EU Referendum

Showing posts with label Liam Fox. Show all posts

Fox+troops[i-Fox+troops]
Politically, for the period that British troops remain in Afghanistan, it is going to be an interesting time. We are going to see a Conservative defence team, which in opposition specialised in low-grade sniping, now exposed to its own medicine, as unhappy events unfold.

What would have been a classic example of this is the resignation today of Colonel Bob Seddon, the principal ammunition technical officer of the Royal Logistics Corps. He has decided to call it a day over his concerns that cuts have left his team - which deals with the threat of IEDs in Afghanistan – "overstretched and undermanned".

Pre-election, then shadow defence secretary Liam Fox would have had a field day, condemning the inadequacies of the government. Now he represents the government, however, Fox is having to promise to remedy the inadequacies of his predecessors. He is now, effectively, on notice, and further problems with ATO shortages will, in due course, be laid at his door.

This, of course, is a game Fox cannot win. There will always be deficiencies emerging somewhere in the order of battle as our forces continue to engage with a relentless enemy. Of those deficiencies, Fox will have little direct knowledge – until they are brought to his attention – but, having been so keen to hold his predecessor responsible for every defect, will now find himself similarly in the hot seat.

So far, Fox has not made a good start of it, having incurred the wrath of the Afghan government during a weekend visit, after describing Afghanistan as a "broken 13th-century country". A senior Afghan government source said: "His view appears to be that Afghanistan has not changed since the 13th century and it implies that Afghanistan is a tribal and medieval society."

If that is indeed Fox's view, it says little for his broader understanding of the politics of the region, but this should come as no surprise. On this and many other things, he shows every indication of having learned absolutely nothing during his period in waiting.

From his privileged position as defence shadow, Fox has had every opportunity to explore the Afghan crisis at length and, had his understanding developed at all, he would undoubtedly be thinking along the lines of Denis MacShane, one of the few to understand the malign role of India in the conflict.

"We cannot keep on sending British soldiers to die in the will-'o-the-wisp search for an ultimate military victory," says MacShane. "Instead of warcraft we need statecraft and that must involve a stronger relationship with Pakistan. There has been much talk about Pakistan and the solution to Afghanistan. But there will be no solution in Pakistan until India changes its strategic approach in the area."

Alongside foreign secretary William Hague, however, the Conservative leadership – MacShane asserts – is totally India-obsessed, which leaves Fox's thinking undeveloped and superficial.

And, if his strategic thinking is lacking, so too is his response to local issues such as perceived shortages. Tonight's Panorama documentary may be a case in point, where Christina Schmid, widow of Staff Sergeant Olaf Schmid, complains that her husband, who was killed by an IED in Sangin, was "flaking" with exhaustion on the day he died because of demands being made on him and his elite team due to staff shortages.

Taking them at face value, Fox has no choice but to respond to such complaints by promising to make good the shortages. But, had he been more conscientious in his research, he might have learned that there were alternative and less labour-intensive way of doing things, than currently undertaken by the military, which could square the circle – providing better military effect at less cost and loss of life.

Crucially though, where over the weekend there emerged what appeared to be a split between Fox and development secretary Andrew Mitchell, a more rational approach by Fox could have had the two ministers singing from the same hymn sheet.

The essential issue here is that, for many of the intractable military problems in the British area of operations, there are no pure military solutions. With such solutions are being sought, in vain, this gave Fox the opening to offer alternatives, such as the tried and tested engineering solutions which have served others so well.

Such an approach would have put Fox on the same wavelength as Mitchell, but instead has him creating his own hostages to fortune, with his current promise that the new government will "do everything we can to ensure that, whatever you are asked to do, you are properly, fully equipped to do so, to maximise your chance of success and minimise the risk to you."

That is a promise which Fox cannot keep – it will always be the case that there could have been something more which could have been done while, on the other hand, nothing Fox has in mind by way of strategy would offer any chance of success. He has already squandered multiple opportunities, to the extent that history has perhaps already marked Thirteenth Century Fox down for failure, before he has even got properly into gear.

COMMENT THREAD

Fox+3[i-Fox+3]Those interested in the Afghan issue are doubtless aware of the recent McChrystal assessment report, and most will have either read the redacted copy or, at the very least, read one or more of the numerous media reviews of it.

Those who have done neither could, if they so wished, read the speech delivered today by Liam Fox to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

With the working title, "Beyond the Smoke: Making Progress in Afghanistan", its substantive parts are unashamedly lifted from the McChrystal assessment report, comprising an evaluation of "three areas in the current struggle in Afghanistan". These are the role of the Afghan population in the war, capacity building of the Afghan Security Forces and the need to improve governance across Afghanistan.

Fox even admits the source, stating that they have been identified as priorities by the General, then somewhat rashly declaring that they form the basis of future strategy in Afghanistan.

Whether McChrystal was defining a strategy or simply a new (as applied to Afghanistan) tactical approach is moot, but the strategy comprises in essence the implementation of the "Integrated civil-military campaign plan", which goes well beyond the three areas enumerated by Fox.

Crucially though, Fox seems to have fallen into the trap (one of many) of assuming that the McChrystal assessment is a done deal. He is behind the curve, seemingly unaware that president Obama has not acted on it and, instead, has commissioned his own strategic review. Whether McChrystal's recommendations will become policy, therefore, remains a matter of speculation. They certainly cannot be taken as read.

The "game changer", of course, was the Afghan presidential election. It is recognised that any successful counterinsurgency requires a stable and legitimate political partner in the host country and, whether Karzai manages to cling on to power or not, there is general agreement that he will be weakened and that his administration will lack legitimacy.

On that basis, there are serious doubts as to whether the classic counterinsurgency strategy, advocated by McChrysal, can actually work. It was that which led Obama to commission his new review, from which an entirely different strategy might emerge.

Apparently completely oblivious to this development, Fox – in his only substantive reference to the election - states that it is "crucial" that it "must be seen to be credible and reflect the wishes of the Afghan people." This is wishful thinking beyond peradventure.

Thus, we are left with what amounts to a slavish adherence to the McChrystal creed, with not one scintilla of critical exploration. Fox's only concern is to ensure that the "strategy" is properly resourced. That much is picked up by The Times, which provocatively headlines: "Tories would send 2,500 more troops to Afghanistan, says Liam Fox".

The paper then reports that the shadow defence secretary had "indicated" that a Conservative government would increase British troop numbers in Afghanistan by up to 2,500 and deliver more helicopters, armoured vehicles and "other key battlefield enablers".

In what could have been an opportunity to set out a new direction for what is evidently a failing campaign, Fox has therefore sold the pass. Like so many before him, he pays lip-service to the received wisdom that the campaign cannot be resolved by a "military victory", but he then defines success as securing security – which of course he seeks to achieve by military means.

No one, it seems, can see the logical absurdity in this approach – least of all Fox. A military solution is not possible ... therefore we must seek a military solution. "The reconstruction will follow," says Fox. "The factors of prosperity, individual freedoms, and free markets ... may someday come to Afghanistan. We should do all we can to help this to happen but it will not happen overnight," he adds.

It does not dawn on him, the simple precept that the order might be reversed. Focus on economic reconstruction, build prosperity, and protect a people who then have a stake in their society and something to lose. Security will follow. In the final analysis, security comes not from the barrel of a gun – it comes from the will of the people. But then, that is probably too difficult for Fox to understand.

COMMENT THREAD

Liam-Fox[i-Liam-Fox]A major public speech by a shadow defence secretary of an opposition party which will in all probability win the next general election should, by any normal measure, be an important event. It is in that light that we approach yesterday's keynote speech from Liam Fox to the UK Defence Conference 2009.

