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Showing posts with label Royal Navy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Royal Navy. Show all posts

Iran+110[i-Iran+110]
The kindest thing one can say of the press conference organised by the MoD yesterday afternoon, to show off the released Iranian hostages, is that it should never have happened.

If the Navy was actually serious about carrying out an inquiry – even if it is of the watered-down "lessons learned" variety – then the last thing it should have done was expose some of the key witnesses to media scrutiny, with carefully pre-prepared and rehearsed statements. Although the issue is not formally sub judice the same general provisions must surely apply, in order not to prejudice any findings.

However, by his behaviour this morning (see also here) before the statement by the two recently captive officers, Lieutenant Felix Carman RN and Royal Marine Captain Chris Air, First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Jonathon Band has already delivered his judgement on the conduct of the boarding crew. That rather makes any findings which may emerge from any inquiry redundant, and the inquiry itself a charade.

And, by delivering his injunction not to second-guess "decisions that operational commanders and other people make," defence secretary Des Browne has effectively given carte blanche for the charade to continue.

This is a very foolish move which he may have cause to regret. He could have (and should have) stood aloof from the fray, behind the scenes insisting on a properly constituted Board of Inquiry, then announcing that he would stand by the findings. That way, he could rightly disown any responsibility for what in fact were operational decisions.

All that said, with the benefit of the press conference transcript to hand, we can agree with the officers' decision not to resist the Iranians – in the circumstances in which they found themselves.

It makes an interesting contrast with the December 2004 incident, where the boarding team remained on the ship they were inspecting, when challenged by Iranian Revolutionary Guards, while their boat(s) returned to the mother ship – the team eventually being lifted out by helicopter.

Since the officers have put their own conduct up to the bar of public opinion, we can have no problems with judging them. In that they appeared to have seen, from the vantage point of the boarded freighter, the approach of two Iranian boats, and decided then to return to their boats, this seems to be an unforced error. Like the 2004 crew, they might have been better off remaining on the freighter, sending their own boats away to avoid capture.

That apart, it seems more clear than ever that the capture could not have happened had a warship been standing off to protect them. It is even questionable whether it would have happened had the Lynx remained on guard, as it seems – according to the new narrative – that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards only approached after the unexpected departure of the helicopter.

It also seems, according to Carman and Air, that the boarding team contacted the ship to ask why the helicopter had gone, and was in contact when the Iranians approached. Here, therefore, there appears to be a conflict between this account and that offered by Commodore Nick Lambert.

Shortly after the event, he told the BBC that the boarding had been compliant and that the leader of the boarding party cleared the captain to continue with this business. After that, said Lambert, "we lost communications with the boat, but we did have a helicopter in the air – we always have a helicopter flying top cover – and our understanding is that the boarding party returned to its boats and was promptly arrested by a group of Iranian patrol boats…".

It is precisely to resolve such conflicts that there should be a Board of Inquiry and, for exactly the same reason, the boarding officers' evidence should not have been rehearsed in an informal context before it had been properly heard and evaluated.

That said, we are by no means alone in our criticism of actions taken in relation to this incident and, on yesterday's BBC Radio 4 PM programme – after the press conference – Max Hastings was insistent that the key question must now be how the boarding party was put in the position of being so vulnerable.

He was also highly critical of the lax attitude of the Navy, remarking that the Army had been fighting a "proxy war" with Iran for the last three years, yet the Navy did not even seem to be on a war footing. The operation, he said, had been treated, "apparently as if it were a Sunday stroll".

This in fact was Hastings repeating much of what he had written in The Daily Mail yesterday morning, in a piece headed, "Why there must be sackings over Iran".

The Royal Navy has blundered, he wrote. "It seems unlikely that Commodore Nick Lambert, the local commander off Iraq, will gain promotion to admiral, or deserve to." And, he adds, "Blame must go higher than the Commodore … Some naval heads must roll for the Iranian fiasco. It will not do merely to let officers 'retire with honour' at the end of their present postings. When a fiasco of this magnitude takes place in any walk of life, those responsible must not only be sacked, they must be seen to be sacked."

It was at that point that Hastings was under the impression that there would be a Board of Inquiry and his own fears of a "naval whitewash" now look exceedingly likely to be realised. But, with Band leading the cover-up attempt, apparently endorsed by Des Browne, it appears that they too are putting their careers on the line.

They should know that, in the way of these things, it is often the attempt to cover-up, rather than the original events, which destroy the players.

COMMENT THREAD

Iran+108[i-Iran+108]From a statement of the freed British sailors and marines, read out by their two most senior members, Lieutenant Felix Carman, 26, and Royal Marine Captain Chris Air, 25.

...we were flown to Tehran and transported to a prison where the atmosphere changed completely. We were blindfolded, our hands were bound and we were forced up against a wall. Throughout our ordeal we faced constant psychological pressure.

Later we were stripped and then dressed in pajamas. The next few nights were spent in stone cells, approximately 8ft by 6ft, sleeping on piles of blankets. All of us were kept in isolation.

We were interrogated most nights, and presented with two options. If we admitted we had strayed, we would be on a plane back to the UK soon. If we didn't we faced up to seven years in prison. We all at one time or another made a conscious decision to make a controlled release of non-operational information.

Sijan[i-Sijan]From the Wikipedia entry for Lance Peter Sijan (April 13, 1942 – January 22, 1968), a United States Air Force Officer and fighter pilot. He was awarded the Medal of Honor, the United States' highest military award, for his selflessness and courage in the face of lethal danger.

