnet proposed.

Ironically, in 1954 the French Assembly rejected the plan, but Adenauer still got his way, having demonstrated his European credentials. But, to reassure the French and other member states, each of the successive German leaders have had to re-affirm their personal credentials – and commitment to the "project". And now it is Angela Merkel's turn.

What is not properly appreciated in all this though is that the need for Germany to re-affirm its European credentials is more urgent and more necessary than it has been since that first affirmation by Konrad Adenauer. And the reason here is that, for the first time in its post-war history, Germany is beginning to develop a truly independent and assertive foreign policy – the very thing Monnet's original process of European integration was designed to prevent.

SEA+-+Frettchen[i-SEA+-+Frettchen]The most visible sign of this is the number of foreign expeditions in which German armed forces have participated, starting with the former Yugoslavia but including most recently, sending warships to Lebanon to work alongside the UN, leading the EU force in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and membership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

As we pointed out in an earlier post, it is in Afghanistan that the independence of Germany is coming to the fore as her participation is not through European institutions but as part of a Nato force, currently led by the United States. And her decision to send Tornado bombers to Afghanistan, equipped to carry out reconnaissance has merely reinforced that independence.

However, as it was in 1950, any independent military capability exercised by Germany is a direct challenge to France, which since 1999, has given European military integration high priority, with the development of the European Security and Defence Policy and the establishment of the European Rapid Reaction Force.

AIR+-+Transall+001[i-AIR+-+Transall+001]Part of that programme was the integration of the French and German military transport fleets, to form a single European airlift command, based on the Airbus A400M military transport. But this aircraft had been delayed by the troubles over the Airbus A380 "superjumbo", leaving the Luftwaffe with ancient and inadequate Transall airlifters that must be replaced. Even without that, it was turning to the Americans to lease and possibly buy C-130 Hercules transporters, putting at risk the whole idea of a European airlift command.

It is not only here that close military co-operation is beginning to unravel. At the leading edge of military technology is the development of unmanned aircraft, which the newly formed European Defence Agency declared a priority for EU defence manufacturers. And hoping to lead a common European programme is the French with the expensive and ambitious Neuron programme, in which it would have hoped for German participation.

AIR+-+Euro+Hawk[i-AIR+-+Euro+Hawk]Almost as a snub to France, though, last week, the German Ministry of Defence (MoD) awarded a €430 million contract to EADS and Northrop Grumman for a joint venture, developing the US-designed Global Hawk long-endurance UAV as a Euro Hawk unmanned variant to carry out electronic intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Not only is this system US-designed but it meshes with a similar system being considered by Nato, taking Germany further away from the French camp and its ambitions for a European Army, and into the US sphere of influence.

And, as we previously recorded, in Germany, there is a school of opinion that sees this as advantageous. It also sees the war in Afghanistan is a great opportunity for Germany – an opportunity to join the Anglo-American alliance. This harks back to the dream of Bismarck, which puts Germany taking over from France and leading Europe.

Such a view is undoubtedly worrying the French who are seeing their grip over Germany beginning to weaken – more so since Jung has told the Welt am Sonntag newspaper that he has not ruled out sending German special forces to the more violent southern regions of Afghanistan, where they would be directly invoked in fighting alongside Nato (but not French) allies.

It is developments such as these that create the pressure for Merkel to re-affirm that the Germans are, after all, "good Europeans". Thus Merkel must enthusiastically pursue the constitution as it is only this now that can demonstrate that German military expansion can be contained within a pan-European framework, reassuring the French that Germany is still under control.

The looming problem for Germany though is that her foreign policy and military ambitions are not compatible with total commitment to European integration. Going along with the constitution, therefore, can only be a temporary expedient. It is putting off the day when Germany is going to have to consider whether it is going to remain bound by Europe or strike out once more on its own. That day cannot be long in coming.

COMMENT THREAD

fla[i-fla]Airbus chief executive Christian Streiff was warning in October that there might be delays, and there were strong hints in December.

Now it's official. Airbus, in the form of its executive vice president, Tom Williams, has formally warned customers of a "potential" three-month delay on its 20 billion euro ($26 billion) A400M military transport aircraft programme.

One again, therefore, a symbolic European programme is crumbling into the dust, demonstrating the inability of the "colleagues" even to get a fairly straightforward project like a military transport off the ground. This is more than fifty years after the US introduced the iconic C-130 Hercules into squadron service.

Under pressure from L’Escroc, Britain has ordered 25 of these machines at an expected cost of £2.4 billion, to replace its fleet of 51 US-built C-130 Hercules transports. For some long time it has been suffering a marked shortage of airlift capacity as it waits for Airbus to bring the A400M into production.

In December last, so critical had the situation become that the government was mooting buying another three Boeing C-17 Globemasters for a mere $660 million (about £337 million).

The trouble is that the bulk of the orders for the C-17 have been for the USAF and the orders, barring a few, are largely complete, leading Boeing to close down the production line. Although the Canadians are also interested in buying C-17s, their orders are not sufficient to keep the line open and, therefore, there is some doubt about whether the order could be fulfilled.

But, if this is problematic for the RAF, the Luftwaffe, which is struggling with a fleet of clapped-out Transalls which, even in pristine condition, do not have the range adequately to service German requirements.

More devastated will be the "colleagues" though. As with the troubled A-380, the A400M was always more than an aeroplane. It was a symbol of integration, in this case forming the nucleus of a joint Franco-German military air transport command, a precursor to a European airforce.

I am minded – showing my age somewhat - of the glorious "Telegoons" where Neddy (I am sure it was he), lacking a firearm, conspired to hold up a bank with a colour photograph of a gun. It looks as is the nearest the "colleagues" are going to get to their transport command in the foreseeable future is a colour photograph of an A400M - in the production of which Airbus seems to excel - which, presumably, they can frame and hang over their mantleshelves.

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C-130%20348[i-C-130%20348]Any which way you look at it, the project is in trouble. We scented problems in October and now, no matter how carefully they word it, all the indications are that they are not going to make the 2009 deadline.

We are talking here about the Airbus A400M project, the military transport destined to replace ageing transport fleets in Europe. They say it is still "on track" but a review carried out in September has uncovered "significant" challenges for ensuring that initial deliveries are made in 2009 as planned.

These include the electrical harness design, a wiring problem that was also behind the latest delays to the A380 superjumbo project. Other "critical risk areas" for the A400M are engine modifications, the maturity of military mission systems, and the need for more work on the final assembly line, says manufacturer EADS.

The A400M is crucial for EU military ambitions. Germany has ordered 60 of the aircraft, to replace its ancient fleet, France wants 50, Spain 27 and Britain 25. Without that airlift capability, any idea of a European Rapid Reaction Force is a bigger joke than it already is.

link[i-link]But, if this post is about the A400M, why the picture of the Hercules at the top? Well, this is the oldest picture I could find, circa 1960, and it really puts the whole A400M project in context.

A year before the 50th birthday of the Treaty of Rome there was another 50th anniversary and, in its own way, one more important. That was December 1956 when the very first deliveries of Lockheed C-130 Hercules were made to the USAF, from a batch of 219 machines.

Yet still the "Europeans" cannot even get their act together. All they seem to be able to do is produce a series of increasingly elaborate computer-generated pics while, 50 years ago, the Americans were putting the real thing into service. And, having undergone massive transformations, it is still in service, currently as the "J" version. When you think about it, that tells you all you need to know about the European dream.

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