We have summarised the speech on Defence of the Realm, with no detailed comments of our own, to avoid an intrusive "footprint" which might distort the message Dr Fox wishes to convey. This, presumably, is the platform the Conservative Party will present at the general election.

The main thrust of this "platform" – which will come as no surprise – is that a new administration will conduct a strategic defence review. Its purpose will be to define what Britain's strategic interests are and where they exist at home and abroad.

Unless you have clear foreign policy objectives you cannot have a proper defence strategy, says Fox. This will allow the strategic environment and the threats posed to our interests to be assessed within reasonably predictable limits. It will then determine the capabilities we need to protect those interests.

There is much sense in this approach. Defence capabilities – barring the insurance policy of home defence – should very much be the servant of our foreign policy, they being simply one instrument in a broader portfolio,

However, there is a significant omission here from Fox's speech. There is no mention of the European Union. Yet to a great and increasing extent, our foreign policy is determined either by or in consultation with the EU, yet we also have our own independent line, in relation to the United States.

Therein lies a major problem, in that this current government has been struggling (and failing) to resolve the conflict between incompatible and often conflicting foreign policy objectives. That Fox does not even acknowledge that conflict augers ill for any attempt by a Conservative administration to resolve it.

Further, there is no recognition that the UK no longer has (nor has had for some time) the capability for wholly autonomous military action. Any future action will either be in the context of a multi-national alliance, or with the material support of our allies.

Here, the conflict between the US and the EU presents the really difficult problems. In terms of physical and doctrinal interoperability, we can work with one set or the other – but it is very difficult to equip and structure our Armed Forces to work effectively with both.

Furthermore, each set has its own capabilities, the US bringing far more to the table than the EU. In that, effectively, we cannot provide a full suite of capabilities, our procurement programme and indeed our structures must be determined by our choice of ally. Trying to satisfy both leads to confusion, duplication and lack of cohesion.

We see, therefore, from Fox, a certain amount of evasion. He has identified a core issue, but he has not addressed it. Whether he will ever do so is a matter of conjecture.

COMMENT THREAD

laimfoxlet[i-laimfoxlet]The Ridgeback story seems to be descending into high farce. On the one hand, we have the Evening Standard telling us that the MoD is rushing the three remaining vehicles (six went last night) to Afghanistan after the "transport bungle".

On the other, we have the Press Association retailing a new, "washes whiter" statement from the MoD saying that the "military trucks waiting to be shipped to Afghanistan" were never intended to be used by British troops until the autumn.

It is insisting that the vehicles were never meant to be used by 19 Light Brigade, which is currently responsible for British operations in Afghanistan. They will instead, says the MoD, be operated by troops from 11 Light Brigade, which takes over in October.

In keeping with their reputation for honesty and truth, an MoD spokeswoman denied that this statement represented a "U-turn" and said it was a more accurate reflection of the situation based on "updated information".

Meanwhile, the story has been picked up by Iain Dale, who charts a further intervention by Liam Fox. He has sent a letter to defence secretary Bob Ainsworth (pictured), asking for clarification of the delivery schedule for these vehicles.

Just a tiny little niggle remains though. If the vehicles are not intended for service until the autumn, why is the MoD now rushing them to theatre? This surely cannot be because their presence has been spotted and reported in the media? Could it be that they are not Ridgebacks?

That could explain why they have been classified as "secret" – nothing to do with the coating, as The Times asserts. And it would also explain why they are being spirited away so quickly - before someone makes a positive ID.

As for the "incompetent" MoD ... this would put it in a different league.

COMMENT THREAD

Liam+Fox[i-Liam+Fox]“Stop the Overstretch in the Armed Forces”, says the headline on the official Conservative website in that rather unappealing green they have taken to using. Dr Fox, Tory spokesman on defence, has been attacking the Labour government for overstretching and underfunding our forces.

So far so good, though he does not seem to have any concrete suggestions as to what the Conservatives might do about this state of affairs but then, it is hard to give definite undertakings or precise figures at this stage of the electoral cycle.

Dr Fox also has a go at NATO allies who do not pull their weight.

He also criticised other NATO governments for not pulling their weight in operations, and called for powers to suspend them if they fail to contribute as promised. Accusing Germany, Italy and Spain of "not fully playing their role" in bolstering Alliance forces in Afghanistan, he said: "We may require more troops but I don't see why that has to be British troops. We are more than shouldering our load."

That is the end of the piece on Conservatives.com and one has to go to the Yorkshire Post to find out what else did the bouncy little lad say.

"Where we have Nato operations taking place, the country that carries out any specific mission is the one that pays for it.

"When I was in Poland and Hungary in the last few weeks, I was complaining to them that they have come into Nato, pocketed the security guarantee and have cut the defence spending.

"We will seek, when we come to Government, to reach an agreement with our Nato partners to be able to suspend Nato members who do not spend the levels of funding that we agreed.

"It is not acceptable that British taxpayers and British armed forces should carry the burden of those who are members of Nato who want the collective security guarantee but are not going to pay for it."

This, dear readers, is known technically as tosh.

First of all, there is no such thing as an agreed level of funding in NATO. We have all seen Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, the SecGen of NATO travel round the capitals with a begging bowl in his hands to increase troop levels here or there, notably Afghanistan.

Secondly, the one country that did respond to the latest appeal for the aforementioned country was Poland, who also has troops in Iraq, as does Hungary. Does Dr Fox not know this? His hosts in those countries must have been superlatively polite not to point certain facts out.

COMMENT THREAD

Piggie[i-Piggie]Forget big green (or sand-coloured) toys, and nasty things that go "bang". If you want to get the Boy King "engaged" in defence, get a general to talk about accommodation standards.

Despite the heroic efforts of the Tory Boy Blog to indicate otherwise, only then you will get the Boy gushing all over the nearest microphone and piggie rushing from studio to studio, wetting his knickers about the need to provide soldiers "with comfortable living quarters while they are not away on dangerous operations."

It was in fact one of our forum members who yesterday pointed out this "girlie" phenomenon, viz-à-viz our own piece about the RAF's air transport capabilities. "The Green Tosser", he wrote,

…can't be seen to be involved in anything nasty that kills our enemies, like armaments, as that might effect the creation of his touchy-feely image in the focus groups ....but complaining about troop transport failures, which keep our brave lads apart from their loving families, is entirely in line with his PR con job of an image. Hence little Liam piping up and the whole tone of that article.

Soldiers+bath[i-Soldiers+bath]On reflection, that is very much the truth. There has been a stunning silence from the Boy about our military capabilities and the limitations of our equipment.

But he and the Party is quite willing to bring up pay, the treatment of the wounded and now, the standard of soldiers' accommodation. These are all "soft" fringe issues which have nothing specifically martial about them. They do not deal directly with military capabilities (i.e., the ability to kill people and break things), or vital force protection issues. The Boy and his shadow cabinet have gone all girlie.

LR241[i-LR241]Frankly, though, when it comes to a dirty bath (one of the pictures sent to the BBC) and a dead soldier dragged from a shattered "Snatch" Land Rover, I know which I find more offensive.

Don't get me wrong, both are important but, in the scheme of things, I would sooner have dirty soldiers than dead ones. It is about time the Conservative Party showed the same sense of values and started getting its priorities right.

COMMENT THREAD

Fox%20004[i-Fox%20004]Poor young Tim Mongomerie over at Conservative Home. Having committed his blog to giving a blow-by-blow account of the opinion polls as they happen, he is obliged to report today's Populus poll in The Times. A year into the Boy King’s "triumph" as leader of the Conservative Party – pitted against a discredited and increasingly unpopular Labour government, it shows the Tories with the most slender of leads, cut down to a mere one percent.