Sijan was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1942 from a Serbian father and Irish mother. He graduated from the United States Air Force Academy in 1965, and after attending pilot training, was assigned to the 366th Wing at Da Nang Air Base, Vietnam.

On his 52nd mission, on the night of November 9, 1967, Sijan and pilot Lt. Col. John Armstrong were tasked with a bombing mission over North Vietnam. As they rolled in on their target to release their ordnance, their F-4C was engulfed in a ball of fire, due to the six bomb's fairly new fuses which malfunctioned causing a premature detonation soon after the release point.

The jet then entered a banking climb before plunging into the jungle below. Sijan ejected from his aircraft, and a search-and-rescue crew, radioed to Sijan that they were attempting a rescue. After almost a whole day of locating his position and softening up air defences in the area, the SAR forces were finally able to get one of the big Jolly Green Giant helicopters roughly over Sijan's position (during this operation over 20 aircraft were disabled, due to the anti-aircraft fire, and had to return to base.

Another aircraft was also shot down, though its pilot was rescued with ease by one of the Jolly Greens on station.) Sijan, refusing to put another person in danger, insisted that he crawl in to the jungle and have a penetrator lowered by the helicopter, instead of sending down the helicopter's Para-Jumpers to carry him. However, he couldn't reach the penetrator quick enough, and after 33 minutes the rescue team, which faced enemy fire and the growing darkness, had to return to base. Although search efforts continued the next day, they were called off when no further radio contact was made with Sijan, due to his unconscious state, and he was placed in MIA status.

With a fractured skull, mangled right hand, compound fracture of the left leg, without food and little water, and no survival kit, Sijan evaded enemy forces for 46 days (all the time "crawling" or rather scooting on his back down the rocky limestone karst on which he landed, causing even more wounds) before being captured on December 25, 1967.

Although emaciated and in poor shape, he managed to overpower his guard and escape, but was recaptured within hours. He was transported to a holding compound in Vinh, North Vietnam, where he was put into the care of other American POWs. Here, in even more pain from his wounds, he suffered beatings from his captors, but never gave any information other than what the Geneva Convention allowed. After further travel to Hanoi, Sijan suffering from exhaustion, malnutrition, and disease, died in captivity on January 22, 1968.

Sijan was promoted posthumously to captain on June 13, 1968. His remains were repatriated on March 13, 1974 and positively identified on April 22, 1974. He is buried in Arlington Park Cemetery in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

* * * *

"As a professional set of Armed Forces – and you can't get a more professional set than the United Kingdom..."

First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Jonathon Band. 6 April 2007.

COMMENT THREAD

admband[i-admband]The First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Jonathan Band has, according to The BBC, claimed that Britain faces a choice between remaining as a first division sea-going nation or "turning into Belgium".

This was at a press briefing where he told the assembled journalists that his price tag for avoiding this horrible fate was "another £1bn" to safeguard future capabilities - and the delivery of extra two aircraft carriers.

"The navy is a very special asset, and if you want to use it, it doesn't come for nothing," he is said to have told the journalists, adding, "We're at a scale now that requires a certain amount of investment to maintain … You can't do deterrence unless you are a really professional outfit."

He summarised his position to journalists: "Give me two carriers and just less than a billion and I will be off your back, a happy boy".

No sooner was the news out, however, than Sir Jonathan was backtracking faster than a French tank in reverse. Up on the MoD website went a statement declaring:

I do not think, and have not said, that the Royal Navy needs a £1bn-a-year extra to do its job or to keep ships at sea. Today's Royal Navy is funded to do what is asked of it – not least thanks to a current investment programme of £14bn, and the delivery of 28 new ships in the last decade alone.
And this is a day after the House of Commons Defence Select Committee warned that the Royal Navy could be left without working aircraft carriers because of continuing delays and doubts surrounding the MoD's management of the £3.6 billion project to buy new vessels.

The Scotsman, being the only newspaper to carry the item, cited the Committee as saying that the whole future of the navy as a fighting force was uncertain and hung on decisions ministers will take in the next few months. The biggest of those concerned the formal placing of the order to build two new aircraft carriers, which was by no means assured.

Anyhow, the next day, Sir Jonathan up and socks it to 'em, and then backs off immediately. You really have to admire the intestinal fortitude of the chap, don't you.

COMMENT THREAD

minehunters[i-minehunters]
There has been much publicity of late on how the Royal Navy has been cut to the bone – to the extent that it is now scarcely if at all a credible force. Yet, despite that, Britain – under the tutelage of Tony Blair – is still determined to play its part in prosecuting the war on terror, alongside its ally the United States.

To that effect, The Times tells us, the allies are beefing up their naval forces in the Gulf to "go after" Iran. Britain's contribution is the two 600-ton minehunters HMS Blyth and HMS Ramsey (pictured above), which will remain in the Gulf for an unusually-long two-year mission "to keep shipping routes open in the event that Iran attempts to block oil exports".

aircraft+carriers[i-aircraft+carriers]
The American contribution is the 97,000 ton USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier, with its escort group, which entered the Gulf in December (carrier shown above right). It will shortly be joined by the 100,000 ton USS John C. Stennis with its carrier group (carrier shown above left). This is the first time since the invasion of Iraq four years ago that the US has deployed two carrier strike groups in the Gulf at one time.

Some interesting facts about the Stennis: it is constructed with 60,000 tons of structural steel; if lined up end-to-end, the bed mattresses carried on the ship would stretch more than nine miles; the vessel also carries 28,000 sheets and 14,000 pillow cases and has 2,000 telephones. Each of its two anchors weighs 30 tons.

The disparity says it all. Britain a naval power? Who do we think we are kidding?

COMMENT THREAD

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