In a style redolent of Comical Ali in the dying days of Saddam Hussein's regime, young Mr Tim describes this as a "slightly disappointing change", before going on to bury the news by posting two more stories in quick succession, the latest one headed "Yesterday was a good day for the Conservative Party".

In the manner of one day in the life of Solzhenitsyn's Ivan Denisovitch, I suppose it was a good day, but it can hardly disguise the fact that Cameron's lack-lustre opposition is failing to register. And three of the reasons why are shown in our illustration. Two of them are the shadow defence spokesman, Liam Fox and his (in this case) left hand man, a rather grey looking Gerald Howarth (he of Pinzgauer fame), two men who have consistently failed to set the defence agenda alive.

Browne%20003[i-Browne%20003]For the third reason, look behind the pair. In the frame, you will see empty space. Now look at the picture of Des Browne, opposing Fox in the exchange. Behind him are seated figures. Look at any "grab" of government spokesmen in Parliament and you will always see figures behind them.

Labour has understood that Parliament is its showcase and they quite deliberately pack the benches round their people, in the knowledge that the camera always takes the close view. This is called doughnutting (donutting, you dumb Yanks!) and it conveys an impression of solidarity and togetherness.

After all these years, the Tories still haven't got even that basic tactic right, and that is the fourth reason why they are doing so badly in the polls. In the manner of the Bourbon kings, they have remembered everything but learnt nothing. You can tell them nothing. They know it all already.

That is why they are going down at the next election.

COMMENT THREAD

MoS%20Sun%2019[i-MoS%20Sun%2019]
If the Mail on Sunday has got it right and its story is true (and there is no reason to believe it is not - my analysis will follow shortly), then there are three men in the frame: David Cameron, the opposition leader; Liam Fox, the shadow defence secretary, and Gerald Howarth, the shadow defence procurement minister. These are the people who must make the running, turning this into a serious political issue.

link[i-link]
At least Iain Dale has got the message. But the question is whether Cameron and his defence team are going to make a fight of it – a real, stand-up fight as opposed to a few "quickie" soundbites - or whether they are going to dive for cover like the rest of the Tory girlies and bury themselves in political trivia?

And before you argue about what is and what is not trivia, upon the decisions made in the next days and weeks rest the lives of many men and women – our service personnel. Get it wrong and they die.

Make a joke out of that, Guido.

COMMENTS – use the combined thread

MoS%20-%20Missing[i-MoS%20-%20Missing]There can be no dispute that, when it comes to monitoring the performance of government, the media are definitely part of the problem – to which effect the Mail on Sunday today offers a graphic example.

The story itself looks worthy enough – the sort of "shock, horror, probe!" item that gets the juices of the average hack going, except that it is probably over-blown.

No case is made that the MoD should not be making recruitment films, and the ministry is already being criticised for not meeting recruitment targets, so the issue rests on whether it would have been cheaper to make the film in the UK (and whether it would have been as effective, bearing in mind that part of the sales pitch was the chance to travel the world).

However, in the typical style of modern hackery, political editor Simon Walters had picked up this snippet and then contacts Liam Fox, shadow secretary of state for defence, for a ritual comment. A story is born, a few inches of space are filled, dead trees are sold and tomorrow's fish and chip wrappers are created.

phoenix%20launch[i-phoenix%20launch]The point, of course, is that in a week when the British Consulate in Basra (recently refurbished at a cost of £14 million) has been evacuated for want of effective countermeasures against incessant mortar fire, not least helicopters but also because of the failure of the Army's Phoenix UAV programme – at a loss of £345 million.

By any measure, that is a bigger and better story, in purely journalistic terms. The fact that Simon Walters and the Mail on Sunday go for the trivial instead of the bigger picture betrays their fundamental amateurism.

However, one has also to point to the opposition parties – and especially the Tories. It is not is if they were not aware of the issues and have not had the opportunity to comment. Liam Fox's office could just have easy contacted Simon Walters to give him the story. But, once again, they have dropped the ball and have also missed out on the bigger picture.

COMMENT THREAD

Doughty%20Street%201[i-Doughty%20Street%201]There has been a modicum of excitement on the blogosphere of late, with the arrival of a brash new kid on the block in the form of the UK's first and only internet television station dedicated entirely to politics.

Rejoicing in the name 18 Doughty Street, an opportunity to test this new genre came today with the release of an interview from the previous evening. This was between one of the station founders, Tim Montgomerie, and shadow secretary of state for defence Liam Fox in an extended discussion lasting – with a pre-made video insert - a full 42 minutes.

read more...

COMMENT THREAD

aircraft_carrier[i-aircraft_carrier]In a breathless piece on the Conservative Party website shadow defence secretary Liam Fox is warning that one the Royal Navy's main bases at Portsmouth or Plymouth could be closed down in a programme of "radical reductions" being masterminded by Labour ministers who have already slashed back the number of warships in the fleet.

We are told that, after defence secretary Des Browne slipped out his scheme to review UK naval bases in an obscure written statement - hoping to hide the news by coinciding the announcement with a briefing on his first major speech - Dr Fox questioned the Government's commitment to the Royal Navy.

Accompanying the piece though is a picture of an aircraft carrier (shown above) – but not as you might think a Royal Navy vessel. This is an aircraft carrier from the US Navy – probably Nimitz class.

Is there a hidden message here – or is this just the usual incompetence, the Conservative website managers being so thick they do not even recognise a US warship?

COMMENT THREAD

A Type 23 frigate[i-A Type 23 frigate]Mulling over the implications of the Israeli situation, our activities in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, and following on from my post about the need for new thinking, my deliberations were given a new focus by an e-mail from a reader.

He had been to a presentation on UK Maritime Trade Operations in the Gulf/Middle East and offered a "few interesting facts".

In the Red Sea, Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf area, he was told, there are generally about fifty coalition naval vessels (mostly frigates and destroyers) dedicated to security and anti terrorist operations.

To put this into context, this is twice the number of frigates/destroyers left after the Hoon cuts and more than twice the number sent to the Falklands in 1982. They are supported by submarines, maritime patrol aircraft (including RAF Nimrods) and various shore based facilities, as well as tankers and other support vessels.

Twenty of these vessels are kept in the Persian Gulf itself, with four on station at any time of the Iraqi coast. Furthermore, there are similar operations performed by NATO warships in the Mediterranean, while vessels carrying equipment, ammunition and other stores for UK forces have to be escorted by the Royal Navy. This includes ships carrying materiel stuff to Pakistan for use by UK forces in Afghanistan.

The increased operation tempo, combined with the cuts of the last few years, means that it is not just the Army (and elements of the RAF) which are suffering from overstretch. The Navy is also suffering badly as well, particularly since the UK has other commitments. As a result, nine-month deployments are becoming common, with an adverse effect on morale.

This is not helped by the uncertainty over the future carriers and the seventh and eighth Type 45 Destroyers but, more to the point – like the Army and Royal Air Force, they are largely equipped to fight a different sort of war from that which it is present undertaking.

It is all very well having the hugely sophisticated and expensive Type 45s, geared to knocking advanced fighters and bombers out of the sky, or massively costly aircraft carriers to support the European Rapid Reaction Force, but much of the Navy's work is in low intensity tasks such MIOPS (maritime interdiction operations – i.e., challenge, board and search potential smugglers) or deterring piracy and other forms of maritime crime.

river_6[i-river_6]For this, we are told, there is an urgent need for a number of fast, armed patrol vessels. Such vessels need a flight deck and hangar for an embarked helicopter, plus accommodation for a number of Marines/Special Forces - perhaps an upgraded River Class offshore patrol vessel, or even this little Italian number (below).

An Italian Commandante patrol vessel[i-An Italian Commandante patrol vessel]In the longer term, this might be cheaper than keeping high-tech, multi-role frigates on station, such as HMS Kent (type pictured, top left) which was recently the lead RN ship in the northern Gulf. On the other hand, additional, dedicated patrol vessels might allow the UK to take a more active role in stopping the oil smuggling which is undermining the Iraqi economy.

What all this again points to is the need to re-orientate our thinking, and address the actual tasks confronting our armed forces, rather than fantasy tasks, perhaps in pursuit of EU foreign policy objectives, some time in the unforeseeable future.

This, to some extent, was what Liam Fox was getting at when he delivered his speech on defence in June, but the real debate has yet to start. Unfortunately, it seems, the Boy King is tiptoeing away from any such thought. As always, the debate will have to start without him.

COMMENT THREAD

Conservatives[i-Conservatives]In the event that the Conservatives win the next election – the date of which could be anything from 2007 to 2010, depending on diverse factors – they could be in for a very nasty surprise.

According to the current edition of Aviation Week, the Ministry of Defence is looking down the nose of a huge shortfall in funding over the next procurement planning period – from 2011-21. This amounts to perhaps £11.6 billion, or even more, on top of the £6 billion or so spent each year on defence procurement.

The problem for the Conservatives is that purchasing decisions made during the Labour term of office – and even before – will come to fruition during this next planning period, when there is a possibility that there will be a new government.

JSF - a £10 billion price tag[i-JSF - a £10 billion price tag]Pojects that will have to be paid for include the acquisition of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter – at an estimated £10 billion - the two proposed aircraft carriers (£4 billion) and the remaining tranches on the Eurofighter, tranche 2 alone estimated at £4.3 billion.

On top of that, there is the £2.4 billion order for 24 Airbus A400M military airlifters, the remainder of the Type 45 air defence destroyer, programmed for £6 billion – and more if a new Conservative government decided to increase the numbers - as well as the £14 billion Future Rapid Effects System. There is also a marked increase in guided-weapons spending in the period, including the £1.2 billion Meteor air-to-air missile for the Eurofighter, and there is the MARS fleet replenishment programme, the Future-Lynx, and the £3bn contract for 12 Nimrod MRA4 aircraft which was announced this week.

All this is money already committed and does not take into account the need for any new equipment for the Army – such as additional armoured vehicles to deal with the threat from IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nor does it include any provision for increasing helicopter airlift capability, already depleted with the MoD facing the prospect of scrapping eight Chinooks which have never flown operationally, at a cost of £259 million.

Apart from anything else, this "funding gap" raises important questions about the very nature of our democracy, arising from the lengthening period between ordering military hardware and taking delivery. We are getting to the situation where typical procurement cycles are longer than the length of several parliaments, so that one government can make huge spending commitments which may have to be met by a completely different government.

Eurofighter - Mr Heseltine's legacy[i-Eurofighter - Mr Heseltine's legacy]There is a certain irony here in that the Eurofighter project, which was approved by Heseltine in 1985, will revisit the Conservatives, who will have to find the money for tranche 2 and 3. The great Europhile casts a long shadow.

As importantly, whether intentional or not, the defence "funding gap" takes on the aspect of a "poison pill", potentially saddling the next government with huge commitments. This cannot but help but have an effect on other spending programmes and broader policies. A future Conservative chancellor may, for instance, find himself unable to implement manifesto commitments – if any are ever made – simply because he has to pay the debts incurred by the previous Labour government.

This possibility alone drags defence issues out of the specialist ghetto and into mainstream politics. It makes it all the more urgent that future defence policy is properly debated – not least in terms of the major spending programmes such as FRES, which will have an important effect on shaping our defence capabilities and options.

So far, Liam Fox has not risen to the challenge and David Cameron has yet to engage on the issue at all. But, unless this issue is confronted, a new Conservative government may find it has bitten off more than it can chew.

COMMENT THREAD

For the Pinzgauer "Vector" see here.

For an update on this post, see here.

Des Browne - secretary of state for defence[i-Des Browne - secretary of state for defence]And so to that defence debate held in the Commons last Thursday.

While we have been "banging on" about this on this blog, what perceptive readers will find is that the most significant issue to emerge from this debate is that the process itself transcends the subject matter. The way the subject material was handled actually provides a graphic illustration of how the conspiracy of silence in our Parliament over European Union issues continues.

To develop this theme, we need to look at specific aspects of the opening speech from the secretary of state for defence, Des Browne, a man new to his post and without any background military experience. He was, therefore, wholly reliant on his brief from his civil servants and was thus parroting what he has been told.

The Warrior - track wear and maintenance becomes a major issue with extended use[i-The Warrior - track wear and maintenance becomes a major issue with extended use]The touchstone issue, of course – for this blog – is the "Snatch" Land Rover. This subject is first introduced into the debate by way of an "intervention" by Mark Pritchard, the newly elected Conservative MP for the Wrekin. He asks the secretary of state, in respect of the promised review of armoured vehicles in Iraq and in Afghanistan, "whether Warrior armoured vehicles be supplied to the front line, where there is a demand for them, thereby reducing casualties resulting from Snatch Land Rover use?"

Before getting on to our Des Browne, Pritchard's intervention has to be marked down as utterly fatuous and unhelpful. It is a line that has also been pursued by the egregious Sean Rayment in the Sunday Telegraph and needs a little exploration.

The Warrior Mechanised Infantry Combat Vehicles (MICV) are tracked armoured vehicles designed specifically to carry sections of infantry into battle alongside main battle tanks, providing the infantry support without which tanks cannot operate. Moreover, they were designed specifically for the European theatre for action against Warsaw Pact forces.

As such, these are not patrol vehicles – they are troop carriers. Visibility for the troops carried is poor and they are not able to participate in the action until dismounted. Further, as tracked vehicles, they are noisy and uncomfortable – important factors when troops are carried for long periods – and, being built for the European theatre, they lack air conditioning. Being tracked, they are relatively slow and, crucially, require a high level of maintenance, as the tracks wear out very quickly in adverse conditions.

Very recently, we have seen a report from Canadian forces operating in Afghanistan, recounting the enormous toll that operations are exacting on equipment; we have first-hand accounts from British troops in Iraq about how the increased use of Warriors in that theatre is imposing acute maintenance burdens which will shortly reach a crisis point; and there are many public domain narratives which convey the concern of US over the extraordinary toll routine operations in Iraq are taking of mechanical equipment.

A long distance patrol in Afghanistan - hard on wheeled vehicles but harder on tracks[i-A long distance patrol in Afghanistan - hard on wheeled vehicles but harder on tracks]Whatever the need for improved armour in both Iraq and Afghanistan, therefore, Warriors are not the answer. We are using them simply because we have them – and nothing else – but, given the huge distances they would have to travel in Afghanistan, they would be a liability. Pritchard, had he taken the time and effort to research the issue, would have known this. But, instead, we get a cheap little intervention that actually misses the point completely – that we do not have a suitable armoured vehicle in either Iraq or Afghanistan for use in counter-insurgency operations.

Turning now to Des Browne, the man responded by agreeing that "we identified a deficiency in capability as regards Snatch Land Rovers and the fully armoured vehicles and thought that it needed to be addressed", reminding Pritchard of the ongoing review. He then went into a long spiel about the IED threat and the use of armoured vehicles.

Improved armour, he said, is part of the solution and claimed that "additional armoured options" will become available to commanders over the next year. This included the "new patrol vehicle", the Vector (the infamous armoured Pinzgauer), which will enter service in Afghanistan in 2007. In addition, said Browne. "we have already upgraded the protection on Warrior, Saxon and the CVR(T), and we are currently upgrading it on the FV430 vehicle." There, the secretary of state seems to be unaware of his own department's decision to withdraw the Saxon completely. Heedless of this, he then continued:

However, Snatch Land Rovers will continue to be an important option. The Army's approach to its role in Iraq and broadly in Afghanistan - although not on certain tasks - requires a low profile and a highly mobile patrol vehicle that allows troops to engage with local people. As people will have seen from their television screens, paratroopers in Afghanistan prefer to walk the streets of towns there with soft hats on. That is not our decision, but a decision made by their commanders in the light of what they are trying to do. It is clear from the pictures relayed back in recent days that that engagement works in a substantial part of the area for which they have taken responsibility. Larger and significantly heavier vehicles, such as Warrior, might be better armoured, but they are not always suitable for the lower profile and less intimidating manner in which the Army often prefers to operate. That, in turn, feeds into the security of our forces, because their relationship with the people with whom they work is an important component of security.

We must remember, however, that equipment - armour and other counter measures - is only one element of protection. According to the experts who have advised me continuously over past weeks, it is only about a third of the story. The rest is down to intelligence gathering, surveillance and proactive operations to disrupt and capture insurgents, and to the tactics that our troops adopt to minimise the risks of successful attack. I am told by experienced commanders that they sometimes choose not to be in a vehicle at all but to walk the streets, which is much safer than being cooped up in a vehicle and provides a degree of flexibility.

What we have to remember, though, is that, of the four major armies in the two theatres, the Americans, the Canadians, the French and the British, the first three have decided to provide entirely new armoured equipment or upgrade existing equipment. Therefore, what we are seeing is Browne telling us that, beyond unspecified "additional armoured options" and the new and dangerous Pinzgauer – which is a troop transport rather than a patrol vehicle – the MoD, uniquely, does not see the need for re-equipment. The fact is that the MoD has been caught short, committing troops to two highly dangerous theatres without suitable armoured vehicles.

Now, you would have thought that an opposition, desperate to score "brownie points", and with a reputation to build and an election to win – whenever it happens – would have made capital out of this. Browne had just presented them with an open goal.

This was left primarily to Liam Fox, who was is next on his feet as shadow secretary of state for defence. But the open goal was ignored. He talked about defence spending, recruitment and retention, the territorial army and the reserves, overstretch and its effect on morale, family accommodation, shortages in the medical services, combat stress, the working condition of troops and the general situation in Afghanistan. But not once in his speech is there any mention of armoured vehicles – not even a passing reference to their deficiencies.

Then, throughout the main part of the debate, this became the dog that did not bark. We were treated to a huge range of issues – even one Labour MP bemoaning the injustices done to the Bevin Boys – the conscripted coal miners during that Second World War – but nothing more on equipment, until it cames to Conservative back-bencher, Ann Winterton. But she went further. She that asked members to cast their minds back to December 1998 during the negotiations on the St. Malo agreement. It was at that time, she said, that the Prime Minister decided that the UK would not join the euro. "In all matters relating to the European Union, there can never be a straight decision. There is always a trade off—that is, a price to be paid. In this instance, the UK conceded and agreed that our forces would be integrated into a European Union defence force".

She continued:

From that time onwards, the Ministry of Defence did not quite know in what direction it would have to commit our armed forces in the future. Would the first priority be to serve the interests of the UK, or to co-operate with the European Union or with the United States of America, or a combination of all three? If the MOD did not know in which direction it was meant to be going, how could members of the armed services second-guess the future? Subsequently, the problems have been exacerbated because the UK is engaged in conflicts in which our troops are committed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

It has been well understood that, moving on from the former cold war scenario, changes would have to be introduced and the concept of the future Army structure came to light with its objective of strengthening the medium sector. It is crystal clear that we are without a whole category of vehicles suitable for insurgency work, and this lack has been shown in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The focus and direction of policy has been to prioritise the future rapid effect system, which is an integral part of the European Union rapid reaction force, but which realistically will not be in operation until possibly as late as 2020. Moreover, the whole project falls into a world of fantasy in which the total package requires airlift, electronics, future technology and state of the art communication at a projected overall cost of £6 billion initially, which ballooned almost overnight to £14 billion.

Those sum are all beyond our financial means and are almost just a wish list, but these plans have resulted in us taking our eye off the ball. Rather than concentrating on what is needed now and for the immediate future to enable our armed forces to meet the challenges of fighting insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan—insurgents who are highly mobile and armed with cheap but deadly weaponry—we are left in a virtual vacuum. We are expecting our forces to operate Snatch 1 armoured Land Rovers from Northern Ireland, which are clapped out and always overheating and breaking down. The No. 2s are just about acceptable, with a little life left in them yet, while the No. 3s are very few on the ground.

The problem is that we are forced to use these old vehicles because there is no alternative, and because of ongoing long- term commitments the MOD is now virtually broke.

…

While our armed forces are placing their lives on the line each and every day on behalf of us all, which they are now doing in Afghanistan as well as in Iraq, it is essential that the Government, through the MOD and Parliament, concentrate on providing what is necessary for the present and for the immediate future. The Prime Minister has spent too much time placing European Union integrationist policy first, rather than ensuring that present day servicemen and women have appropriate and adequate resources and equipment.

If we do not provide our forces with the best that money can buy, rather than some of the present outdated equipment, which is hardly fit for purpose, will it be any surprise if we cannot recruit or retain sufficient high calibre personnel? By spending too much time and energy on the future creation of forces which will eventually be totally integrated within the European Union rapid defence force, the Prime Minister and his Chancellor have sold the pass and limited the choices for the future.

Many commentators believe that the Army of today is being starved of resources in order to feed a fantasy army of the future. I hope that they will be proved wrong, and I trust that the MoD will provide the appropriate equipment for our armed services to allow them to perform their valuable and vital duties.

Looked at dispassionately, this was an extraordinary speech. Despite her measured tones, Winterton was effectively accusing the government is so obsessed with European integration that it was neglecting the combat army and sending troops to their deaths for want of the right equipment.

In the remainder of the debate, one more back-bencher, Tobias Ellwood, the Conservative member for Bournemouth East, did mention equipment but when it came to the summing up, there was not a mention of the European issue. Mark Harper, for the Conservatives, noted that Anne Winterton had "raised the issue of equipment" while Adam Ingram, the minister of state for defence, speaking for the government, simply ignored Winterton's speech. As to Europe, he ignored that as well, although he did take the time out to commend all the speakers, saying: "We have not been in party-political point-scoring mode today".

Thus it is that the conspiracy of silence continues. This is the new conservatism of "Dave", where the Conservative party doesn't "do" Europe any more, while the government blithely ignores any references made by errant back-benchers. And so the chaps all patted themselves on their respective backs, congratulating themselves on what a jolly good debate it had been and went off to the bars, or their offices, or toddled off home – or whatever.

The media, in turn, also ignored the debate and the elephant slumbered on quietly in the corner of the room.

COMMENT THREAD

For an update on this post, see here.

A Saxon APC - a top-heavy liability that has to go[i-A Saxon APC - a top-heavy liability that has to go]Today, we read in The Daily Telegraph that the Conservatives are concerned that our forces in Afghanistan are under-equipped for their mission.

In a separate piece, we also read that the Army is scrapping 500 Saxon armoured personnel carriers that are unfit for use in Iraq or Afghanistan, but is so short of money that it is planning to replace them with vehicles that are almost 40 years old.

If ever there was a time for saying, "I told you so", it is this. It was two years ago, almost to the day, that I first wrote a piece on this blog about defence equipment plans, noting that the government was planning to spend (then) £6 billion – since increased to £14 billion - on re-equipping the Army with the Future Rapid Effects System.

Presciently, I headed my piece "Another blunder of Eurofighter proportions", introducing a thesis since amplified that the government was preparing to spend huge amounts of money on an untried force structure, all to meet Tony Blair's commitment to providing formations for the European Rapid Reaction Force.

From a limited defence budget, therefore, we were devoting huge sums to feeding a fantasy army while starving our real army, increasingly committed to actual combat, of the equipment and men it needs.

A Panther FCLV - a battlefield limousine for Ruperts[i-A Panther FCLV - a battlefield limousine for Ruperts]One of the first pieces of equipment actually to roll off the production lines for this new, fantasy army is the Panther Command Liaison Vehicle, about which we have written at length.

But what is particularly relevant at this juncture – when the Army is desperately short of a protected patrol vehicle - is that the Panther, at £413,000 each, was purchased against a specification so narrowly drawn that it is useable only for its designated functions. Yet, it was chosen in preference to the RG-31. This was not only £150,000 cheaper but is also a multi-purpose vehicle which could easily have accommodated the Command/Liaison role as well as providing an ideal, protected patrol vehicle.

Currently, the Italian-built Panthers are being finished off by BAE Systems, with the additional of a machine gun, radios and other accessories, when they will be delivered to the Army, effectively providing "battlefield limousines" for Ruperts – as officers are dismissively called – while troops are forced to patrol in dangerously vulnerable "Snatch" Land Rovers.

A Canadian RG-31 in Afghanistan[i-A Canadian RG-31 in Afghanistan]Had the decision to buy Panthers, announced in November 2003, been different, we would have had RG-31s rolling off the production lines in British Army colours which, with minor modifications, could be re-fitted as patrol vehicles and shipped out to Iraq and Afghanistan. In the latter theatre, they would be joining the RG-31s operated by the Canadian Army which is so pleased with the vehicles that it has just ordered another 25.

Hindsight, you might say, is easy, but for the fact that the Panther decision always looked suspect and, in the context of a limited budget and an uncertain future, it makes sense to buy a multi-role vehicle, even if it is not absolutely ideal for all of the different tasks for which it might be called upon to perform – more so if, like the RG-31, it is significantly cheaper.

What has happened, though, is that the MoD – under successive governments – has taken its eye of the ball. Obsessed with the idea of constructing a mean, lean, high-tech army, with shiny new toys to impress the European "colleagues", it has neglected the here and now, and the immediate needs of our present-day armed forces, engaged in the messy, bloody counterinsurgency operations for which it is singularly ill-equipped.

Storm Shadow - the million £ bomb[i-Storm Shadow - the million £ bomb]This obsession with shiny (and expensive) high-tech toys – and the prestige they bring - is also another fatal weakness of the MoD, their defence industry pals and the warring tribes within the armed forces. This is behind the decision to buy 900 Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles at over £1,000,000 each, the introduction of which was brought forward so that the RAF could indulge in a dick-measuring contest with the Americans during Gulf War II, proving that it too had a stand-off munitions capability.

During that war, the RAF managed to launch 27 missiles at a cost of £29.43 million in weapons alone, compared with the 400 or so US Tomahawk cruise missiles, making no measurable contribution to the campaign and saddling us with a massive bill which we are still having to meet. Yet, in simple terms, the £1 billion for these missiles – the bulk of which are now sitting uselessly in RAF stores – could have bought 4,000 RG-31s. It is not difficult to work out which would be of more use in our current situation.

British Army Apaches - at £60 million each[i-British Army Apaches - at £60 million each]Similarly, although there is a massive shortage of tactical helicopters in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as we have recently reported, the government has announced its intention to procure 70 "super-Lynx" helicopters for £1 billion, to come into service from 2014. Once again, we see this obsession with "high-tech" kit for the future, when the need is here and now.

But even the £14.2 each to be expended on these aircraft pales into insignificance compared with the £60 million each paid for the Army’s 67 Apache attack helicopters, a squadron of which is currently deployed in Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, they have their value, as attested by a typically "Boy's Own" piece in the Telegraph recently. However, we saw in the Sunday Times, this weekend, a graphic account of a firefight between British troops and the Taliban.

The journalist, Christina Lamb, recounts that, at the height of the battle, the patrol leader, Major Blair, "was very angry indeed". "Where's the f****** air support?" the major was yelling on the radio to British headquarters at Camp Bastion, reading off a GPS position. Lamb continues with the narrative:

"Two A10s 10 minutes away can be with you for 20 minutes," came the reply. Nothing arrived. "We need air support. Where's the air support?" Major Blair radioed again after sliding on his back in another trench, pulled down by the weight of the kit on the mud. The message came back that the A10s had been called off to Sangin, a village to the north where two British special forces had been killed. No other planes were available because heavy fighting was still going on.

Now, let's do a little sum. An Apache costs £60,000,000. A Hughes 500 – a light, 4-seater commercial utility helicopter - costs £900,000. For each Apache, you could buy over 60 Hughes helicopters.

A Hughes 500 on convoy escort duties[i-A Hughes 500 on convoy escort duties]Purists will immediately say that there is no comparison between the two, and indeed there is not. However, in the hands of the private security company, Blackwater Security Consulting, off-the-shelf Hughes 500s, with two door gunners, are used to devastating effect as convoy escorts. Now ask which would have been more use to Major Blair – one Apache committed to a battle elsewhere, or a detachment of four Hughes 500s, on the spot, spitting out fire from eight machine guns?

And yes, I know you can buy such helicopters off the shelf, but it takes two years fully to train a combat helicopter pilot. But how many redundant or under-used helicopter pilots are there currently in the Armed Forces, and how many civilian pilots are there, who were military-trained? And how long would it take to train a pilot to handle a simple machine like a Hughes 500?

So much for the toys, but what about the political implications? These are graphically put by the Telegraph leader which cites Liam Fox, the shadow defence secretary, who told the Commons yesterday, the cost of succeeding could be very high, but the cost of failure would be intolerable. At stake, he says, is the future of both Afghanistan and Nato, under whose aegis the campaign is being waged.

This theme is amplified by Con Coughlin in an op-ed but, like so many, he misses the point. The Army itself, he writes, might be suffering severe overstretch through a combination of underfunding by Gordon Brown's Treasury and Tony Blair's messianic willingness to commit forces to resolve the world's ills…

Eurocorps - the Fantasy Army[i-Eurocorps - the Fantasy Army]No, Mr Coughlin, with the MoD committing £14 billion to FRES, having spent £166 million on its battlefield limousines for Ruperts, having spent £1 billion on Storm Shadow, and billions more on other grandiose European projects – not least committing £30 billion to the Eurofighter - you cannot say there is any underfunding. The real problem is that the Army is suffering from the cumulative effect of bad procurement decisions, which started under the Conservatives' watch but are currently being driven by the Blair government's obsession for European defence integration.

At the moment, it looks doubtful whether the small, under-equipped British force can prevail in a country four times the size of Wales and a border with Pakistan 1,500 miles long, but, as Liam Fox rightly remarked, the cost of failure would be intolerable. Equally, although attention has shifted from there to Afghanistan, the cost of failure in Iraq – where we also have a small, under-equipped force - would be intolerable. Yet, without more troops and more equipment – the right equipment – failure is a distinct possibility.

In fact, failure in either theatre would destroy what little credibility the UK has as a world power. Arguably, to slink out defeated, licking our wounds, would have a greater effect on our standing in the world community than our ignominious departure from Suez. That is what is at stake and the real reason why we are in such a parlous situation is that we have devoted far too much of our energy and wealth to feeding the European fantasy, while neglecting our current responsibilities.

COMMENT THREAD

The Vanguard missile submarine - due for replacement[i-The Vanguard missile submarine - due for replacement]You have to give it to little Gordie. Not even prime minister yet (if ever) and he is already making the "big decisions". And they don't get much bigger than deciding to renew Britain's "independent" nuclear deterrent.

That certainly has got the BBC nicely worked up, and the Guardian too, not least because the estimates of the cost vary from £10bn to £25bn, depending on what type of new missiles or submarines are chosen.

In fact, generally, Mr Brown was very robust about his future defence policy in his Mansion House speech last night, declaring that he would be, “Strong in defence in fighting terrorism, upholding Nato, supporting our armed forces at home and abroad, and retaining our independent nuclear deterrent." For all the world he sounded just like Liam Fox, complete with exactly the same commitment to Nato – thus, ostensibly kicking European defence integration into touch.

British warheads for the missiles - but French explosives[i-British warheads for the missiles - but French explosives]But, Brown's declaration will also renew the argument about whether the deterrent is truly independent, not least because the missiles will be made by the US – probably Lockheed Missiles and Systems - and we will be beholden to the US for the supply and then the ongoing maintenance.

As before though, we will be making the warheads – which gives us the notional indpendence, except for one very important difference. As we recorded in November last year, the last remaining military explosives factory in the UK is being closed down, and the production transferred to France.

Included in that transfer is the vital and very special technology for making the conventional explosives which are required to trigger a nuclear bomb, without which we will have no deterrent at all.

If Mr Brown wants his "independent" nuclear deterrent, therefore, he had better not be too robust about his support for Nato. Au contraire, he will need to be very, very nice to the French - or he won't get his bombs. I wonder if anyone has bothered to tell him this?

COMMENT THREAD

How Tory Diary sees it[i-How Tory Diary sees it]It is just the way it stacks up. Liam Fox, the shadow secretary of state for defence gave a speech on the "Europeanisation of Defence" at the Centre for Policy Studies last night and, although it unbalances the blog somewhat – with rather a heavy concentration on defence issues recently – this is something which we cannot ignore.

The Tory Boy Blog got to it first with its own commentary and the view seems to be that it was "a thoughtful and well-balanced speech". For my own part, I have to disagree with the blog author. Much as I would very much like to see a coherent defence policy from the Conservatives, I found Fox's speech horribly superficial, demonstrating an almost complete lack of understanding of the core issues and strategic developments. As a result, it lacked clear (or any) substantive conclusions or direction.

The man starts well enough, pointing out that there are three distinct problems we must consider in relation to European defence co-operation: defence expenditure, foreign policy and democratic accountability.

The first, inevitably, is a given – in that our defence capabilities and therefore policy in general are inevitably determined by what we are prepared to pay, or are capable of paying. As to foreign policy, Fox rightly says, "Defence policy follows foreign policy...". From thereon, however, it is all downhill.

The problem is that Fox does not even begin to define our foreign policy interests, where they have a defence interface, which is probably why he ends up with a curiously flat speech, so lacking in substance.

Arguably, in the context of limited funding, the central issue is that we are pursuing two fundamentally incompatible defence strategies in pursuit of two entirely different foreign policy objectives. The first is supporting the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, prosecuting the "war on terror". The second is the building up an air-portable expeditionary force, primarily to fulfil our commitment to the EU's European Rapid Reaction Force – although this force is "double hatted" and can be used for Nato tasks or with ad hoc multinational alliances.

Failing to make that distinction, Fox blathered on about the European Defence Agency, Nato co-operation and sundry other matters, but what he really did not address was that the shoe is already pinching badly. The problem is that force structures, equipment and tactics required for each of our two objectives are fundamentally different. Given our current defence budget – which Fox shows no inclination to increase – we simply cannot do both simultaneously and well.

This is coming over with increasing clarity from the situation in Iraq. As the experience of Viet Nam adequately demonstrates, once the flow of body bags reaches a certain level, deployment of troops on extended foreign campaigns becomes politically unsustainable, even if the military objectives are achievable. Thus, the political need is for a heavy investment in force protection, to keep down casualties to a tolerable level.

Not only did Fox fail to address that issue, he failed also to acknowledge that the bulk of our procurement funds are already being devoted to fulfilling our commitment to the European/Nato Rapid Reaction Force, which means that the finance is not available properly to equip our forces in existing theatres.

Thus, his central argument that "Nato remains the cornerstone of our defence" is actually irrelevant or, at least, downstream. Both the EU and Nato are competing over the same strategic vision – air-mobile expeditionary forces, able to respond at short notice to crises but equipped only for short-term deployment.

Fox, it seems, want to argue that the force should be dedicated to Nato rather than the EU, but the current demand is for forces equipped and structured for the counter-insurgency role. In layman's terms, I suppose the difference is that, in expeditionary warfare, we move in to beat up the natives while, in counter-insurgency, we stay still and they beat us up. In the latter, the emphasis needs to be on heavy armour for force protection, with forces engaged in long-term action which might extend to decades. In this, the question of EU or Nato does not really arise. The more urgent question is whether we go for "counter-insurgency" or an "expeditionary force". Only if we chose the latter does the EU-Nato issue really become central.

As it stands, in trying to satisfy all demands – which is what Blair is attempting to do - we potentially end up with a dangerously inadequate expeditionary force – whether it is tasked to the EU's ERRF or to Nato - while our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are undermanned and ill-equipped, because we are devoting so much funding to building up the rapid reaction capability.

We are at risk, therefore, of performing all tasks badly and, in the context of our unwillingness to increase defence spending, the crucial issue must be where we put our resource. That is where the debate should lie, and one which Fox completely ignored (or missed). And, despite the indifference and the ignorance of the media, it is a debate which must eventually dominate.

COMMENT THREAD

EPP%202[i-EPP%202]It really is extraordinary the extent to which The Daily Telegraph, prop. Daniel Hannan, Esq, is pursuing the EPP agenda, even to the extent of devoting the main leader to the strident call: “Cameron must keep his pledge to leave the EPP”.

The decision, we are told, is David Cameron's “most important of his leadership so far”, not least because his commitment to leave was the one promise he made before being elected leader. “If he fails to fulfil it,” says the leader writer, a.k.a Daniel Hannan, “he will confirm Labour's smear - that he is a flip-flopping lightweight without firm principles - and irreparably damage the electorate's growing sense that here, at last, is a different sort of politician.”

Reading between the lines though, there is a different story. The self-proclaimed Eurosceptic Hannan, in a move that represented a triumph of hope over experience, pitched his weight behind the “flip-flopping lightweight” David Cameron during the Tory leadership election, on the promise of leaving the EPP – given in haste by the Boy King when he saw that Liam Fox might erode his lead.

Now, as we see, the chances of this actually happening are receding by the day, the young Hannan has large dollops of egg smeared all over his face, having not only supported the Boy King but actively campaigned for fellow Eurosceptics to join the band wagon.

In fact, leaving the EPP group mid-parliamentary term was always going to be difficult, as the groups are set up at the beginning of the term and, once settled, MEPs are always reluctant to change. The right time was immediately after the Euro-elections, but that opportunity was lost, making William Hague’s task an uphill slog, even without the active resistance of the leader of the Conservative Group in the EU parliament, Timothy Kirkhope.

In fact, prior to the elections, the deal had all but been done and it was the failure of the Tories to deliver then – not a little due to the actions of the Boy King himself – that soured many of the potential members from the accession countries.

The idea, as we have written before, was to set up an alternative right-wing group, one that would be free-market, eurosceptic, atlanticist, the EPP being none of these things but part of the European project, as Hannan’s article points out. With the influx of supposedly like-minded East European MEPs this seemed an extremely good idea. But it was not to be. All that is now past history and the groups, if not carved in stone are, at the very least, set in hard to shift clay.

In any case, is there really any point to this agonizing (beyond fulfilling the one and only promise the Boy King had made during his election campaign and saving the career of one or two eurosceptic MEPs)?

The leader in the Telegraph gets almost apocalyptic. Leaving the EPP, it explains, will change the entire politics of the European Parliament:

“Indeed, the effect of establishing a new group would be to create, for the first time, a real opposition in the European Parliament - for every current major group, including the EPP, is formally committed to the integrationist project.”

logoINDDEM[i-logoINDDEM]There is, as it happens, a group in the European Parliament, the Independence/ Democracy Group, which is, roughly speaking, in opposition to the European project or as much as any group can be within the Toy Parliament. Surely the writer of the leader must know that the way in which the Toy Parliament and, indeed, the whole EU legislative process functions prevents any form of genuine opposition at any time.

A new grouping, the article goes on, would solve many of the problems Europe (and the European Union) face:

“All over Europe, voters are crying out, not for ever-closer union, but for a Europe of independent states, trading and co-operating on the basis of national sovereignty. Britain's Conservatives are the largest party in the European Parliament to hold this sentiment. They could lead the reform of Europe - but they cannot do so from within the EPP.”

The idea that Britain’s Conservatives hold a consistent sentiment about the EU or European developments from one day to the next is laughable. Most of the MEPs, as it happens, are happily federalist.

In any case, exactly how would a new grouping in the European Parliament achieve that “Europe of independent states, trading and co-operating on the basis of national sovereignty”? Does Mr Hannan have any practical ideas on the subject or will it happen about the same time as Mr Hague reforms of the Treaty of Rome?

[This is a joint posting by the two editors of EUReferendum.]

COMMENT THREAD

I have a cunning plan...[i-I have a cunning plan...]Despite having done our best to ignore the tedious ins and outs of the Boy King’s attempts to withdraw his troops from the EU parliament's Eurofederalist shock troops, the EPP group, the issue has climbed so far up the Westminster village agenda that we can no longer maintain our lofty silence.

The latest development in the saga in recounted in more detail than any normal person could possibly want in today's Telegraph, precipitated by a piece in the Sunday, essentially dumping the blame on William Hague for taking so long in dragging the Tory MEPs – some kicking and screaming – into the new dawn of a Eurorealist group.

But that was yesterday and today, as usual, it is a different story. The Boy King isn't about to sack his foreign affairs spokesman. Young William has been doing a splendid job, no one is at loggerheads and the idea that there is some sort of fall-out "is complete nonsense".

Not of course that we are any closer to the Tories actually leaving the EPP but, according to party chairman Francis Maude, the Boy King remains "committed to delivering on his pledge" and young William is committed to making a statement about this "some time, he hopes, before the end of July."

So that's alright then.

Meanwhile, there is the strange case of the Sunday Telegraph leader which told us yesterday that “the big story is being missed,” although it should look to its own laurels before casting aspersions.

Anyhow, the "big story" we are apparently missing is that David Cameron "is being truly revolutionary". He has one of those Baldrick-type "cunning plans" to give the EU something it has never had before: an Official Opposition. So said the Sunday Telegraph yesterday, although we rather think it would be a good idea if we had an official opposition in Westminster.

Anyhow, it looks like us thickos haven't realised quite what a genius the Boy King really is. It was entirely wrong of us to think that he only made the commitment because he wanted the Tory Eurosceptics on-side and thought Liam Fox might steal a march on him, and then sent young William blundering into a situation where he was comprehensively outmanoeuvred by the Europhile MEPs.

Nevertheless, us thickos are still having a little trouble working out how, as Booker wrote in his column yesterday, the Boy squares his Eurosceptic credentials with dumping the fishing policy.

Since this now means that his conversion to supporting the CFP in principle means that the Conservative Party must now be committed to defending that central plank of the CFP, the "Third World fisheries agreements" which are creating such havoc down the west coast of Africa, we also wonder how his MPs can explain how they will persuade Brussels and Spain to abandon what has now become as integral to the CFP as the disastrous quota system which forces fishermen every year to discard hundreds of millions of tons of dead fish back into the sea.

"Modern", it may be, writes Booker. "Compassionate" it is not. But then, us thickos may have got that wrong as well. For all we know, the Boy King has a cunning plan on that as well.

COMMENT THREAD

blairbush[i-blairbush]In a surprise move following the Bush-Blair summit yesterday, president Bush has agreed to agreed to step up Britain's access to sensitive technology in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. "Both governments agree that the UK will have the ability to successfully operate, upgrade, employ, and maintain the Joint Strike Fighter such that the UK retains operational sovereignty over the aircraft," the official statement read.

Conveyed by Reuters, via DefenseNews, The Times, Financial Times and others, this now makes it very difficult for the UK to dump the aircraft and buy alternatives for the UK's "super-carrier" programme.

This is against the background of UK manoeuvring and heavy spin, with the government cosying up to the French and even agreeing to consider the Rafale, following the Pentagon's attempt to cancel the second JSF engine, in which Rolls Royce have a forty percent stake.

Now that the second engine programme looks set to continue, the indications are that Bush has been listening to heavy lobbying from voices such as Liam Fox and The Heritage Foundation.

jsf%20sunset.bmp[i-jsf%20sunset.bmp]Bush has certainly been counselled that it would be politic to make a gesture towards Blair at this critical juncture in the Iraq venture and has been warned that refusal to allow the British access to JSF technology would strengthen the drive towards European defence integration that is already a well advanced feature of British defence policy.

In yesterday's statement, therefore, reference was made to the need to enhance US-British military cooperation, with both Bush and Blair stating that the two countries must "strengthen and deepen the relationship between their defence establishments, achieve fully interoperable forces and leverage the strength of their industries."

Interestingly, that very issue was raised this week in the House of Lords during a starred question by the Lord Hoyle on the JSF. The Lord Pearson of Rannoch asked:

My Lords, would it not be understandable for the Pentagon to be nervous of sharing stealth and other sophisticated technology with us, if it feared that we, under our EU commitments, might have to share it with the French and, through them, more widely? If that is so, does it not mean that the special relationship is pretty well over?

Defence procurement minister, Lord Drayson, predictably, dismissed the idea, stating that there was "absolutely no requirement on us, under British law or any EU treaty, to share technology related to this or any other defence-related project," a somewhat disingenuous answer given the 2000 "Framework Agreement" and Britain's commitment to the European Defence Agency (EDA) - to say nothing of last week's procurement agreement, about which The Business tomorrow will have some comment.

Thus, although the JSF contract is something of a litmus test in the progression of British integration into the European defence camp, the existence of the Framework Agreement, the EDA and other developments – all on the back of the Helsinki European Council of 1999 (when the European Raid Reaction Force was agreed) - demonstrate that nothing fundamental has changed.

Although the US rightly fears that technology passed to the UK will find its way to our gallant European "allies", the risk appears to have been judged worth taking – but it has the hallmarks of a temporary political expedient, calling the bluff of the "Europe firsters" in the British defence establishment who have been trying to engineer the cancellation of the JSF.

In many respects though, this is too little, too late. While it is currently "cutting edge" technology, the JSF is, in a sense, yesterday's project. Procurement decisions are made for ten and twenty years hence and the thinking is focused on unmanned aircraft.

Neuron%20test[i-Neuron%20test]Already, the UK has abandoned any plans to develop a new generation of manned aircraft, but has also pulled out of the partnership with the United States on the development of advanced UAVs in a programme known as FOAS.

On the other hand, the French-led programme, code-named "Neuron" is powering ahead. Although the MoD is being very reticent about publicly declaring an interest, if the UK does opt-in to this multi-national programme, continued British participation in the JSF programme will prove to be nothing more than a temporary setback for the promoters of European integration.

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